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1. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Scott Aikin, Tempest Henning

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2. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Emily McGill

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Rawlsian political liberalism famously requires a prohibition on truth. This has led to the charge that liberalism embraces non-cognitivism, according to which political claims have the moral status of emotions or expressions of preference. This result would render liberalism a non-starter for liberatory politics, a conclusion that political liberals themselves disavow. This conflict between what liberalism claims and what liberalism does has led critics to charge that the theory is disingenuous and functions as political ideology. In this paper, I explore one way that this charge unfolds: critics charge that liberalism utilizes an individualistic and identity-insensitive social ontology, which in turn yields epistemic deficiencies that render it incapable of detecting oppression. The theory’s claim to freestandingness then shields it from necessary critique. I argue that this objection relies on constructing a conflict between liberalism’s professed non-cognitivism and its actual cognitivist commitments. By demonstrating that Rawlsian political liberalism explicitly endorses substantive moral truths, and that the method of avoidance applies only to public justification for coercive state action, I show that the theory is openly and foundationally cognitivist, and thus that the charge of disingenuousness does not stick.

3. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Eric T. Morton

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Robert Talisse and Scott Aikin have argued that substantive versions of value pluralism are incompatible with pragmatism, and that all such versions of pluralism must necessarily collapse into versions of strong metaphysical pluralism. They also argue that any strong version of value pluralism is incompatible with pragmatism’s meliorist commitment and will block the road of inquiry. I defend the compatibility of a version of value pluralism (the strong epistemic pluralism of John Rawls) with pragmatism, and offer counterarguments to all of these claims.

4. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Shannon Fyfe

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In this article, I consider the possibilities and limitations for testimonial justice in an international criminal courtroom. I begin by exploring the relationship between epistemology and criminal law, and consider how testimony contributes to the goals of truth and justice. I then assess the susceptibility of international criminal courts to the two harms of testimonial injustice: epistemic harm to the speaker, and harm to the truth-seeking process. I conclude that international criminal courtrooms are particularly susceptible to perpetrating testimonial injustice. Hearers in the international criminal courtroom should practice testimonial justice, but the institution is not structured in a way that can prevent every instance of testimonial injustice.

5. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Scott F. Aikin

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In this paper, I will argue for a complex of three theses. First, that the problem of deep disagreement is an instance of the regress problem of justification. Second, that the problem of deep disagreement, as a regress problem, depends on a dialecticality requirement for arguments. Third, that the dialecticality requirement is plausible and defensible.

6. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Connie Wang

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Accounts of deep disagreements can generally be categorized as optimistic or pessimistic. Pessimistic interpretations insist that the depth of deep disagreements precludes the possibility of rational resolution altogether, while optimistic variations maintain the contrary. Despite both approaches’ respective positions, they nevertheless often, either explicitly or implicitly, agree on the underlying assumption that argumentation offers the only possible rational resolution to deep disagreements. This paper challenges that idea by, first, diagnosing this argument-only model of arriving at rational resolutions, second, articulating a competing but undertheorized Hegelian-informed approach, and third, attending briefly to some of the challenges of such an approach.

7. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Tempest Henning

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This paper critically examines non-adversarial feminist argumentation model specifically within the scope of politeness norms and cultural communicative practices. Asserting women typically have a particular mode of arguing which is often seen as ‘weak’ or docile within male dominated fields, the model argues that the feminine mode of arguing is actually more affiliative and community orientated, which should become the standard within argumentation as opposed to the Adversary Method. I argue that the nonadversarial feminist argumentation model (NAFAM) primarily focuses on one demographic of women’s communicative styles – white women. Taking an intersectional approach, I examine practices within African American women’s speech communities to illustrate the ways in which the virtues and vices purported by the NAFAM fails to capture other ways of productive argumentation.

8. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Alessandra Tanesini

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Arrogance has widespread negative consequences for epistemic practices. Arrogant people tend to intimidate and humiliate other agents, and to ignore or dismiss their views. They have a propensity to mansplain. They are also angry. In this paper I explain why anger is a common manifestation of arrogance in order to understand the effects of arrogance on debate. I argue that superbia (which is the kind of arrogance that is my concern here) is a vice of superiority characterised by an overwhelming desire to diminish other people in order to excel and by a tendency to arrogate special entitlements for oneself, including the privilege of not having to justify one’s claims.

9. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Moira Howes, Catherine Hundleby

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While anger can derail argumentation, it can also help arguers and audiences to reason together in argumentation. Anger can provide information about premises, biases, goals, discussants, and depth of disagreement that people might otherwise fail to recognize or prematurely dismiss. Anger can also enhance the salience of certain premises and underscore the importance of related inferences. For these reasons, we claim that anger can serve as an epistemic resource in argumentation.

10. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2

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11. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2

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12. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2

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research articles

13. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Alex Blum

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We argue that the part of the future which is up to us is in principle unknowable.
14. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Ștefan Bolea

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In the present paper I analyze the theme of death in Gothic Metal songs such as Forever Failure (1995) by Paradise Lost, Everything Dies (1999) by Type O Negative, The Hanged Man (1998) by Moonspell or Gone with The Sin (1999) by HIM. The subthemes I am mostly interested in are the death of anima, the suicide of the self and the universal death. Several Romanian poets – Mihai Eminescu (1850-1889), Iuliu Cezar Săvescu (1866-1903), George Bacovia (1881-1957) and D. Iacobescu (1893-1913), who all have in common the pursuit of nihilism – used death to enhance their nihilist poetical universe. I will trace the aforementioned subthemes in some of their most spectacular poems.
15. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Emanuel Copilaș

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The present article aims to offer a synoptic picture of communist Romania’s relations with Third World countries during the Ceaușescu regime. Within these relations, economic and geopolitical motivations coexisted along with ideological ones, thus making the topic one of the most interesting and relevant key for understanding RSR’s complex and cunning international strategy. However, I intend to prove that mere pragmatism is not enough to comprehend the drive behind Ceaușescu’s diplomatic efforts in post-colonial Africa; ideological factors need also to be taken into account.
16. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Anca Dohotariu

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This article seeks to identify and analyse the most significant changes regarding parental leave provision in post-communist Romania, as well as the extent to which its legal adjustments that took place after 1990 reveal both old trends inherited from the former political regime as well as new tendencies influenced by EU norms and directives. Consequently, this article has a twofold structure. First, a brief overview of the main concepts and theoretical approaches to parental leave will allow us to proceed to a proper understanding of the epistemological tools underpinning this research object. Second, this article tackles the numerous legislative changes concerning parental leave that occurred after the fall of the communist regime. Although limited to a single category of research sources, this inquiry is indispensable for analysing the extent to which childcare and the gendered division of parental responsibilities have become real political struggles within the post-communist public agenda in Romania.
17. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Rizalino Noble Malabed

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The epistemological problem is traditionally expressed in the question “How do we know that we know?” The emphasis is on the relationship between the claim that we know and what it is that we know. We notice, only belatedly, that the agent who knows does not really matter in the question. The knower is but an abstracted entity whose only qualification is that s/he claims to know. Virtue epistemology’s virtue lies in the centering of the knower: What is it about the knower that enables her to claim that she knows or that enables us to agree that she indeed knows? The concept of intellectual responsibility in virtue epistemology does not only brings us into the realm of the normative but also implicates, necessarily, the social and the political. Invoking the openness of alternative virtue epistemology to unconventional sources and methods, this essay turns to metaphysics and social ontology in order to explore the problems of intellectual responsibility, society, and politics in humankind’s disposition and striving to know.
18. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Rajesh Sampath

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This paper will articulate the conditions of thinking about the transition of Division II in Heidegger’s Being and Time in order to imagine the architecture of the missing Division III, which never appeared in the published Part I of Being and Time (1927). The paper explores questions of temporality, historical temporality, and Heidegger’s confrontation with Hegel at the end of Being and Time while enlisting the resources of his very late lecture of 1962 – “On Time and Being” – to lay down the conditions of possibility to reconstruct the missing Division III. The paper argues that this feat has yet to be adequately accomplished given 90 years that have elapsed since the publication of Being and Time.

19. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1

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20. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1

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