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Environmental Ethics:
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Environmental Ethics:
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Ned Hettinger
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Animal beauty provides a significant aesthetic reason for protecting nature. Worries about aesthetic discrimination and the ugliness of predation might make one think otherwise. Although it has been argued that aesthetic merit is a trivial and morally objectionable basis for action, beauty is an important value and a legitimate basis for differential treatment, especially in the case of animals. While the suffering and death of animals due to predation are important disvalues that must be recognized, predation’s tragic beauty has positive aesthetic value that can be appropriately aesthetically appreciated.
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Environmental Ethics:
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John Basl
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Our environmental wrongdoings result in a moral debt that requires restitution. One component of restitution is reparative and another is remediative. The remediative component requires that we remediate our characters in ways that alter or eliminate the character traits that tend to lead, in their expression, to environmental wrongdoing. Restitutive restoration is a way of engaging in ecological restoration that helps to meet the remediative requirement that accompanies environmental wrongdoing. This account of restoration provides a new motivation and justification for engaging in restorative practices in addition to the standard pragmatist justification and motivations.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Shari Collins-Chobanian,
Eric Comerford,
Chris Kerlin
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For over two decades, the debate about whether legally to recognize environmental refugees as refugees has been ongoing. Because their numbers are growing, environmental refugees should be recognized as convention refugees or a new UN convention should be drafted to address their needs. A typology of the environmental refugee should be developed to make the term more concrete and useful.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Ian A. Smith
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Environmental groups have worked tirelessly to save several species of endangered fish along the Colorado River, including the humpback chub (Gila cypha). The humpback chub does not seem to have any significant instrumental goods, but these environmentalists have championed its cause nonetheless. If the humpback chub has no instrumental goods, then appealing to another kind of goods is needed to show that it should be preserved. Some environmental ethicists have suggested appealing to the intrinsic goods of a species (or, alternatively, its intrinsic value or inherent value). Drawing on and going beyond John O’Neill’s work, it can be argued that all currently existing (biological) species have their own goods, or intrinsic goods. In terms of the notion of flourishing, the intrinsic goods of a species consist in its abilities to flourish. These goods can be used to construct a defense of the view that a species, even a species such as the humpback chub, ought to be preserved. One way to construct this defense is to appeal to virtue ethics, specifically the virtue of humility. Exercising the virtue of humility in our relations with species that we human beings have endangered involves preserving them along with preserving their intrinsic goods.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Steven Fesmire
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Environmental thinkers recognize that ecological thinking has a vital role to play in many wise choices and policies; yet, little theoretical attention has been given to developing an adequate philosophical psychology of the imaginative nature of such thinking. Ecological imagination is an outgrowth of our more general deliberative capacity to perceive, in light of possibilities for thinking and acting, the relationships that constitute any object. Such imagination is of a specifically ecological sort when key metaphors, images, symbols, and the like used in the ecologies shape the mental simulations we use to deliberate—i.e., when these interpretive structures shape what John Dewey calls our “dramatic rehearsals.” There is an urgent practical need to cultivate ecological imagination, and an equally practical need to make theoretical sense of the imaginative dimension of ecological reflection.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Roger Paden
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Environmental Ethics:
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Jeanne Hamming
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Environmental Ethics:
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Jerome A. Stone
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Environmental Ethics:
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Peter Harries-Jones
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Environmental Ethics:
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John Nolt
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Environmental Ethics:
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David Schlosberg
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Environmental Ethics:
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Frank Schalow
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