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1. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Roger Paden

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The eighteenth century notion of the “picturesque” has been misunderstood by many contemporary environmental aestheticians. This has contributed both to amisunderstanding of the history of environmental aesthetics and, within the discipline, to a misunderstanding of English garden design. This essay contains a discussion of the term as it appears in environmental aesthetics literature and an examination of the history of the term as used in eighteenth-century garden design literature. This history is used to contest the account of the term as used by contemporary environmental aestheticians and to develop a philosophically more interesting interpretation of it.
2. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Paul Ott

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In this paper, I address the motivation gap that prevents many people from acquiring and activating environmental values. In the face of this gap, I analyze Aldo Leopold’s conservation philosophy as a potential solution. This is done by reading Leopold through John Dewey’s theory of aesthetic experience, in which motivated action develops out of unified aesthetic experience made up of three phases: action, emotion, and intelligence. Showing that Leopold’s approach to conservation exhibits this aesthetic structure not only gives it a clearer organization but promotes its use for rectifying the severe lack of environmental conscience and practice in society.
3. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Daniel L. Crescenzo

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David Schlosberg argues that Nussbaum’s capabilities approach can include ecosystems as subjects of justice if we view integrity, rather than dignity, as the conceptual ground for being a subject of justice. I further specify Schlosberg’s concept of ecosystem integrity, arguing that it should be understood as loose integrity. An ecosystem has loose integrity if it retains its capacity to return, after disruption, to functioning as substantially the same kind of system it was before disruption. Finally, I argue that the opportunity for ecosystems to maintain loose integrity can become the object of an overlapping consensus.
4. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Elisa Aaltola

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The aim of this paper is to investigate key works on empathy and intersubjectivity and to compare how they relate to non-human animals. It will be suggested that intersubjectivity forms a powerful objection to skepticism concerning the minds of other animals and lays the grounds for normatively loaded empathic responses. It will also be argued that the core of intersubjectivity takes place outside of propositional language, thus defying the linguocentric stance often adopted in relation to other animals. Although descriptions of non- or pre-lingual responses is challenging, the type of “attention” brought forward by Simone Weil is offered as one alternative way of understanding what it is to pay heed to animal others, and the work of the ethologist Barbara Smuts is brought forward asan example of such attention.
5. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Ignasi Ribó

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Three approximations to the understanding of nonhuman animals are discussed. Ethologists and philosophers of mind, guided by an objectifying model of cognition, have not enquired about the being-in-the-world of animals and their meaning. The continental tradition has been asking the right questions, but has not given adequate answers, as ontological discourse remains tied up with logocentrism. Kafka’s animal fictions are presented as an example of how the human logos can be attentive to the worlds of other animals and allow them to manifest themselves in their own being, an attitude defined as imaginary attentiveness.

book reviews

6. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Darrell P. Arnold

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7. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Frank Jankunis

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8. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Michael Marder

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9. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Molly Sturdevant

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10. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Ilan Safit

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11. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Robert Metcalf

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12. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Mike Menser

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