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1. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Juan Adolfo Bonaccini

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In the present paper is analyzed the relationship between Kant's theses concerning unknowability and non-spatiotemporality of things in themselves. First of all, it is argued that even by taking for granted that the Unknowability Thesis does not contradict the Non-Spatiotemporality Thesis, because the former can be thought as a consequence of the latter, this is not enough to avoid another problem, namely, that the Non-Spatiotemporality Thesis is not sufficient to abolish the possibility of thinking consistently of space and time as empirical or material. It is also remembered that this point has already been partially envisaged for the first time by H.A. Pistorius (and later by A. Trendelenburg) and raised as the objection of the "third possibility" or "neglected alternative." Furthermore, it is maintained that although Kant tries to eliminate this possibility in the Metaphysical Expositions of Space and Time (but not in the Antinomies), by attempting to prove that space and time are only formal necessary conditions of sensibility, he cannot do it successfully. Hereafter it is argued that his circumstance is not due to the above objection itself, but to another difficulty that can only be grasped through the analysis of Kant's main argument in the Metaphysical Expositions of Transcendental Aesthetic. Ultimately, in order to show this difficulty, it is argued first that insofar as the Non-spatiotemporality Thesis supposes the validity of the Singularity Thesis, and this supposes the validity of the Apriority Thesis, the whole force of proof reposes on this latter. Secondly, it is shown that, despite his effort, Kant could not justify satisfactorily his claim to the formal apriority of space and time because of his failure to demonstrate necessarily the Apriority Thesis.

2. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Miran Bozovic

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According to Malebranche, Adam should be considered as an occasionalist philosopher. Not only did philosophy originate in paradise, but it in fact originated as Malebranchian occasionalism. It was in order to be able to persist in his occasionalist belief that Adam was given exceptional power over his body, that is, the power to detach the principal part of his brain (i.e., the seat of the soul) from the rest of the body. It was only in continually detaching the principal part of his brain from the rest of the body that Adam was able to persist in his occasionalist belief despite the unmistakable testimony of his sense to the contrary. Having once sinned, he thereupon lost his psychophysical privilege. Whereas pre-lapsarian physiology made Adam's belief in the causal efficacy of God possible, post-lapsarian physiology, in contrast, necessarily engenders and sustains belief in the causal efficacy of bodies. It was only as a result of the post-lapsarian physiology that some of the central problems of early modern philosophy arose. Contingent upon Adam's psychophysical privilege, occasionalism was possible only in paradise.

3. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Sébastien Charles

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Parti d'une formulation maladroite de Rousseau laissant croire qu'il ne s'était rien fait sur le thème de l'éducation des Quelques pensées sur l'éducation de Locke à l'Émile, nous avons d'abord voulu montrer le côté fallacieux d'une telle proposition pour bien faire ressortir au contraire l'intérêt d'un tel sujet au siècle des Lumières, sujet qui mobilise toute l'attention des philosophes. Et cette importance accordée à l'éducation est nettement perceptible sur quatre points, qui sont au coeur de l'articulation logique de notre travail. Ainsi, nous montrons d'abord que l'éducation est un topos philosophique par excellence depuis la mise en évidence cartésienne des préjugés attachés à l'enfance. Philosopher, c'est donc former l'individu à repérer et à dénoncer ces présupposés qu'on impose à sa conscience. Cela passe évidemment par une réforme du préceptorat. Ensuite, nous avons mis en valeur l'importance philosophique de l'éducation au siècle du sensualisme où tout part des sens et donc de l'enfance. Dans un troisième moment, nous nous sommes attaché à comprendre comment le siècle des Lumières envisageait l'importance de l'éducation non en termes d'individus mais d'espèce. Faisant intervenir Turgot et Condorcet, nous avons analysé les progrès de l'esprit humain de sa source ténébreuse à la lumière du siècle des philosophes et montré en quoi l'éducation est le socle même d'un tel processes. Enfin, nous terminons en pointant du doight le rôle indispensable de la raison dans toute tentative éducative. Nous inspirant alors de Kant, nous montrons les interactions entre raison et éducation tant au niveau privé que public. En conclusion, nous nous interrogeons sur la portée pratique de ces théories philosophiques.

4. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Syliane Charles

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Au lieu de tracer séparation trop nette entre les écrits pédagogiques de Locke, sur la base de leur caractère souvent anodin, et ses ouvrages philosophiques, en particulier l'Essai philosophique concernant l'entendement humain, nous voulons montrer qu'il faut bien plutôt chercher à bâtir des ponts. L'oeuvre de Locke est construite autour de quelques intuitions fondamentales, dont celle qui définit son empirisme, et qui se concrétise dans sa réfutation de l'existence d'idées innées, et celles-ci se retrouvent et se renforcent mutuellement à différents niveaux. Si l'exemple de l'acquisition tardive par les enfants des principes logiques tout d'abord, et de principes pratiques comme l'idée de Dieu ensuite, ruine l'argument du consentement universel et ainsi prouve que ceux-ci ne sont pas innés l'anti-innéisme confère réciproquement à la pédagogie un rôle essentiel qu'elle se doit d'assumer pour le bien de l'individu et celui de la société. Ce qui donne à comprendre l'enjeu bel et bien philosophique de l'intérêt de Locke pour l'éducation des enfants.

5. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Maria de Lourdes Borges

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I intend to present Kant's refutation of the ontological argument as confronted by Hegel's critique of Kant's refutation. The ontological argument can be exposed in a syllogistic way: everything I conceive as belonging clearly and distinctly to the nature or essence of something can be asserted as true of something. I perceive clearly and distinctly that existence belongs to the nature or essence of a perfect being; therefore, existence can be stated as true of a supremely perfect being, that is, perfect being exists. I intend to argue that Kant criticizes both the major and minor premises. To the major premise, he objects that there is an unqualified passage from the logical to the ontological level. To the minor premise, he objects that existence is not a concept predicate. Finally, I will show how Hegel criticizes Kant's refutation. To the former, Kant's critique is naïve as he could prove that existence is not inherent to a finite being's concept, which is not the concept of God.

6. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Zbigniew Drozdowicz

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Je vais fonder mes réflexions sur la thêse de l'apparition et de la popularisation parmi l'élite intellectuelle laique du XVIème, du XVIIème et du XVIIIème siècle du modèle de l'égoiste raisonnable, c'est-a-dire de celui qui veut et qui est capable de coexister et de collaborer avec les autres, mais non pas par charité ni-comme au Moyen Age-par une contrainte exteriéure, mais par un choix rationnel, ayant constaté que le bilan des pertes et de profits était positif. Dans la présentation de ce phénomène, je me limiterai à la culture française, sans toutefois essayer de trancher dans quelle mesure les processus en question sont paralleles à ceux qui ont eu lieu dans d'autres pays. Je n'en suis pas moins persuadé que la creation et la popularisation de ce modèle intervient dans toute l'Europe occidentale, non sans differences détails. C'est le XVIème siècle qui y sert de point de depart, car c'est dans ce centenaire qu'on a lancé la raison et le calme intérieur en tant que valeurs morales /vertus/ essentielles et réelles: ce fut le premier succès sérieux de l'egoiste raisonnable, la raison lui donnant la possibilité de défense contre les plus sérieuses menaces du côté du monde extérieur /social et naturel/, tandis que le calme intérieur lui permettant de garder une distance par rapport à tout ce qu'il considerait comme étranger. Cette idée est bien illustrée par des Essais de Montaigne. Au XVIIème siècle cet égoiste raisonnable note un autre succes important que fut le lancement de l'intellectualisme en tant que forme suprême de la connaissance de la réalite. Cette forme de l'égoiste raissonnable est bien illustrée par 'la morale d'attente' de Descartes. Au XVIIIème siècle on a observé que c'etait une raison assez étroite et un égoisme assez borné, et on y apporta plusieurs modifications essentielles. En consequence, l'égoiste raisonnable devait mieux s'adapter à son milieu, être mieux disposé à apprécier le rationnalité et l'égoisme des autres, et en fin des comptes, être plus efficace dans ses entreprises. Toutes ces proncipes ont trouvé leur forme expresse dans la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen en 1789.

7. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
James Fieser

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The term "virtue" has traditionally been used to designate morally good character traits such as benevolence, charity, honesty, wisdom, and honor. Although ethicists do not commonly offer a definitive list of virtues, the number of virtues discussed is often short and their moral significance is clear. Hume's analysis of the virtues departs from this tradition both in terms of the quantity of virtues discussed and their obvious moral significance. A conservative estimate of the various virtues Hume refers to in his moral writings would put the number at around seventy, with the more untraditional ones including wit, good manners, and dialog. Unsurprisingly, Hume's critics have attacked him for making nonsense of the concept of virtue by construing it so widely. Hume was aware that his broad understanding of virtue was controversial and he offered several defenses for it. After presenting the neglected attacks of his contemporaries along with Hume's response, I argue that a problem remains: by failing to distinguish between degrees of virtue, Hume also fails to distinguish between degrees of vice. But, some vices (e.g., malevolence) clearly deserve punishment whereas other alleged vices (e.g., uncleanliness) clearly do not. Thus, for adequate retribution, a distinction is needed between important and less important virtues and vices. I conclude that Hume could have used his own account of instinctive vengeance as a natural indicator for distinguishing between important and unimportant vices.

8. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Edgard José Jorge Filho

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According to Kant, radical evil is the deep inherent blemish of our species that does not spare even the best of people. Despite judging the extirpation of such evil as an impossibility, Kant holds out the possibility of converting evil into good by means of human forces. But how can this be given the radical evil of human nature? I articulate various problems that arise from Kant’s conception of conversion while exploring certain resources in his thinking in order to clarify and resolve this difficulty. The difficulty nears an aporia when Kant asks: how can a bad tree bear good fruit? Two arguments will be presented as answers. The first maintains that free will is not definitely committed to any maxim generally accepted. The second points out the possibility of compromise between free will and a good ground maxim as the way to build up a coherent system of maxims. This would be clearly impossible if a bad ground maxim were chosen. While undecisive, the second argument is relevant because it leads to the overcoming of a certain incoherence in Kant's thought. In this way, I argue that the thesis of an existing intrinsic deficiency of the radical evil enjoys the status of a "quasi foundation" of human behavior.

9. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Paola Giacomoni

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There have been many interpretations of Bildung in the history of German philosophy, from the Medieval mystics to the secularization of the Enlightenment. Wilhelm von Humboldt's work at the end of the 18th century is a good example. He placed the idea of Bildung at the center of his work because it was rooted in a dynamic, transforming idea of the natural and human worlds while also being oriented toward a model of balance and perfection. Von Humboldt's interpretation of modernity is characterized by a strong emphasis on change as well as the need to find criteria for guiding such a transformation that has no intrinsic or predetermined end. Love of classical antiquity was not merely nostalgia for a lost world, a normative current that placed the idea of perfection and balance foremost in order to achieve the ideal of Humanitas in an attempt to overcome the unilaterally of modernity.

10. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Robert Greenberg

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Adopting a Quinean criterion of ontological commitment, I consider the question of the ontological commitment of Kant's theory of our a priori knowledge of objects. Its direct concern is the customary view that the ontology of Kant's theory of knowledge in general, whether a priori or empirical, must be thought in terms of the a priori conditions or representations of space, time, and the categories. Accordingly, this view is accompanied by the customary interpretation of ontology as consisting of Kantian "appearances" or "empirical objects." I argue against this view and interpretation. My argument turns on the opposition between the necessity and universality of the a priori and the particularity and contingency of the existent. Its main point is that the a priori can remain necessary and universal only if the existence of objects is kept distinct from it.

11. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Marcia L. Homiak

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I argue that Hume's ethics can be characterized as a virtue ethics, by which I mean a view according to which character has priority over action and the principles governing action: virtuous character guides and constrains practical deliberation. In a traditional utilitarian or Kantian ethics, character is subordinate to practical deliberation: virtue is needed only to motivate virtuous action. I begin by outlining this approach in Aristotle's ethics, then draw relevant parallels to Hume. I argue that virtuous character in Aristotle is understood in terms of "self-love." A true self-lover enjoys most the exercise of the characteristic human powers of judging, choosing, deciding and deliberating. A virtuous agent's self-love enables sizing up practical situations properly and exhibiting the virtue called for by the situation. But if an agent's character is defective, the practical situation will be misapprehended and responded to improperly. I argue that though Hume claims moral judgments are the product of sympathy, they are actually the result of a complex process of practical reflection and deliberation. Although Hume writes as though anyone can be a judicious spectator, there is reason to think that persons of calm temperament, who enjoy deliberation and have a facility for it, are more likely to perform the corrections in sentiments that may be necessary. If this is so, an agent's character has priority over his or her practical deliberations.

12. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Timo Kajamies

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Some commentators maintain that Spinozistic active ideas are judgements. I shall call this view the common interpretation, since it is popular to interpret Spinoza as reacting against Descartes's theory of ideas. According to this reading, Spinozistic ideas are considered not as Cartesian ideas but as Cartesian judgements. One clear difference between Descartes and Spinoza is that Spinoza holds that ideas are active, while Descartes does not. According to the common interpretation, Spinoza and Descartes use the concept of activity in the same way. Since Descartes holds that judgements are active, it is maintained that Spinozistic active ideas are like Cartesian judgements. I find this an overly superficial interpretation of Spinoza. I argue that, for Spinoza, activity denotes more than mere Cartesian activity. Whereas Spinoza wants to say that active ideas incorporate the property of truth or certainty, Descartes does not consider judgements in that way. In this way, Spinozistic active ideas can be called truth-expressing.

13. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Olli Koistinen

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Spinoza's philosophy has a practical aim. The Ethics can be interpreted as a guide to a happy, intellectually flourishing life. Spinoza gives us principles about how to guard against the power of passions which prevent the mind from attaining understanding. In what follows, I consider Spinoza's techniques for guarding against the passions by turning to Jonathan Bennett's criticisms of Spinozistic psychotherapy. Bennett finds three central techniques for freeing oneself from the passions: (i) reflecting on determinism; (ii) separating and joining; and (iii) turning passions into actions. Bennett believes that all of these techniques are in some sense flawed. I contend that Bennett offers good criticism against technique (i), but his criticisms against (ii) and (iii) are unfounded.

14. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Károly Kókai

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Wenn man nach der Bedeutung des Wortes Freiheit fragt, fragt man nach dem System, wo dieses Wort seine Bedeutung hat. Die Frage richtet sich nach der Beschreibung des philosophischen, rechtlichen, politischen, wirtschaflichen und gesellschaftlichen System, in dem Freiheit sich entfalten soll. Man Fragt nach der Bedeutung des Wortes Liberalismus. Ich möchte hier auf die Erscheinung eines Begriffs in einer konkreten gesellschaftlichen Situation eingehen, indem ich die Ersheingung des Begriffs in den Schriften Immanuel Kants darstelle. Überblickt man die Erscheinungen des Begriffs Freiheit bei Kant, muß man zum Schluß die Frage stellen: Was ist das Problem der Freiheit innerhalb von Kants Philosophie? Die Probleme mit dem Begrif der Freiheit sind mehrfach. Freiheit ist keine Tatache, sondern eine Annahme. Angenommne wird sie, um die Verfolgung eines verbindlichen Gesetzes fordern zu können. Im selben Moment, als Freiheit angenommen wird, muß sie negiert werden. Freiheit der spekulativen und der praktischen Vernunft sind gegenseitig aufeinander bezogen. Spekulative kann sie nur mit einem Hinweis auf ihren praktischen Gebrauch, praktisch wiederum mit ihrer spekulativen Annahme bestehen. Das sind die Probleme innerhalb von Kants Philosophie. Weitere treten auf, wenn man Freiheit als gesellschftliche Realität betrachtet--auch dann, wenn dies bloß philosophisch, etwa in Anbetracht von Kants Metaphysik der Sitten geschieht. Was hier von Kant nämlich als Freiheit dargestellt wird, ist Freiheit des mit Rechten ausgestatteten Besitzbürgers und Unfreiheit aller anderen. Über Freiheit läßt sich nachdenken, man kann sie in kurzen Momenten, rückblickend und als offene Zukunft erleben, emphatisch verteidigen, für die praktische Umsetzung ihrer Idee kämpfen. Was bleibt aber zurück, wenn man den Begriff Freiheit zerlegt? Etwas, was von der Komplexität des Freiheitsbegriffs nichts mehr hat und nicht zu gebrauchen ist. Es bleibt eines: mit dem widersprüchlichen Begriff zu leben. In einer diskussion etwa, zu der diese Rede als Beitrag gedacht ist.

15. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Toshio Kurozumi

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Die Möglichkeit der Erfahrung kann nach Kant nur im immanenten Denken vertanden werden, daß die (in der Erfahrung) immanenten Formen der Erkenntnis überhaupt allererst die (in der Erfahrung) immanenten Gegenstände derselben möglich machen sollten. Die Transzendentalphilosophie Kants ist also die lediglich auf diesem immanenten Denken beruhende, d.i., immanente Philosophie. Sie ist aber in der Tat durch ganze Geschichte der Interpretation hindurch von Fichte über cohen und Husserl bis Kaulbach im Gegenteil doch als die auf dem transzendenten Denken (das die Transzendenz von der Erfahrung billigt) beruhende, d.i., tranzendente Philosophie verstanden worden. Die bisherige tranzendente Kantinterpretaion ist jedoch angesichts der schwierigen Probleme ohnmächtig und kann die Kritik der reinen Verunft als ein einheitliches System nicht auffassen. Diese Probleme kann erst unsere immanente Interpretation ohne Schwierigkeit lösen und auch den gegenwärtigen Naturwissenschaften einen bestimmten Platz in der Erfahung Kants geben, welches bisher unmöglich bleibt. Die Philosophien vor und nach Kant sind insgesamt die transzendente im Vergleich mit der alleinigen immanach Kant sind insgesamt die transzendente im Vergleich mit der alleinigen immanenten Philsophie Kants. Und in bezug auf die Möglichkeit der Erfahrung muß die transzendente von der immanenten Philosophie abhëngig sein.

16. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Brandon Look

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Leibniz's correspondence with Des Bosses presents students of his thought with a problem. It contains some of Leibniz's longest and most detailed discussions of the nature of substance while at the same time introducing two concepts into Leibniz's metaphysics that continually baffle commentators: scientia visionis and the vinculum substantiale. The aim of this paper is to explicate the relationship between scientia visionis, or God's knowledge by vision, and the vinculum substantiale, or the substantial bond, and to show how these concepts are used by Leibniz in the correspondence with Des Bosses to account for the unity and reality of corporal substances. In my view, the vinculum substantiale and scientia visionis do not represent rival strategies, as they have been recently portrayed in the literature; rather, they work together. But scientia visionis, when applied to questions of ontology, gives us a rather vacuous kind of reality, while the vinculum substantiale represents a much more significant, albeit problematic, account of the nature of substance.

17. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Wolfgang Malzkorn

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It is well known that a central issue in the famous debate between Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Samuel Clarke is the nature of space. They disagreed on the ontological status of space rather than on its geometrical or physical structure. Closely related is the disagreement on the existence of vacuums in nature: while Leibniz denies it, Clarke asserts it. In this paper, I shall focus on Leibniz's position in this debate. In part one, I shall reconstruct the theory of physical space which Leibniz presents in his letters to Clarke. This theory differs from Leibniz's ultimate metaphysics of space, but it is particularly interesting for systematic reasons, and it also gave rise to a lively discussion in modern philosophy of science. In part two, I shall examine whether the existence of vacuums is ruled out by that theory of space, as Leibniz seems to imply in one of his letters. I shall confirm the result of E. J. Khamara ("Leibniz's Theory of Space: A Reconstruction," Philosophical Quarterly 43 [1993]: 472-88) that Leibniz's theory of space rules out the existence of a certain kind of vacuum, namely extramundane vacuums, although it does not rule out vacuums within the world.

18. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Danilo Marcondes de Souza Filho

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This paper discusses the importance of skeptical arguments for the philosophy of language in early modern thought. It contrasts the rationalist conception of language and knowledge with that of philosophers who adopt some sort of skeptical position, maintaining that these philosophers end up by giving language a greater importance than rationalists. The criticism of the rationalists' appeal to natural light is examined, as well as skeptical arguments limiting knowledge such as the so-called 'maker's knowledge' argument. This argument is then seen as capital for favoring a positive interpretation of the importance of language for knowledge.

19. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Scarlett Marton

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Il s'agit d'examiner premièrement les conceptions de la philosophie que Nietzsche et Kant embrassent. Tandis que Kant considère que la philosophie et le système s'identificient, Nietzsche envisage la philosophie surtout en tant que création des valeurs. D'après Kant, Nietzsche ne serait peutêtre qu'un dissipateur du savoir; celui qui se propose de faire des essais avec la pensée et qui assume, par conséquent, de différentes perspectives pour aborder la même question ne pourrait se prendre en tant que philosophe. Selon Nietzsche, Kant ne serait qu'un fonctionnaire du savoir; celui qui se limite à fonder des valeurs déjà établies ne serait qu'un "ouvrier philosophique." Pourtant, Nietzsche et Kant se mettent d'accord, quand ils attribuent un rôle privilégié à la critique, mais bien vite reapparaîssent les divergences entre eux. D'après Kant, la critique doit être considérée comme une discipline philosophique, non pas dans le sens d'un domaine du savoir, mais d'une "éducation" de la raison humaine, puisqu'il faut que celle-ci reconnaisse ses limites pour bien opérer dans ses différents usages. Selon Nietzsche, la critique entreprise par Kant n'a aucune légitimité, dans la mesure où elle opère de façon à accorder à la raison le double rôle de juge et d'accusé. Le but que nous poursuivons dans notre texte est cului d'examiner, à partir de ces résultats-là, la position prise par Nietzschhe vis-à-vis de la philosophie kantienne.

20. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Zuraya Monroy-Nasr

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Cartesian dualism and the union of mind and body are often understood as conceptions that contradict each other. Diachronic interpretations maintain that Descartes was first a dualist (in the Meditations) and later on developed his stance on the union of mind and body (Passions). Some authors find here a problem without solution. Nevertheless, in the last two decades, some interpretations have been developed intending to give a positive solution to the difficult relation between Cartesian dualism and the union of mind and body. The problem that I find in most of them is that they try to show no incoherence between Descartes' dualism and his conception of the union and interaction by "weakening" or making more "flexible" the dualist doctrine. I develop a synchronic interpretation, based on textual evidence, in order to show that dualism and union appeared simultaneously in Descartes' works. Under this perspective, my claim is that Cartesian radical dualism and the union of mind and body can be coherently understood only because they belong to different domains of knowledge. Thought and matter are clear and distinct primitive notions that come from reason, whose role is laying the foundations for Cartesian metaphysics and physics, while the primitive notion of union is acquired by the senses and lacks clarity and distinction even while it serves the objective of founding Descartes' moral philosophy.