Environmental Ethics

The American environmental movement has a longstanding tradition of respect for American Indians. Recently, however, there has been a noticeable erosion of that tradition. The most volatile issues in the Indian/environmentalist controversey at present are those involving the right of many Indians to hunt and fish unrestricted by state or federal conservation regulations. Especially where endangered species areinvolved, some environmentalists have been quick to recommend that this unique privilege accorded to Indians be curtailed. While I share a deep concem for the preservation of endangered species and ecosystems, I suggest that the environmental movement has so far been insensitive to the concems of the American Indian community. Rather than simply seeking to take away rights to which Indians havebeen entitled for decades, environmentalists should be prepared to negotiate on such matters. As an example, I suggest that-in exchange for the Indians’ voluntary surrender of some of their treaty rights--environmentalists might agree to seek legislation opening national forest lands to Indians who wish to live subsistence life styles, as some Alaskan wildemess lands are now open to the Inuit.

With the enactment of the Wildemess Act, wildemess solitude has become a major issue in the assessment and designation of wildemess areas. Interpreting this solitude criterion to mean loneliness, federal agencies have judged wildlands according to their “isolation potential.” This perspective is highly inaccurate given the etymological derivation of solitude-“soul-mood.” Wildemess solitude is in fact a communion with wild nature. Philosophically it reflects a wildemess episteme and land aesthetic grounded in organicism. The natural aesthetic categories of Sole-the rare or unique -and the Sublime properly reflect the intent of wildemess solitude in cognitive experience. The result of this experience is an “at-one-ment” with wild nature affirming religious rapture and ecological egalitarianism. Consequently, federal agencies ought to employ wildemess review criteria grounded in natural aesthetic theory.

Because complex environmental problems are relegated to scientific experts, the ethical questions that are embedded in these problems are often hidden or distorted in scientific and administrative methodology and communication. The administrative process requires that facts and values be separated. Those values that cannot simply be ignored are usually translated into technical economic language and settled in terms of economic costs and benefits. Calls for regulatory reform-i.e., to reduce or eliminate environmental regulation--create additional pressures on analysts that encourage them to focus on quantitative questions at the expense of qualitative ones. Distortion can also result from the use of standard risk assessment procedures and from the improper placement of burden of proof on govemment agencies. The greatest problem, nevertheless, is the narrow scientific training of technical experts which frequently leaves them unprepared to deal with the ethical and value issues in environmental public policy.

Many valuable natural resources are found outside current territorial limits, for example, on the Moon and in the deep sea. As technology advances, these resources become more accessible. I argue that the claim that all humanity owns these resources is insupportable if taken literally. Because they are truly unowned, we need to develop a principle of justice in acquisition which describes the procedure that must be followed to obtain property rights to these unowned objects. I conclude with a tentative development of such a principle based on the moral ideals of fairness, freedom, and the maximization of the common good.

Sympathy for animals is regarded by many thinkers as theoretically disreputable. Against this I argue that sympathy appropriately underlies moral concern for animals. I offer an account of sympathy that distinguishes sympathy with from sympathy for fellow creatures, and I argue that both can be placed on an objective basis, if we differentiate enlightened from folk sympathy. Moreover, I suggest that sympathy for animals is not, as some have claimed, incompatible with environmentalism; on the contrary, it can ground environmental concern. Finally, I show that the traditional concept of anthropomorphism has no coherent basis, and I argue that the attempt to prove that animals lack thoughts is both unsuccessful and irrelevant to sympathy for languageless creatures.

James Lovelock’s “Gaia hypothesis”-the suggestion that life on Earth functions in essential ways as one organism, as a single living entity-is extraordinarily suggestive for environmental philosophy. What exactly it suggests, however, is not yet so clear. Although many of Lovelock’s own ethical conclusions are rather distressing for environmental ethics, there are other possible approaches to the Gaia Hypothesis. Ethical philosophers might take Gaia to be analogous to a “person” and thus to have the same sorts of values that more familiar sorts of persons have. Deep ecologists might find in the Gaia hypothesis a means by which to transform and reunderstand our concrete experience of the world. This essay canvasses some of the strengths, weaknesses, and possibilities of each approach.

Anthony Weston has criticized the place of “inttinsic value” in the development of an environmental ethic, and he has urged a “pragmatic shift” toward a plurality of values based on human desires and experiences. I argue that Weston is mistaken for two reasons: (1) his view of the methodology of environmental ethics is distorted: the intrinsic value of natural entities is not the ground of all moral obligations regarding the environment; and (2) his pragmatic theory of value is too anthropocentric and subjective for the development of a secure and reliable environmental ethic. The obligation to protect the natural environment should not be based on certain “correct” experiences of humans as they interact with wild nature.

In this essay I review John Dewey’s pragmatism from the perspective of environmental social theory. Dewey’s clarification of aesthetics, values, experience, and the natural world are useful to contemporary environmentalism. His work represents a precedent for critical, anti-dualistic social philosophy in the U. S., and usefully clarifies the relationship of humans to the “material world.” Dewey’s conception ofvalues, politics, and experience suggests that these elements may be combined in ways congenial to environmental thought.