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Stanisław Kaminski
Stanisław Kaminski
Methods Of Modern Metaphysics (Part I)
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The ways of pursuing metaphysics have become so numerous and varied today that the need for some classification is obvious. In fact they differ so much that one may doubt whether they can still be ranged under the common name of metaphysics. That is why, we must first explain how this term should be understood so as to cover all modern trends and styles adopted in this discipline. Next a distinction must be drawn between actually applied methods and others which are simply suggested or advised in a particular metaphysical approach. The paper is essentially devoted to both kinds.Following the introductory terminological remarks, the choice of the principles governing the systematics of the methods of metaphysics today is examined. Ultimately two principles have been accepted: a more historical one — according to the most distinct philosophical trends — and a second one, more systematic, according to the accepted starting point in metaphysics and the tasks ascribed.The first part of the study, presented here, gives a cyclopedic description of the characteristics of metaphysical methods, grouped in the main philosophical trends of today. In the first set are grouped methods belonging to a very large trend which may be called scientistic and intuitive philosophy (among others, Bergson, Teihard de Chardin, Whitehead, Collingwood, Gonseth, G. Martin and N. Hartmann). The second group represents analytical philosophy developing in three stages: I — Moore, Russell; II — Wittgenstein, Russell and some neopositivists; III — Wittgenstein, Wisdom, Ryle, Lazerowitz, Strawson. Phenomenology and existentialism are grouped together because their methods intercross: phenomenological method — Husserl, Scheler, Conrad-Martius, Ingarden, Landgrebe, Fink, Ricoeur; phenomenological and existential method — Heidegger, Sartre, Mer- leau-Ponty; existential method — Jaspers, Marcel and the so-called Philosophie de Vesprit (Lavelle, Le Senne, Guitton). The last group, Peripatetic philosophy, will be considered in part II.
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Witold Michałowski
Witold Michałowski
Boethius’ Hypothetical Syllogisms in the Interpretation of Modern Systems of Logic
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In the light of quotations from De syllogismo hypothetico the author shows that, in Boethius’ logic, the conjunction „si” functions as strict implication, while „cum” as truth-implication. When Boethius negates a whole sentence beginning with „si” or „cum”, he places the particle „non” before the word ,,est” in the consequent. The interpretations of Boethius’ hypothetical propositions and syUogisms by K. Dürr and R. van den Driessche are not in agreement with his intentions as expressed in De syllogismo hypothetico. In this study all Boethius’ hypothetical syllogisms have been verified as formally valid in C. I. Lewis’s system of strict implication.
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Stanisław Adamczyk
Stanisław Adamczyk
Objectivite de la Connaissance Humaine dans l’Enseignement d’Aristote et de Thomas d’Aquin
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Dans l’idée qu’elle produit du monde environnant, la connaissance humaine mène les uns à un subjectivisme exagéré, d’autres à un objectivisme total. S’il est vrai que l’idéalisme de toute espèce, suivant les pas de Platon, tombe dans un subjectivisme démesuré, le thomisme, lui, sorti de l’aristotélisme, maintient l’objectivité de notre connaissance. Ce bref article se propose de montrer que la doctrine d’Aristote et de Thomas est juste à cet égard.La première partie, appuyée principalement sur le texte du Stagirite affirmant que notre esprit ést comme une table rase sur laquelle rien n’est ecrit (III De Anima, 4, 429b 31), s’efforce de montrer, à l’encontre de l’idéalisme extréme (dont l’hégélianisme a marqué le point culminant) que les idées des choses extérieures, reconnues sur la base de l’expérience intérieure, exigent l’existence du monde extérieur.Le second point s’avance un pas plus loin. A partir de l’enseignement d’Aristote et de Thomas, l’auteur affirme, contre l’idéalisme acosmique (Leibniz, Berkeley, Leszczyński) que les idées que nous créons de choses étendues nous forcent à admettre qu’il existe un mon de matériel extérieur.Le troisième point, dirigé au premier chef contre l'empirisme de Locke et le réalisme d’une fraction néoscolastique entreprend d’établir le bien-fondé de la thèse péripatéticienne en ce qu’elle souligne l’existence d’un monde matériel extérieur, ćorrespondant à l'objet propre de notre connaissance, même sensible.Enfin, dans le dernier et 4me point, pour mettre davantage en relief l'objectivité de notre connaissance, l’auteur ajoute quelques remarques témoignant de la perception immédiate par nous du monde extérieur, que nous atteignons „propre- ment” c.' à. d. ,,au premier rang et en soi”, et avec pleine conscience dans l’acte même de la connaissance.
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Franciszek Tokarz
Franciszek Tokarz
W kwestii „teistycznych” i „ateistycznych** systemow indyjskich
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Mieczysław Gogacz
Mieczysław Gogacz
For the Proper Understanding of Proclos’ Philosophy
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To reach the right understanding of Proclos’ philosophy one needs to draw the distinction in his writings between the erudite, methodical inheritance of Neoplatonic tradition, and his own contribution to Neoplatonism. This consists not so much in the logical ordering of the learning of the Masters within the framework of Neoplatonic schemes, as in the analysis of possibilities, eliminated with the help of the principle of sufficient reason, implicitly accepted. The application of this principle in the field of possibilities a’lows Proclos to pursue a metaphysics of possibilities. What makes such metaphysics a specific one is the problem of cause, developed within the compass of a trichotomic scheme (the One, intermediaries, matter), which makes necessary the acceptance of an infinite number of hypostases between the One and matter.The proper insight into Proclos’ thought further requires the distinction between the affirmations which he accepts and the tendencies derived therefrom, and the consequences of these statements and tendencies. The hypostases of philosophy often characterize Proclos’ philosophy in the light of these consequences.Tendencies of Proclos’ philosophy: hierarchy of hypostases, tendency to exhaust the list of intermediaries between the One and matter.His basic statements: causation of hypostases, trichotomic structure of reality (the One, intermediate hypostases, matter).Consequences derived from these statements and tendencies: contradiction between the necessity of accepting an infinite number of intermediaries and the actual acceptance of a limited number of these; a nearly infinite separation of the One from plurality and, at the same time, a pantheistically emanating identification of the One with plurality in the nature of hypostases.The consequences here described have been drawn on the basis of the analysis of the passus „on cause” and that „on the immutable” from Institutio theologica. Showing thaft the problems of cause and infinite continuity of causes were pursued by Proclos on the ground of the analysis of possibilities, enables us to state that, contrary to handbook information, he not only marshalled the material of the School, but also, independently of the Masters, brought new elements into Neoplatonic philosophy (analysis of possibility, Aristotelian problem of the continuity of causes within Neoplatonic metaphysics). His solution of the thesis on the intermediaries brought him more explicitly than other Neoplatonists to essentialistic solutions.
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Stanisław Kowalczyk
Stanisław Kowalczyk
St. Augustine’s Idea of Wisdom and Learning
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St. Augustine's idea of wisdom partly studied by H. I. Marrou, F. Cayre, J. Maritain and E. Gilson, is more universal that Aristotle’s or Thomas Aquinas’. For the Bishop of Hippo the term sapientia can designate, on the supernatural plane, God’s nature, the life of grace, contemplation of God, and, on the natural plane, contemplation of truth or even man’s ethical life.The purpose of this paper is to examine in what relationship theoretical wisdom, which Augustine identifies with philosophy, and learning stand to each other. Wisdom is a universal and genetic knowledge of the world, while learning is the know^dge of the particular and phenomenon. The object of wisdom is the world of the spirit, that of learning is the material world. Wisdom and learning, even though they may be opposed, do not exclude one another. Their development precisely depends on their mutual harmonious cooperation, sapiential knowledge keeping the guiding role.
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Jan Czerkawski
Jan Czerkawski
Hannibal Rosseli Representant de l’Hermetisme Philosophique en Pologne
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L’article représente un premier essai d’analyse de Poeuvre d’Hannibal Rosseli. II cherche à découvrir la source d’inspiration philosophique de l’auteur du commentaire sur les écrits hermétiques, le seul publié en Pologne.Selon Rosseli, les écrits hermétiques eurent pour auteur Hermès Trismegistos, roi, prêtre, et sage égyptien, ayant vécu avant les prophètes juifs. II enferma la sagesse qu’il possédait dans Pimandre (14 traités du Corpus hermeticum dans la traduction de M. Ficino) et dans Asclepius; c’est une sagesse divine, révélée. Hermés est done le premier, le plus ancien d’entre les „prisci theologi”; après lui vinrent successivement les prophètes juifs, Zoroastre, Orphée, Pithagoras et Platon. De Panalyse du commentaire sur les écrits hermétiques il apparaît que Rosseli est à placer dans le courant de l'hermétisme religieux et philosophique, e’est-à-dire de l'hermétisme séparé de la magie. II met un accent particulier sur les valeurs apologétiques des textes hermétiques en montrant la concordance entre les vérités fondamentales de la religion chrétienne et celles de la „doctrine d’Hermès” et des autres „prisci theologi*’. II cherche l’unité religieuse de tous les chrétiens en propageant un christianisme moins rigoureux, du point de vue du catholicisme orthodoxe, christianisme appuyé sur quelques vérités fondamentales de la doctrine chrétienne, qui se trouvent déjà dans la „prisca theologia” (irénisme). Rosseli développe le contenu philosophique des écrits hermétiques avant tout à l’aide des doctrines philosophiques chrétiennes (augustinisme, thomisme et scotisme). La multiplicité et la diversité de ces doctrines l'inquiète, aussi cherche-t-il à en opérer la synthèse.
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Andrzej Wawrzyniak
Andrzej Wawrzyniak
Metaphysics. A Systematic Survey
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Czesław Wojtkiewicz
Czesław Wojtkiewicz
Individuals. An Essay in descriptive Metaphysics
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Stanisław Majdański
Stanisław Majdański
Filozofia na rozdrożu — analizy metodologiczne
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Antoni Stępień
Antoni Stępień
Rzeczy i dane zmysłowe. Świat i spostrzeżenie u G. E. Moore'a
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12.
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Kazimierz Wójcik
Kazimierz Wójcik
Z dziejów filozofii na Uniwersytecie Krakowskim w XV wieku
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13.
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A. B. S.
A. B. S.
Nowe czasopisma w Polsce
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14.
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Bohdan Bejze
Bohdan Bejze
W sprawie badań nad filozofią Boga. Ankieta
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15.
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Bohdan Bejze
Bohdan Bejze
Somme actual problems of the Research on the Philosophy of God
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