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1. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Dan López de Sa

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Es conocido que Kripke argumentó que la ilusión de contingencia en el caso de la conciencia no puede explicarse del modo en que se explica en el resto de casos familiares de enunciados necesarios a posteriori. En un artículo reciente, Pérez Otero (2002) argumenta que hay una explicación alternativa, en términos de mera aposterioridad. Argumento en contra de la corrección exegética y de la verdad de esta tesis.Kripke famously argued that the illusion of contingency cannot be explained away, in the case of consciousness, in the way it is explained away in the rest of familiar cases of necessary aposteriori statements. In a recent paper, Pérez Otero (2002) argues that there is an alternative way of explaining it a way, in terms of mere aposteriority. I argue against the exegetical accuracy and the truth of this contention.
2. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Xabier de Donato Rodríguez, Marek Polanski

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En el presente artículo, se examinan y discuten dos argumentos con consecuencias reduccionistas debidos a Jaegwon Kim y a Theodore Sider respectivamente. De acuerdo con el argumento de Kim, la superveniencia fuerte implicaría la coexistencia necesaria de propiedades (es decir, tal y como normalmente se interpreta, la reducción). De acuerdo con el de Sider, ocurriría lo mismo con la superveniencia global. Uno y otro hacen un uso esencial de sendas nociones de propiedad maximal, las cuales son discutidas aquí a la luz de una interpretación natural e interesante de la teoría de las propiedades implícita en sus argumentos. Bajo esta nueva interpretación, en términos modelo-teóricos (véase apartado 4), obtenemos diversas posibilidades de relaciones formales entre las tesis de superveniencia y la reducción, según la lógica utilizada. Al menos bajo una interpretación interesante, los argumentos de Kim y Sider no son correctos, quedando demos-trado así que dichos argumentos no son válidos en general. We discuss and analyze two reductive arguments due to Jaegwon Kim and Theodore Sider respectively. According to the first one, strong supervenience would imply necessary coextension of properties (i.e., reduction). According to the second, this would be also the case of global supervenience. Kim and Sider make essential use of their respective notions of maximal properties, which we analyze here in the light of a natural and interesting interpretation of the underlying theory of properties. Under this interpretation, in terms of model theory (see § 4), we obtain different possibilities of formal relations between the superveniencie theses and reduction, depending on the logic we use. Under at least one interesting interpretation, the arguments of Kim and Sider are not correct and we become the conclusion that these arguments are not valid in general.
3. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Dan López de Sa

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In this paper I offer a characterization of evaluative realism, present the intuitive case against it, and offer two considerations to support it further: one concerning the internalist connection between values and motivation, and the other concerning the intuitive causal inefficacy of evaluative properties. The considerations ultimately rely on the former intuitions themselves, but are not devoid of interest, as they might make one revise what one took to be his own realistic supporting intuitions, if such one had.
4. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Henrik Zinkernagel

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This paper investigates some of the philosophical and conceptual issues raised by the search for a quantum theory of gravity. It is critically discussed whether such a theory is necessary in the first place, and how much would be accomplished if it is eventually constructed. I argue that the motivations behind, and expectations to, a theory of quantum gravity are entangled with central themes in the philosophy of science, in particular unification, reductionism, and the interpretation of quantum mechanics. I further argue that there are —contrary to claims made on behalf of string theory— no good reasons to think that a quantum theory of gravity, if constructed, will provide a theory of everything, that is, a fundamental theory from which all physics in principle can be derived.

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5. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Josep L. Prades

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6. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Alejandro Martín Maldonado, Gabriel Painceyra

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7. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
David Teira

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8. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
David Teira

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9. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Andoni Eizagirre

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10. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3

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11. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3

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