Journal of Philosophical Research

Descartes is typically interpreted as asserting two related theses: 1) that the will is absolutely free in the sense that no bodily state can compel it or restrain its activity; and 2) that error is always avoidable, no matter what the condition of the body. On the basis of Descartes’s discussions of insanity and dreaming, I argue that both of these interpretive claims are false. In other words, Descartes acknowledged that a diseased or otherwise out of sorts body can compel the will to affirm obscure and confused perceptions. After marshalling textual evidence for this conclusion, I go on to show how Descartes’s acknowledgment of physically induced impaired judgment can be squared with his unqualified assertions of free will, his commitment to the non-deceptiveness of God, and his epistemology.

This essay is concerned with defending Husserl against the criticism that he is insuffi ciently attentive to intersubjectivity. It has two moments; the fi rst articulates what I take to be a general version of the critique and then turns to a discussion of a version derived from Wittgenstein’s private language argument and the ensuing debate regarding this critique between Suzanne Cunningham and Peter Hutcheson. This discussion concludes by noting a general agreement betweenthe two participants that Husserl’s ego is not directly involved in intersubjective relationships. I argue that as long as this is granted, the broader criticism cannot be answered. Whence, the second moment defends Husserl against this critique arguing that Husserl’s transcendental ego is an intersubjective one.

What is sexism? What are its underlying causes? What makes it morally wrong? Can whole institutions, practices and policies, contribute to the unjust distribution of benefi ts and burdens? Or does sexism, when it exists, occur on an individual basis? This article analyzes the notion of institutional sexism for its conceptual, causal, and moral character. The author compares the notions that institutional sexism largely pertains to the oppression of women to those which say that it pertains broadly to any unjust treatment on the basis of sex. She examines the historical and cultural sources of sexism. When it exists, do the sources of sexism rest with attitudes of individuals or the very structure of institutions themselves? She shows why individual attitudes themselves are often not the sole sources of sexism, where it exists. Institutional structure can equally contribute to its existence.

Emmanuel Levinas’s contribution to philosophical conceptions of time can be understood fully only in terms of his debt to Heidegger. Taking up Levinas’s critiques of Heidegger’s Destruktion of the Aristotelian conception of time in Being and Time, this paper argues that Levinas is ultimately unable to refuse fully, for reasons having to do with Heidegger’s disastrous alignment with the Nazis in the 1930s, the debt he owes to Heidegger, his earliest and most lasting influence. Despite his problems with the Dasein analytic, Levinas does not repudiate Heidegger’s essential contributions to a deconstruction of the history of ontology. Indeed, Levinas assumes this de-structuring as providing the necessary opening for his own contribution to rethinking the notion of time. In the last section of this paper, we tease out what Levinas’s analysis means for his ambivalent relationship to Heidegger, but also in his quest to go “beyond” phenomenology.

Most shoppers like bargains. Do bargains come at the expense of workers in sweatshops around the world? The authors argue that many large multinational corporations are running the moral equivalents of sweatshops and are not properly respecting the rights of persons. They list a set of minimum standards of safety and decency that they claim all corporations should meet (and that many are not). Finally, they defend their call for improved working conditions by replying to objections that meeting improved conditions will cause greater harm than good, even to the workers themselves. They consider many specifi c corporations and name names and point the finger at various forms of disrespect for persons, along the way.

Habermas and Brandom remain divided on a key point in their theories of language concerning the priority of a participant vs. a third-person, observational perspective onto language. I examine this dispute as it has played out in a recent exchange between them, attempting to explicate and defend a qualified version of Habermas’s claim in the light of his more developed treatment of this issue elsewhere. Once the defensible content of Habermas’s claim is clarified, I argue that Habermas’s critique of Brandom highlights an important way in which Brandom fails to follow through adquately in the development of his own understanding of language as a distinctively social practice. The value in Habermas’s criticism of Brandom’s work lies not in exposing an unbridgeable gulf between their two positions, but in helping us to work out more consistently the social perspective onto language that informs both their work.

Brandom (1994) claims to have succeeded in showing how certain kinds of social practices can institute objective deontic statuses and confer objective conceptual contents on certain performances. This paper proposes a reconstruction of how, on Brandom’s views, this is supposed to come about, and a critical examination of the explicit arguments offered in support for this claim.