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1. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Ilya T. Kasavin, Vladimir N. Porus Илья Теодорович Касавин
Contemporary Epistemology and Its Critics: on Crisis and Perspectives
Современная эпистемология и ее критики: о кризисах и перспективах

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The article considers the basic arguments of some “critics of epistemology”, according to which the philosophical analysis of the problems associated with the processes of cognition (including science) should be eventually replaced by the study of these problems by means of special cognitive sciences. It is shown that these arguments are in part incorrect and in part can be seen as an indication of the real difficulties in the modern philosophy of cognition. A future philosophical epistemology is associated with the reform of its conceptual apparatus, the methodological arsenal and problem field. An interaction between epistemology and the sciences dealing with cognition is the only and necessary way of development for philosophical epistemology. There are two ways of such interaction. Firstly, there is an analysis of scientific discussions, on the basis of which one identifies new opportunities to overcome the well-known philosophical controversies (between rationalism and empiricism, realism and constructivism, fundamentalism and relativism, etc.). On this way, epistemology moves into a position of horizontal moderation of interdisciplinary discourse and creates a trading (Harry Collins). Secondly, epistemology provides a rational criticism of the foundations of special sciences, and selects semantic levels in the content of its own categories (truth, rationality, agent, object, etc.) referring to different cognitive practices. These practices are evaluated normatively in terms of a value perspective of modern culture. Both ways are complementary to each other.
panel discussion
2. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Oleg A. Domanov Олег Анатольевич Доманов
Type Theory in the Semantics of Propositional Attitudes
Теория типов в семантике пропозициональных установок

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The article deals with an approach to the analysis of propositional attitudes based on the type-theoretical semantics proposed by A. Ranta and originating from the type theory of P. Martin-Löf. Type-theoretical semantics contains the notion of context and tools of extracting information from it in an explicit form. This allows us to correctly formalize the dependence on contexts typical of propositional attitudes. In the article the context is presented as a dependent sum type (Record type in the proof assistant Coq). Ranta’s approach is refined and applied to the analysis of Quine’s phrase “Ralph believes that someone is a spy”. Three variants of formalization for this phrase are described which differ in the content of contextual knowledge and the way the truth values of the phrase are derived. Contexts are connected through the function of conversion, making it possible to relate truth values. As a result, it is shown that the instruments for working with contexts provided by type-theoretical semantics allow us to avoid the problem of opacity described by Quine. Provided formalization along with proofs is coded in Coq and made freely available.
3. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Daniel B. Tiskin Даниил Борисович Тискин
New Machinery, Olden Tasks?
На новой машине – старым путём?

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This reply to Oleg Domanov’s target paper is not concerned with the technicalities of the proposed approach. Rather, I discuss the fruitfulness of the underlying ideas in dealing with Quine’s famous “double vision” scenario, for which the approach is designed. I point out some key ingredients of Domanov’s proposal: (a) context dependence of propositional attitude ascription (and ascribability); (b) replacement of individuals with finer-grained entities for reference and quantification, such as Kaplan’s “vivid names”, Frege and Yalcin’s senses or Percus and Sauerland’s concept generators; and (c) using the apparatus of cross-identification functions. I show that those ingredients were already present in a body of work preceding the target paper. On the other hand, there are known problems related to the fact that sometimes the choice of the pertinent mode of presentation depends on the choices associated with quantifiers higher in the syntactic tree. No account based on manipulations with the global context, such as Domanov’s in its current form, can handle them.
4. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Andrei V. Rodin Андрей Вячеславович Родин
Martin-Löf Type Theory as a Multi-Agent Epistemic Formal System
Теория типов Мартина-Лёфа как мультиагентная формальная эпистемическая система

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Ranta’s view that all substitutions of variables between MLTT contexts in some sense “extend” these contexts, so the MLTT contexts always form a partial order, is not justified. It is well known that the category of MLTT contexts is, generally, locally Cartesian closed but not necessarily a poset. Thus, Domanov’s reading of such general substitutions as mutual interpretations between contexts, which represent their corresponding epistemic agents, is more adequate. The formal analysis offered by Domanov can be improved if this latter viewpoint is developed more systematically than the author does it in his paper.
5. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Lev D. Lamberov Лев Дмитриевич Ламберов
New Analytic Philosophy: A Comment on Oleg A. Domanov’s Paper
Новая аналитическая философия: комментарий к статье О.А. Доманова

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The present paper is a commentary on O.A. Domanov’s paper devoted to the use of modern type theory in the analysis of quantification in opaque contexts (e. g., propositional attitudes and believe reports). The article briefly mentions several recent attempts to use type theory to solve a number of philosophical problems. The paper suggests that the use of modern type theory, which has a number of significant advantages over classical logic and set theory, is a very promising direction in the development of philosophical problems in the spirit of analytic philosophy. In addition, the paper indicates a number of questions on which it would be desired to receive a clarification from the author of the paper being commented.
6. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Ivan B. Mikirtumov Иван Борисович Микиртумов
Type Theoretical Grammar, Intensional Entities and Epistemic Attitudes
Теоретико-типовая грамматика, интенсионалы и эпистемические установки

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In the article, I discuss some ideas of the type theoretical grammar of Aarne Ranta and the analysis of the problem of Quine (Ralph and Ortcutt), which Oleg Domanov implemented by means of this theory. There are more similarities than differences in TT grammar with well-known ideas, including “fine grinding” of meanings, counterparts, procedural understanding of – intensions. The main problem, which, in my opinion, exists in the TT grammar, consists in understanding how another agent’s epistemic attitudes can be justified for me. Ranta proceeds from the metaphor of the agent as a calculator, which for the general case is unacceptable. I believe that the interpretation of the epistemic attitudes of another agent must be externalistic, that is, referring not to the agent’s worlds, but to his actions in the actual world: “agent X believes that A” is true when the interpreter sees the behavior of the agent in situations that the interpreter would consider adequate for himself if he believed A and would be “in place” of X. To formalize here, it would take complicated tools which are used for describing actions. I’ve come to the conclusion that an understanding of the type in TT grammar makes it intensional in some extended sense, since the working with the naming relation is already an element of a specific pragmatics.
7. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Evgeny V. Borisov Евгений Васильевич Борисов
Quine’s Problem is Coming Back
Проблема Куайна возвращается

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In ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’ (1956), Quine demonstrated that the naïve model-theoretic formalization of belief ascriptions de re, applied to cases of recognition failure, produces two unwelcome effects: 1) the seeming inconsistency of belief systems ascribed to rational agents, and 2) the contradictoriness of some (apparently well justified) belief reports. In the paper under discussion, Domanov claims that proof-theoretical formalization of belief ascriptions, based on the constructive type theory, precludes those effects. I challenge this claim by showing that the formalism used by him reproduces at least the first of them. I suggest that this is so because of the identifying of variables from different contexts in Domanov’s definition of context extension functions.
8. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Oleg A. Domanov Олег Анатольевич Доманов
Remarks on the Type Theory in the Semantics of Propositional Attitudes
Замечания о теории типов в семантике пропозициональных установок

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The article contains concise comments on issues addressed in responses to the article “Type theory in the semantics of propositional attitudes”. I agree that the opening paper suggests no new solutions for problems of propositional attitudes. It aims at developing a method of their more convenient and effective description. Type theory is more expressive in comparison with many traditional approaches. I also agree that the connection between this approach and operations of epistemic subject needs further clarification. However, this disadvantage belongs not to Martin-Löf’s theory itself but to the approach chosen by me. As regards to the intuitinism of type theory, it does not need to be intuitionistic in its logic, but for semantics it is important for it to preserve the constructivist character. Relations between type theory and intensional logic also call for clarification. It seems that it is rather closer to situation semantics. The criticism by E. Borisov and A. Rodin reveals problems of the concept of the context relation function. The chief result of the discussion is the awarenness that means similar to conterpart relations are more appropriate here than this function.
language and mind
9. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Garris S. Rogonyan Гаррис Сергеевич Рогонян
Davidson on Truth, Norms, and Dispositions
Дэвидсон об истине, нормах и диспозициях

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Normative dualism between descriptions of the mental and the physical is still a problem for many philosophers that provokes more and more attempts to justify it, or, on the contrary, to overcome it by means of reduction. The problem of a special normative status of mental states is usually considered in isolation from the concept of truth. Moreover, the definition of truth is often construed only as a part of the problem of normativity: in this case, truth is only a kind of norm, for example, a goal of scientific research. Donald Davidson, however, believed that truth is not the norm and that, on the contrary, norms are possible only through the use of the primitive and original concept of truth already available to us. In this paper, we propose that if one develops an idea of such a conceptual dependence between truth and norms in a certain way, then it will become possible to solve the problem of a normative gap between our descriptions of the mental and the physical. In other words, if the assimilation of the concept of truth precedes the learning of norms pertaining to the mental and the physical, then the solution for the problem of the gap between these norms can be directly related to conditions and differences in the use of the notion of truth.
epistemology and cognition
10. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Amanda Machin Аманда Мэчин
Bodies of Knowledge and Knowledge of Bodies: “We Can Know More than We Can Tell”
Тела знания и знание тел

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Classic epistemological accounts, as far back as Plato, have regarded knowledge as essentially disembodied. Bodies are seen as either distracting objects or passive instruments of knowledge. In this paper I attend to the knowledge of human bodies. Using insights from Michael Polanyi and feminist epistemology, I not only argue that bodies have a tacit and habitual knowledge of their own, but I also challenge the idea that scientific knowledge is itself separable from the bodies of scientists. I focus upon the arena of environmental governance, an arena in which scholars have already challenged the dominance of scientific knowledge over other forms of knowledge. I aim to extend this challenge, by highlighting the bodily knowledge that is relevant in environmental science and policy. I do not query the value of the knowledge of scientific experts, but I show that this knowledge is always embodied. I consider, first, critiques that challenge the assumption that scientific knowledge is universally applicable and demand the inclusion of different type of knowledge in environmental governance. Second, I argue that not only local, but also bodily knowledge is relevant in detecting, understanding and responding to environmental concerns and implementing, resisting and extending policy. Third, using Polanyi I show that science itself is entangled with bodily knowledge. Finally, I suggest that far from undermining the value of scientific knowledge, acknowledging its corporeality may allow a reassessment of the role and responsibilities of scientists. Polanyi’s ideas lead him to defend the authority of “the body of scientists”. In contrast, I argue that his ideas rather compel an on-going critical attentiveness to the constitution of this body. The aim of the paper is to underline is the omission of the body from prevailing epistemological discussions, and to show that bodies are tricky objects, critical subjects and situated agents of knowledge.
11. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Gala V. Maksudova-Eliseeva Гала Валерьевна Максудова-Елисеева
Between Psychologism and Logicism: from Wilhelm Wundt to Logical Investigations of Autism
Между психологизмом и логицизмом: от Вильгельма Вундта к логическим исследованиям аутизма

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Due to some recent researches the problem of the reciprocity of logic and psychology got back into the philosophy of logic. Logicians and psychologists reconsider the relations between the logical laws and the human reasoning and deny the idea expressed by antipsychologists that exploration of the human reasoning is non-informative for logical theory. In the course of the controversy over psychologism at the turn of the XXth century some thinkers claimed that these disciplines were strongly connected. Some current researchers united under the name “Neopsychologism”. The article covers the problem of the reciprocity between logic and psychology in terms of Wilhelm Wundt’s theory and the Keith Stenning and Michiel van Lambalgen’s case research of reasoning peculiar to children with autism. Wundt was not a typical psychologist. He argued that the laws of logic and the laws of thought should be strongly separated. His idea of the correlation between the thought process and the other cognitive functions is “heuretic” as well. Despite that – or thanks to that – his theory is prolific. Its analysis and comparison with the recent logical researches show the difference between the classical psychologism and the neopsychologism. The article also reveals which of Wundt’s ideas are still important for philosophy of logic and psychology today.
12. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Alexey Yu. Rakhmanin Юрье­вич Рахманин Алексей
Norman Malcolm on the Ontological Argument: Ordinary Language, Common Sense, and Philosophical Analysis
Норман Малкольм об онтологическом аргументе: философский анализ, обыденный язык и здравый смысл

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The paper discusses Norman Malcolm’s interpretation of Anselm’s ontological argument. Since Malcolm had shown no interest in religious or theological issues prior to publishing his article on that subject in 1960, the analysis takes clue from Malcolm’s earlier writings. By doing so, I revisit the assessment of the ontological argument as fallacious and the tendency to assess Anselm from the traditional framework initiated by Kant. As I demonstrate, Malcolm interpreted Anselm based on the method elaborated during the 1950s. That method involved a synthesis between ordinary language philosophy and common sense philosophy, associated with the late Wittgenstein and Moore respectively. As I further argue, the usual objections to Malcolm’s approach ignore the main line of his reasoning: that Anselm’s ontological argument does not violate ordinary language. Indeed, the two concepts of God as “the greatest of all beings” and of the necessity of God’s existence both perfectly fit in how language works. The “God-talk” is therefore logical only in accordance with Malcoms definition of logical: an explication of the rules of ordinary language, whereas each and every argument against Anselm’s ontological proof violates ordinary language drastically. In his late works on the subject, Malcolm suggested that multiple proofs of God’s existence should be viewed as expressions of a specific philosophic pathology whose underlying drive is a justification of various forms of life. Instead of regarding this idea as “fideistic” (e.g., in K. Nielsen’s work), I propose that the very concept of ordinary language, as Malcolm developed it, makes a treatment of language games along the lines of dependence or independence obsolete. Rather, a crucial issue that Malcolm pushes to investigate is how religious statements correlate with ordinary language.
13. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Nadezhda A. Kasavina Надежда Алексан­дровна Касавина
Man and Technology: Ambivalence of Digital Culture
Человек и техника

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The article interprets the position of the human being in a new technical space – electronic culture; provides an understanding of its social, psychological and existential risks and possibilities. The author traces versatility in the process of personal adaptation to the new forms of communication, sociality and the life space. The positive impact of electronic mode of culture follows from the expansion of the cognitive horizon, access to information, to various kinds of communication, creativity, self-presentation, recreation, the education choice and flexibility of employment. The negative influence is due to the absorbing the personality by technology, the crisis of traditional cultural values, which are threatened by the rhythm of social life and information noise of modern society. The author interprets these challenges through the problem of self-identification and the phenomenon of Internet addiction. The human issues in the context of electronic culture becomes the subject matter in the various areas of philosophical and scientific research, such as analysis and search forms of human adaptation to digital reality, humanizing the process of digitalization, cognitive ecology of the Internet, the creation of artificial intelligence, the humanitarian expertise of digital technologies.
14. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Petr S. Kusliy, Ekaterina V. Vostrikova Петр Сергеевич Куслий
Scientific Rationality in Social Context: Conceptual and Practical Issues
Научная рациональность в социальном контексте

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In this overview article, we explore a number of trends in the rational philosophy of science that have been developed in reaction to the development of the relativist program of social constructivism. These trends are also known as isolationism, reconciliationism, and integrationism. According to the isolationist view, the core of science is immune to the influence of social factors and the scientific enterprise retains its autonomy. The proponents of this view point out the shortcomings and internal inconsistencies inside the constructivist argumentation and dismiss their arguments on those grounds. Reconciliationists agree that social factors can influence the process of decision making in individuals and they accept the idea that decisions in science are not bused exclusively on rational arguments. The core of science, however, still remains intact, from the reconsiliationist perspective. Integrationists tend to redefine science by including the “extra-scientific” agenda into discussions of science. Still, they do not reduce science to “non-scientific” phenomena. Having built this perspective, we then move on to the discussion the practical issues that arise in the process of bringing the scientific agenda closer to the needs of society. This process has been treated as crucial in helping societies to get the most out of science, given the significant gap that exists today between the rationalistic ideal of pure science and the complicated and socially dependent nature of scientific institutions. The latter very often suffer from the impact of extra-scientific values. Yet, we also present work suggesting that such values can be beneficial. We end our discussion with concrete suggestions of democratization of science that have recently been proposed in the literature on philosophy of science.
case-studies – science studies
15. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Vladislav A. Shaposhnikov Владислав Алексеевич Шапошников
Distributed Cognition and Mathematical Practice in the Digital Society: from Formalized Proofs to Revisited Foundations
Распределенное познание и математическая практика в цифровом обществе: от формализации доказательств к пересмотру оснований

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This paper attempts to look at the contemporary mathematical practice through the lenses of the distributed cognition approach. The ubiquitous use of personal computers and the internet as a key attribute of the digital society is interpreted here as a means to achieve a more effective distribution of the human cognitive activity. The major challenge that determines the transformation of mathematical practice is identified as ‘the problem of complexity’. The computer-assisted complete formalization of mathematical proofs as a current tendency is viewed as one of the strands along which the mathematical community responds to the challenge. It is shown that this tendency gives live to the project calling to revisit and rebuild the very foundations of mathematics to secure more effective communication and thus guarantee the reliability of contemporary mathematics.
16. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Alexander Yu. Antonovski, Raisa E. Barash Александр Юрьевич Антоновский
Max Weber on Science: Reception and Perspectives
О науке Макса Вебера: рецепция и современность

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The article is devoted to social problems of modern science (as it were interpreted Max Weber) considered in the context of the system-communicative approach by N. Luhmann. In contrast to the modern work of art, the modern science, as M. Weber believes, is associated with the fundamental unattainability of “true being”, and, as a result, with the transitory character of any scientific achievement. The specialty of modern science, as Weber noted, is determinated, on the one hand by its self-understanding, due to the “peculiarity of the current moment”, and, on the other, by its transformation into a kind of blind spot of scientific observation. As a result, Weber formulated the main problem of the meaning of modern science: he wondered why any scientist needs a science under (1) external alienation and (2) inaccessibility of a scientific object? Moreover, the category of truth not just acquires its special value, but also sets a special meaning to the purpose of scientific communication, that becomes an object but not a property of scientific search. The main content of the article is the study of the Weberian concepts of the external (science as a profession) and internal (science as vocation) social factors of modern science as they were interpreted by E. von Kahler, G. Rickert, M. Scheller, K. Loewit. The authors discuss their attempts to modernize the fundamental Weberian distinction of truth/value as a principle of inclusion in the scientific community, that was formulated as a response to the “Weber’s challenge”. The authors argue that von Kahler criticized the Weberian concept for the incompatibility of the spatial and temporal discreteness of science within the “organic understanding” of the unity of the world. At the same time Scheler and Rickert payed special attention to the problem of subject specification of science. K. Levit discussed the possibility of Weber’s substitution of objectivity as a key distinction of modern knowledge with some opposite attribute. In the final part, the authors summarize the inconsistency of predictions about the further internal differentiation of scientific disciplines and the rejection of research motive for “genuine being”.
interdisciplinary studies
17. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Igor S. Dmitriev Игорь Сергеевич Дмитриев
“Tempus Spargendi Lapides”: The Fuzzy Structure of Scientific Revolutions
“Tempus Spargendi Lapides”

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The article formulates some aspects concerning the nature and structure of scientific revolutions. As a reference example, the scientific (more precisely, natural-philosophical) revolution of the 16th-17th centuries (SR1) was taken, which in turn became part of the intellectual revolution of the Early Modern period. It is shown that SR1 is not at all monodirectional and not predetermined in its milestones process, when the break with the Aristotelian tradition automatically cleared the way to the new science and philosophy. In reality, there was an intellectual war, the outcome of which was by no means known to any of the opposing sides in advance. In the article eight factors are noted that contributed to the SR1: 1) weakening ideological control on the part of the Church; 2) chaotization and fragmentation of intellectual space; 3) the redundancy of the intellectual resource for the emergence of innovative theories and practices; 4) the presence of intellectual reserve (the legacy of classical Antiquity and the Hellenistic era, as well as the scholastic method); 5) the flow of new information not embedded in traditional world picture and practices; 6) weakening the requirements for the validity of the hypotheses put forward and the rigor of reasoning, declining (delution) the rationality of cognitive activity and behavior; 7) local breakthrough (as seed impulse) in one of the areas of knowledge (heliocentric theory); 8) the possibility of developments a nd tendencies of the proper natural-philosophical revolution to develop in the tideway (in a shell) of innovative concepts, methodologies and practices that have arisen in unscientific spheres (culture, politics, economics, theology, etc.).
18. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Vitaly V. Ogleznev, Valeriy A. Surovtsev Виталий Васильевич Оглезнев
Friedrich Waismann on the Many-Level-Structure of Language and Problems of Reductionism
Фридрих Вайсман о многоуровневой структуре языка и проблемах редукционизма

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The article presents the philosophical and linguistic conception of Friedrich Waismann – the theory of many-level-structure of language. The key point of this theory is that each language stratum has its own logic: different concepts of truth, the methods of verifiability and the completeness of description are used in different strata. All this has an influence on the structure of logic itself. This approach suggests that all homogeneous statements (identical in a logical sense) are grouped in one stratum. The relations between the different strata are of a most complicated, peculiar and elusive nature and that does not allow to reduce statement of one stratum to another. According to Waismann, these considerations lead to a new picture of the language, naturally divided into strata.
19. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Friedrich Waismann Вайсман Фридрих
The Many-Level-Structure of Language
Многоуровневая структура языка

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The author attempts to sketch a new picture of language: language is stratified into layers, each layer having a logic of its own and being separated from the others by gaps over which one may jump but which cannot be bridged by logical processes. Philosophers try to bridge the gaps and become entangled in pseudo-problems. Law statements exemplify one stratum, thing statements another, sense-datum statements another, ethical statements another, and so on. The different subject-matters are to be characterized by reference to the different strata, rather than conversely; a sense impression is something that is describable in a language of such-and-such structure; a material object is something which can be described in such-and-such language; and so on. A consequence of the theory is said to be that logic loses its universal validity: logic can only be applied to statements that are homogeneous. However, relations between the layers do claim the attention of the logician.
book reviews
20. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Sergii G. Secundant Сергей Григорьевич Секундант
The Unity of Philosophy and Science: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
Единство философии и науки: Лейбниц

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This paper submits the state-of-the-art review of the collection of remote articles of Hans Poser, the largest expert on philosophy Leibniz who has devoted to studying of his philosophy more half a century. Specifics of his position, as interpreter of philosophy of Leibniz, the author of this review sees in Poser’s justification of the fundamental character of Leibniz’s doctrine about modalities, signs and language. Underlining of reflexive and system forming character of modal concepts in the Leibniz’s philosophy and also relevance of his doctrine about modal concepts both for modern modal logic, and for the modern theory of the proof and metamathematics is the central point of interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy by H. Poser. Concerning a question of the relation of science and metaphysics, H. Poser speaks out in defense of metaphysics, pointing to impossibility of the solution of many problems without the appeal to metaphysics.24 articles presented in this collection give a complete look about all parties of many-sided thinking of Leibniz. The collection presents some kind of encyclopedia of Leibniz’s philosophy in which all last achievements of the modern Leibniz Research are accumulated and are presented in such systematic order that the collection by right can be considered as the monography and to serve as the reference book for everyone who wants to gain a complete and competent view about Leibniz’s philosophy.