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1. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Przemysław Gut
Przemysław Gut
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
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The aim of this paper is to set out the following: firstly, the most important facts from Leibniz’s biography; secondly, the position of Leibniz’s philosophy within the philosophical thought of the 17th century; thirdly, the diverse ways to explicate Leibniz’s philosophical thought that are still in use in literature today; fourthly, basic features which define the general spirit as well as the methods ofLeibniz’s philosophizing.

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2. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Martyna Koszkało
Martyna Koszkało
Scholastyczne Źródła Traktatu Gottfryda Wilhelma Leibniza Disputatio Metaphysica Deprincipioindividui
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The object of this article is the scholastic inspirations found in the metaphysical disputation De principio individui by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The purpose ofthis study was, on one hand, a reconstruction of Leibniz’s theory concerning the principle of individuation, and on the other hand, a presentation of some texts by medieval scholastic authors (Henry of Ghent, Peter of Falco, Thomas Aquinas, Aegidius of Rome, Robert Kilwardby, William of Ockham) to whose ideas Leibniz refers in the named work, even though he had, for the most part, only second-hand information concerning them. In his juvenile treatise, Leibniz states that the individuating principle has to be universal, which means relevant to all kinds of being; it has to be metaphysical in character and not merely epistemological. He regards individuality as synonymous with unity combined with difference. He resolutely takes sides with nominalism and rejects the reality of all kinds of universal beings and beings whose unity is weaker than numerical unity. As a consequence of this assumption, he rejects the conceptions in which the principle of individuation is formed by: double negation, existence or the haecceity. By contrast, he embraces the solution (close to the tradition originated by Ockham and also related to Suarez), according to which the whole entity (tota entitas) of an individual thing is the principle of individuation. In effect, for Leibniz, any real thing is simply singular, which comes down to the thesis that a thing is singular owing to its own metaphysical subcomponents, which are singular by themselves.
3. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Krystyna Krauze-Błachowicz
Krystyna Krauze-Błachowicz
Analiza Treściowa „Dowodu Na Istnienie Boga” Zaproponowanego Przez Leibniza W 1666 Roku
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Leibniz’s juvenile work De arte combinatoria of 1666 included the “Proof for the Existence of God.” This proof bears a mathematical character and is constructed in line with Euclid’s pattern. I attempted to logically formalize it in 1982. In this text, on the basis of then analysis and the contents of the proof, I seek to show what concept of substance Leibniz used on behalf of the proof. Besides, Leibnizian conception of the whole and part as well as Leibniz’s definitional method have been reconstructed here.
4. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Marek Piwowarczyk
Marek Piwowarczyk
Leibnizjańska Koncepcja Vinculum Substantiale A Problem Substancji Złożonych
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This paper is devoted to the late Leibnizian doctrine of vinculum substantiale. In the first section I sketch the old problem of possibility of composite substances. This possibility is refuted on the ground of Monadism (presented in section two). However Leibniz’s correspondence with Des Bosses contains new thoughts concerning composite substances. A vinculum enters the stage as a real unifier, transforming aggregates of monads into genuine substances (section three). In the last section I give a systematic interpretation of a vinculum.I start with the thesis that every composed thing, which is not a pure plurality of objects, must have two structures: the whole-parts structure and the subject-properties structure. In the case of substances the latter is ontologically prior over the former. A vinculum is a subject-of-properties (accidents) determining such a way of composition which makes a compound entity a true substance. Since Leibniz still thought a vinculum unifies independent (existentially and with regard to activity) substances he was inclined to separate a vinculum from the integrated monads and finally conceived it as an additional relatively independent monad-like substance.
5. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Przemysław Gut
Przemysław Gut
Leibniz — Osobowa Identyczność I Tożsamość Substancji
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Leibniz’s theory of personal identity has been the object of numerous discussions and various interpretations. In the paper I contrast my view on Leibniz’s solution to the problem of personal identity with the view of Margaret Wilson and Samuel Scheffler. They both claimed that Leibniz failed to formulate a coherent, uniform and tenable theory of personal identity. His stance - as they state - contains so many inconsistencies that it cannot be adopted as a satisfactory solution to this problem. I disagree with this opinion. It is my conviction that a more inquisitive analysis of Leibniz’s texts leads to the conclusion that such severe criticism of the results of Leibniz’s studies of personal identity is ill-founded. My paper consists of two parts. In the first part— drawing on suggestions made by Vailati, Thiel, Noonan, and Bobro—I attempt to present the essential arguments against the interpretation offered by M. Wilson and S. Scheffler. In the second part I address two issues. First, I try to discuss the reasons which Leibniz listed to support his thesis that personal identity requires both the continuity of substance and the continuity of some psychological phenomena. Then, I turn to identifying Leibniz’s arguments which support the thesis that what ultimately provides a person with identity is their substantial principle, i.e. the soul or “I.”
6. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Bogusław Paź
Bogusław Paź
Zasada Racji W Interpretacji G.W. Leibniza
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The subject of this article is Leibnizian interpretation of the principle of reason. Although the German philosopher called it principium grande of his philosophy, we do not find its systematic exposition in Leibniz’s works. The main aim of my paper is to present a short exposition of the principle. The article consists of three parts: in the first I present systematic exposition of the principle of reason with particular emphasis on explication of terms “principle” and “reason,” in the second, I show the origins of the principle, finally, in the third part, I discuss in detail three forms of it: the principle of sufficient reason, the principle of determining reason and the principle of rendering reason. I accept two main theses: firstly, a proper interpretation of this principle requires taking into account the whole context of Leibnizian philosophy, i.e. one cannot limit oneself (as it is usually happens among researchers) to only one discipline, e.g. logic. Secondly, the ultimate methodological and heuristical foundation of the principle of reason is Leibnizian metaphysics, especially natural theology.
7. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Jerzy Kopania
Jerzy Kopania
Świat Najlepszy Z Możliwych A Chrześcijańska Teza O Skażeniu Świata
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Leibniz’s claim that we live is the best of all possible worlds is in contradiction with our experience, which is why we tend to maintain that the world would become better if at least some of its properties and characteristics were different. Leibniz criticized such an approach and argued that every attempt at changing the world would make it worse, or even impossible. His claim seems to be in contradiction with the Christian belief that our world is contaminated with sin, but it will be renewed in the end to become the reality of salvation, i.e. the best of all possible realities. This article puts forward two arguments: (1) Leibniz’s claim is not in contradiction with the Christian belief in salvation; (2) Leibniz’s claim is in contradiction with the human experience of the world because it is a result of an intellectual speculation based on the false assumption that the structure of the human mind adequately corresponds to the mind of God.
8. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Adam Grzeliński
Adam Grzeliński
Locke I Leibniz O Percepcji
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In his critique of the Lockean concept of perception as presented in Nouveaux essais, Leibniz reproaches Locke for neglecting the role of minute perceptions in experience and reducing all mental operations to the sphere of consciousness. However, the critique seems to be the result of the differences of their philosophical standpoints: Leibniz’s idealistic metaphysics, and Locke’s commonsensical empiricism rather than of the different understanding of perception itself. The descriptions of the process of perceiving provided by them seem to be surprisingly similar, whilst the difference between their stances is for the most part no more than terminological. The dispute is rooted in their different approaches to the role of psychological investigations, which for Locke are autonomous and quite independent from the claims of metaphysics.
9. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Aleksandra Horowska
Aleksandra Horowska
Iustitia ut caritas sapientis
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The purpose of this paper is an attempt to present and analyse one of the most intriguing and unique elements of Leibniz’s philosophy of right—the relationship between love (amor, dilectio, caritas) and justice (iustitia)—mainly based on selected excerpts from the Elementa Iuris Naturalis (1669-1671) and the preface to the Codex Iuris Gentium Diplomaticus (1693). The author presents the characteristics of this close connection (particularly noticeable in definitions of justice as habitus amandi omnes and caritas sapientis) and she tries to answer the question about the reasons for this relationship referring to the metaphysical assumptions and principles of Leibniz’s philosophy. With respect to the latter the author also explains significance of the connection between love and justice in Leibniz’s philosophy of right as a part of his whole philosophical system.
10. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Bogdan Lisiak
Bogdan Lisiak
Współpraca Naukowa Leibniza Z Adamem Kochańskim, S.J.
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The exchange of thoughts between Adam Kochański and Leibniz presented in this paper points to a very large spectrum of scientific interests shared by both scientists. The scope of their research included, above all, mathematics, philosophy, linguistics, the construction of a calculating device, a perpetuum mobile, other mechanics, and alchemy. Both men became close to each other through their passion for mathematics in which they searched for a universal method of scientific investigation, a method that would be of use not only in solving typically mathematical puzzles, but would also serve to solve problems in physics and other technical sciences. The ideas they exchanged, in particular those concerning the calculating machine, a perpetuum mobile and the universal cure, the panaceum, indicate a very special aspect of their scientific activity, namely their openness to the technical problems discussed in their time. Both Kochański and Leibniz regarded seriously the practical dimension of human life as it manifested itself in the technical problems that occupied the minds of their contemporaries. They both treated the scientific treatment of these problems as an important area of scientific and technical activity. Kochański, like Leibniz, firmly believed that science should be concerned with practical activity, the attitude captured by one of the principles of his philosophy, Theoria cum praxi. This principle, shared by both learned men, forms one of their principal philosophical ideas.Adam Kochański and Leibniz were scientists and philosophers living in a time of revolutionary changes in both European philosophy and science; they keenly appreciated the value of new currents in intellectual life, yet they did not lose sight of philosophical tradition, especially the tradition of Aristotelian philosophy, which they both regarded as an important vehicle of truth. Thus, in their style of doing philosophy and science, one finds certain peripatetic traits, for example the acceptance of the Aristotelian conception of philosophy as science.