Roczniki Filozoficzne

The encyclical makes an analysis of the situation of the contemporary culture in which a crisis of the truth about man has occurred as well as a crisis of the meaning of human life that is connected with it. The deformities are first of all concerned with recognising the truth about God and the relations between Him and man. Hence the aim of the encyclical is to point out that „man cannot be understood without God”, and what is more, „man cannot be understood without Christ”.The problem of learning about God then has a clearly anthropological context in the encyclical. It points to two complementary ways to learn about God as the ultimate source of existence and of the Supreme Good that makes human life meaningful:1) the way of reason, through learning about the existing reality and explaining it (philosophy)2) the way of faith, that is, the way of the reason thinking while believing that God’s word is true; in it God shows truths about Himself and about man that exceed man’s cognitive abilities.Hence full cognition of the truth about God and about man as significantly connected with Him requires two kinds of cognition. Fides et ratio expresses this in a simple way: „man is a creature in quest of the truth”, he is „a philosopher by nature” and one „whose life is based on faith”. Hence man can „on the wings of reason and faith rise to contemplating the truth”. Both these ways are ways of the truth concerning the existing reality; be it natural or supernatural. When a man recognises and lives through them both they can show him the ultimate meaning of life.

The article is focused on Theological Philosophy constructed by Peter van Inwagen and modern Fundamental Theology which has been cultivated at KUL. Both disciplines try to present reasonable justification for Christian fundamental convictions. P. van Inwagen − specially in his book God, Knowledge, and Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology − knowing well modern philosophy and the mentality of people living today tries to legitimate the main Christian beliefs. He writes about how Christians can justify the existence of personal God, he legitimates the authority of the Bible (which is questionable according to some scientific theories) and he defends the specific position of the Christian Church among other religions. In conclusion he suggests that Christian beliefs are not certain for non-Christians but it does not mean that they are not reasonable and acceptable. Fundamental Theology cultivated at KUL is very similiar to P. van Inwagen’s project in some points. But in some other aspects his position should be deepened.

Along the history of ethics there is a controversy concerning the subject-matter of ethics itself − is it focused on the ways of fulfilling one’s life (happiness) or is it the normative theory of the moral duty? The author of the paper takes into considerations three concepts of ethics which were developed by Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas and Antonio Rosmini.The classical model of replacing ethics by eudaimonology is presented by Aristotle. Eudaimonism is connected in his philosophy of the human praxis with conceiveing of good in terms of the end of human action (teleological concept of good). Eudaimonia consists in fulfillment of the human life as a whole. Therefore the ultimate end of the human life is understood as the immanent end of the human nature. Aristotle identifies the moral good with the good of the human nature (natural fallacy in ethics).On the one hand the ethics of St. Thomas is dependent on the eudaimonistic views of Aristotle and on the other hand it goes beyond naturalism by pointing out the transcendent ultimate end of the human life which is idendified with God. In his theological thought St. Thomas Aquinas seeks to develop personalism. The good of person is the reason for an attitude of love on which the community of persons is founded. Because of the presence of the eudaimonistic and personalistic elements the ethics of Aquinas remains metodologically inconsistent.Antonio Rosmini thanks to his inspiration by the ethical thought of I. Kant distinguishes two diffrent practical sciences: eudaimonology and ethics. He refuses, however, Kantian apriorism and acognitivism. The moral duty is justified by the data of the moral experience. For the essence of morality consists in recognition of a being in accordance with its axiological order. Eudaimonology deals with the subjective good which is related to the nature of subject and only ethics discovers the moral obligation of affirming good for its own sake (objective good).

The birth of bioethics as a distinct branch of applied ethics is connected with extremely intensive extension of biomedical sciences in the second half of the 20th century. The problems which are connected with practical application of the achievements in contemporary medicine are not only of pragmatic but also of ethical character. The moral nature of these problems is specifically dealt with by bioethics. The interdisciplinary character of the research carried out in the field of bioethical analyses provokes a set of methodological problems; firstly, the problem of the nature and definition of bioethics. The development of bioethics is accompanied by a diversity of standpoints, often excluding each other. The authors who represent these mutually-excluding standpoints accept, at the point of departure, different ethical and anthropological principles. Thus we do not speak about one bioethics, but rather about many bioethical theories. The pluralism of bioethical standpoints is seen by some authors as an inheritance of postmodernism, some others are trying to look for general and universal bioethical principles. Such a consensus appears impossible due to the diversity of the conceptions of the person in contemporary bioethics. So the consensus in bioethics should be looked for rather in the field of anthropology.

The paper aims at answering the question of whether scientists qua scientists pass moral judgements. My answer is: “yes”. I claim that moral judgements are necessary for advancing science and that they may even belong to the content of science. This fact threatens neither rationality nor objectivity of science. On the contrary − pretending that science is morally neutral distorts it. I develop two arguments for my theses. First, against the background of the ideal of value-free science I show that value-judgements are constitutive for science. This ideal is not tenable when we consider science as human activity. By analyzing cases of research I then show that in applied sciences both methodological and moral judgements are necessary for any successful inquiry. The structure of scientific research allows me to extend this claim to science in general. Secondly, by considering science as governed by practical − not instrumental − rationality I show that moral judgements, which evaluate actions constitutive of any research as “permissible”, have their source in this rationality. Without them rationality, freedom, and autonomy of science are endangered.

In the article, the author presents certain aspects concerning the constitution of science as a distinct domain of culture. Although civilizations antedating Greek civilization had many importantachievements that today we would call scientific, science itself as having a definite object, method and aim appeared first in Greece. In Babylon and Egypt science had purely practical aims, such as counting and astrology. Among the Greeks, science possessed a theoretical dimension. The Greek concept of THEORIA signified science as well as the highest type of life man could achieve, the BIOS THEORETIKOS. Human knowledge progresses through stages. It passes through a phase where it has much in common with the knowledge possessed by brute animals, based on sensation and memory. At a later and higher phase, human knowledge is characterized by a more comprehensive experience than mere memory of facts, then by art, and finally by science, the crowning point of which is wisdom (philosophy).

Społeczeństwa zachodnie stają się coraz bardziej wielokulturowe i występuje w nich wiele różnorodnych koncepcji wolności. Jest to przejaw kryzysu kultury zachodniej. Równocześnie jest to także jedna z przyczyn tego kryzysu.Zdaniem autorki artykułu kryzys ten może być przezwyciężony poprzez prawdę. Trzeba więc obecnie formować nową kulturę − kulturę prawdy, zakorzenioną w mądrości filozoficznej i chrześcijańskiej. Tylko „kultura prawdy” może być fundamentem „cywilizacji miłości”.Poznanie prawdy o ludzkiej wolności domaga się prawdy dotyczącej całej rzeczywistości, a więc prawdy, jaką można zdobyć w filozofii wzmocnionej prawdą objawioną przez Chrystusa. W filozofii poznajemy, że Bóg jest Stwórcą całego świata, jest Miłością − Dawcą bytu, prawdy, dobra i piękna.Ostatecznie więc wolność dana jest człowiekowi przez Boga, abyśmy jako osoby − mężczyźni czy kobiety − osiągnęli pełny rozwój.Fundamentem ludzkiej wolności jest więc Bóg, który stworzył wszystko, co istnieje, co jest pomyślane przez Boga-Najwyższą Prawdę i dzięki temu posiada własną „prawdę ontologiczną". Rzeczywistość jest także chciana przez Boga-Najwyższe Dobro i dzięki temu wszystko jest dobre i możemy je kochać. Rzeczywistość stworzona jest także przez Boga-Najwyższe Piękno i dlatego wszystko, co istnieje, jest piękne i możemy je podziwiać.Własności transcendentalne wszystkiego, co istnieje, mające swe źródło w Bogu sprawiają, że człowiek posiada wolność. Brak oczywistości bezpośredniej transcendentaliów stanowi najgłębszy powód zafałszowania wolności ludzkiej.