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Philosophical Inquiry:
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Issue: 3/4
Wolfgang Detel
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Philosophical Inquiry:
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Desmond M. Clarke
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Philosophical Inquiry:
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David Drebushenko
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Philosophical Inquiry:
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Manuel Cruz
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Philosophical Inquiry:
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Eleni Papamichael
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Philosophical Inquiry:
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Robert Mosimann
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Philosophical Inquiry:
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23 >
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Cigden Dürusken
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Philosophical Inquiry:
Volume >
23 >
Issue: 3/4
Rubina Kousar Lodhi
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Philosophical Inquiry:
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23 >
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Martha Husain
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Philosophical Inquiry:
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James Danaher
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Philosophical Inquiry:
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23 >
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A. Brook
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Philosophical Inquiry:
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23 >
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Michael Ruse
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13.
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Philosophical Inquiry:
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23 >
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Howard V. Hong,
Edna H. Hong
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14.
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Philosophical Inquiry:
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23 >
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Jonathan Lear
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15.
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Philosophical Inquiry:
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23 >
Issue: 3/4
Eli Friedlander
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16.
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Philosophical Inquiry:
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23 >
Issue: 1/2
Richard McKirahan
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Philosophical Inquiry:
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23 >
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Richard Gray
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18.
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Philosophical Inquiry:
Volume >
23 >
Issue: 1/2
Malte Hossenfelder
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19.
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Philosophical Inquiry:
Volume >
23 >
Issue: 1/2
Safak Ural
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20.
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Philosophical Inquiry:
Volume >
23 >
Issue: 1/2
Duncan Pritchard
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A puzzle about warranted belief, often attributed to Kripke, has recently come to prominence. This puzzle claims to show that it follows from the possession of a warrant for one's belief in an empirical proposition that one is entitled to dismiss all subsequent evidence against that proposition as misleading. The two main solutions that have been offered to this puzzle in the recent literature - by James Cargile and David Lewis - argue for a revisionist epistemology which, respectively, either denies the so-called 'Closure' principle that warrants transmit across known entailments, or 'contextualizes' the epistemic operator in question. In contrast, it is argued here that such revisionism is unnecessary because the puzzle in fact depends upon an ambiguity in the notion of warrant. It is claimed that once this ambiguity is made explicit then the puzzle dissipates.
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