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symposium on practicing philosophy with children
1. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Megan Laverty Introduction: Philosophy for Children and/as Philosophical Practice
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2. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Mark Weinstein Ruminations on Philosophical Practice
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An autobiographical narrative forms the basis for the exploration of a tension at the heart of philosophical practice. This paper considers whether Philosophy should be construed as a text-driven, expert-based endeavor as is typical in University programs or whether there is a primordial philosophical experience that grounds a more informal process of philosophical engagement? That is, is Philosophy a natural extension of human perplexity available as a tool for understanding without the trappings of Professorial scholarship and the authority of canonical texts, or has the historical development of Philosophy so constructed its practice that it is beholden to sophisticated scholarship and the professional interpretation of a definitive body of classical and contemporary sources?
3. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Maughn Gregory Practicing Democracy: Social Intelligence and Philosophical Practice
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In pragmatist social theory communities faced with significant troubles or opportunities inquire after their advantage and reconstruct their habits and their environments. Three programs of philosophical practice—Socratic Dialogue, the Philosophy Café and Philosophy for Children—cultivate citizenly virtues necessary for this process. They facilitate dialogue and open-ended inquiry, give practice in cognitive and social skills, and institute shared authority. However, certain factors limit the programs’ effectiveness for citizenship education. They tend to construe social problems and opportunities in strictly discursive terms; they do not encourage empirical experiment with philosophical judgments; and they do not extend the shared governance of the dialogue to other aspects of social life. None of these are limitations of the programs’ stated objectives.
4. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Ann Margaret Sharp And the Children Shall Lead Them
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Philosophy for Children engages students in philosophical deliberation characterized by dialogue, inquiry, reasoning and self-reflection. Philosophy for Children assumes a pluralistic conception of philosophy which, when practiced in a community of inquiry with children, is a necessary tool for the liberation from oppression. It is on this basis that an analogous relationship with feminist philosophy is established. Students of Philosophy for Children commit themselves, either consciously or unconsciously, to such principles as egalitarianism, respect for persons, fallibilism, pluralism, open-mindedness, tolerance, and the procedures of democracy. Some procedures for philosophizing with children are enumerated. The author concludes that Philosophy for Children is not just a discipline to be added to the curriculum, but represents an alternative model of education in which thinking, questioning, self-correction, judgment making, collaboration, dialogue, and inquiry are central.
5. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Megan Laverty Philosophical Dialogue and Ethics: Redefining the Virtues
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If philosophical dialogue is broadly defined by concepts that are central to our lives and essentially contested, then philosophical dialogue is ethically valuable because it engages participants in the kind of communal and reasonable deliberation necessary for ethical life. Discourse Ethics acknowledges the instrumental value of philosophical dialogue for the making of ethical judgments. I defend the intrinsically ethical value of philosophical dialogue on the grounds that it potentially orients us towards that which transcends human subjectivity in an effort to include it (which could also be called “otherness,” “alterity,” “Thou,” or “the unthinkable”). If respect is the modality of reason, then love is the modality of the transcendent, and, as with respect, love is recognizable by the virtues that express it. These include faith, grace, naivety, irony, and genius. My observation that these qualities are more readily found in children than adults suggests that children are particularly suited to philosophical dialogue because they can engage in it with an appreciation of its value and limits.
6. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
David Kennedy Communal Philosophical Dialogue and the Intersubject
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The self is a historical and cultural phenomenon in the sense of a dialectically evolving narrative construct about who we are, what our borders and limits and capacities are, what is pathology, and what is normality, and so on. These ontological and epistemological narratives are usually linked to grand explanatory narratives like science and religion, and are intimately linked to cosmological pictures. The “intersubject” is an emergent form of subjectivity in our time which reconstructs its borders to include the other, and which understands itself as always building and being built through a combination of internal and external dialogue. The shift from monological to dialogical discourse is both a product and a producer of the intersubject, and is in turn made possible by a shift—underway for the last one hundred years or so—in the human information environment. The major educational innovation which reconstructs theory and practice for the intersubject—community of philosophical inquiry (CPI)—assumes, following field and systems theory, that any group gathered together is an interactive system. It also assumes that the fundamental forms of growth and development both of the individual and of the collective take place through a process of communal deliberative inquiry into meaning, resulting in the reconstruction of beliefs, values, and discourses on both an individual and a collective level. CPI is a process in which subject and object are both active and passive, shaping and being shaped, determining and determined, in and through their transaction. It assumes that its interlocutors are in a relation of both mutual and self-interrogation. As the phenomenon of the intersubject gains credence in human culture, philosophy is gaining power as an educational idea in the elementary and high school classroom. Communal philosophical dialogue is the discursive space where the subject’s fundamental assumptions about self, world, knowledge, belief, beauty, right action and normative ideals enter a dialectical process of confrontation, mediation, and reconstruction.
7. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Carol V. A. Quinn On the Virtue of Not Forgiving: When Withholding Forgiveness Is Morally Praiseworthy
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8. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Benedict Sheehy The Challenge of Objectivist Ethics: Ethical Thinking in Business, Rationalism, and Ayn Rand
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Few people think of business ethics as being addressed outside of main-stream business ethics, philosophy and corporate social responsibility circles. This view is in error. Arguably the most prominent philosopher of the last century, Ayn Rand, has provided a philosophy of business that is satisfying to many people, not the least of which is Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan. Rand’s philosophy suggests that self-interested behaviour is not merely an economic modeling of human behaviour, but an ethical imperative. To professional philosophers, Rand is naïve and unsatisfying; however, that does not diminish her appeal to the less sophisticated. After a review of Rand’s great popular appeal, the article then moves on to some of the main points of her philosophy, offers a critique of those points and then encourages a more serious analysis of Rand’s philosophy, particularly for those teaching and consulting on ethics.
9. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Joseph P. DeMarco, Maurie Markman The Research Misconception
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Recently, several researchers and philosophers argued that clinical research trials are not therapy. Their position is based on foundational research ethics documents, such as the Belmont Report, on conceptual analysis, and on the general way clinical trials are conducted. After examining and rejecting these arguments, we claim that good research is consistent with good therapy; that often trials are good therapy; and that a blanket attack on clinical trials as non-therapeutic creates a research misconception. This misconception is potentially harmful because it could weaken trial recruitment, could adversely affect funding for trials, and could overturn needed moral safeguards on therapeutic trials. Our more careful and accurate analysis of the nature of clinical trials can avoid such problems.
10. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Clifton Perry A Reductio Ad Absurdum of Restricted, Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction
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As Federal Indian Law has evolved, many questions have been posed regarding tribal jurisdiction. This paper examines the jurisdiction tribes have over member Indians, non-member Indians, and non-member, non-Indians. It addresses the ethical challenge faced by tribal attorneys who represent non-member Indian clients in a manner that ultimately undermines tribal sovereignty.
11. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Seumas Miller Terrorism and Collective Responsibility: A Response to Narveson and Rosenbaum
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In this paper I consider the general view of terrorism put forward by Jan Narveson in his “Pacificism and Terrorism: Why We Should Condemn Both” and by Alan Rosenbaum in his “On Terrorism and the Just War: Some Philosophical Reflections.” This is the view that terrorism is morally indefensible. Contra Narveson and Rosenbaum, I argue that some forms of terrorism are morally defensible in some circumstances.In the first section of the paper I will discuss the definition of terrorism, including the definitions put forward by Narveson and Rosenbaum. In the second section, I will outline an account of collective moral responsibility as a necessary precursor to identifying potentially morally defensible forms of terrorism. In the third section I outline a morally defensible form of terrorism, namely terrorism in which certain categories of morally culpable non-attackers are targeted.
about the contributors
12. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
About the Contributors
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