Philosophia Christi

In his book God and Necessity and in four subsequent papers, Brian Leftow argues against metaphysical theories which hold that “God’s nature makes necessary truths true or gives rise to their truthmakers,” asserting that all such “deity theories commit us to the claim that God’s existence depends on there being truthmakers for particular necessary truths about creatures.” Leftow supports this by arguing that all deity theories entail that if it is untrue that water = H2O, then God does not exist. This paper presents a counterexample deity theory along with a synopsis of its correlative theory of truth and truthmaking.

Epistemic reasons exist indubitably, yet confusion surrounds just what exactly they are, in and of themselves. In this paper I argue that there is only one thing they could credibly be: the favoring attitudes a god is adopting toward us believing what is true and following methods of belief formation likely to result in true beliefs. As the existence of epistemic reasons is indubitable then if this analysis is correct, it will provide us with an apparent proof of a god’s existence.

Complexity theorist Stuart Kauffman writes Reinventing the Sacred: A New View of Science, Reason, and Religion to defend ontological emergence and refute theism. He argues naturalistic emergentism is the preferable alternative to a naturalistic reductionism that views all reality as reducible to particles in motion. Among the central claims naturalistic emergentists make is that they have built their worldview on the firm foundations of science. In this paper I argue that naturalistic theories of ontological emergence are incompatible with the philosophical preconditions necessary for practicing science.

The problem of evil typically allows the existence of evil to go unchecked. However, in order to be able to press the problem of evil against the theist, the skeptic must offer an account of evil. We examine several of these God-independent accounts and show how difficult it is to define evil without ultimately relying on the metaphysics of value that theism provides. On the other hand, according to the God-dependent account of evil that we endorse, God is logically and metaphysically antecedent to evil. Thus, in either case, the “problem” of evil for the theist can never coherently arise.

One of the main arguments against interventionist views of special divine action is that God would not violate his own laws. But if intervention entails the breaking of natural law, what precisely is being broken? I consider the main approaches to laws: Humean reductionism, supervenience on causal powers, the structure of possible worlds, and nomological realism. In the end, I argue that early modern natural philosophers largely had it right. Laws are not created entities or powers that act as intermediaries between God and nature; they are best understood as expressions of God’s will for nature.

Kant’s negative, distorted views on black Africans, human sexuality, and revealed religion led him to undervalue the case for racial equality, healthy sexual intimacy, and the virtues of Christianity as a revealed religion with its commending worship, prayer, and rites. Kantian anthropology and critique of revealed religion is contrasted with the more capacious approach of the Cambridge Platonists. Challenging Kant’s methodological bias is important in removing the obstacles facing a fair assessment of matters of race, sexuality, and the virtues of Christianity as a religion based on revelation.

I contend that Kant’s philosophy, as it stands, is strictly deistic in a strictly epistemic sense, but its own internal theological momentum suggests this epistemic deism may be overcome in the eyes of faith because of ontological considerations surrounding God and God’s work in the world. I sketch six “signposts” in defense of this claim that emerge out of the New Wave. Because these signposts lead directly to two philosophically viable and theologically acceptable roadways for overcoming the charge of deism, I conclude that “maybe” is the best answer to the question “Can the New Wave Baptize Kant’s Deism?”

In recent decades there has arisen what Keith Yandell labels the “new wave” of Kant interpretation. These “new wavers” argue that Kant has a more robust view of God and religion than traditionally granted. This article is part of an exchange with Chris Firestone, originally presented at the AAR’s annual meeting, on the question “Can the New Wave Baptize Kant’s Deism?” In what follows, I argue no, contending that the theologically robust Kant of the new wave still builds on a foundation that is fundamentally incompatible with historical Christianity. Thus, Kant’s theology and Christianity can never be brought into harmony.

In “Idolatry and the End of Apologetics,” I worried that while continental philosophy can aid Christian philosophers and theologians, it can also tempt us toward the “Idolatry of Linguistic License”—an idolatry which sets God so far beyond our words that we deny God’s normative place in the community of speakers while safeguarding our autonomy vis-à-vis God. My essay suggested that some passages in Myron Bradley Penner’s helpful book, The End of Apologetics, might pass too close to the Idolatry of Linguistic License. In Penner’s irenic reply he affirmed that the Idolatry of Linguistic License is a real worry, but protested that I had misread him at several points. This response seeks to continue that irenic tone in a discussion of three points where I still have some questions.

Bradley N. Seeman has argued that The End of Apologetics comes perilously close to what he calls “the idolatry of linguistic license.” Despite my recent reply, Seeman continues to have a few concerns about my position. I offer a clarification regarding my description of theological language as “poetics,” and argue that it is a way of acknowledging the contingency of all theological descriptions and vocabularies. I also counter Seeman’s insistence on trans-language game truth-makers by noting that it begs the central issue of my “alethic quasi realism,” and argue that this is not a thoroughly deflated concept of truth.

There are good reasons to think there is a universal, fundamental length, specifically, at the order of the Planck length. If this holds, we then have an empirical answer for (1) Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the tortoise, (2) a potential impasse in the second premise of the kalam cosmological argument, and (3) creation ex nihilo. In this paper, I establish metaphysical, empirical, and epistemic reasons suggesting there is a universal, fundamental length. Along the way, I propose a “contingent necessity” for such a notion. I then detail how a universal, fundamental length is a preferred solution for issues (1)–(3).

Some Christian theorists define love in terms of benevolence (that is, willing or desiring someone’s good for her own sake), or benevolence plus some minor addition (e.g., being emotionally responsive to the one loved). Here I rely on a thought experiment involving a fully benevolent human, dubbed “Benevolent Billy,” to show that benevolence accounts of this kind are insufficient as a distinctly Christian account of love. This is because those who exemplify ideal Christian love for another must be intrinsically motivated to form or maintain caring, reciprocal relationships with those loved (at least when all other things are equal); yet there is nothing about Billy’s perfect benevolence that so motivates.

There is an old argument rooted in the classical natural law tradition that says that the “perverse” or “unnatural” use of a human faculty is immoral. This short essay offers a derivation, overview, and brief defense of this “perverted faculty” argument (PFA). I shall argue that the PFA is entailed by some commonsense theses about the nature of goodness.

In this article, I examine and respond to Charles Taylor’s phenomenology of language. Taylor argues for the constitutive theory of language by refuting the designative theory of language. According to Taylor, designative theory fails to grasp the constitutive nature of language which opens up human meanings and values, shapes our emotions, and defines our social footings. Metaphors and symbols convey important insights about human reality through extending our language capacity. By comparing with Paul Ricoeur’s and Avery Dulles’ analysis of symbols, we can also see the significance of figurative speech in religious life. Finally, the anticipated criticism of Taylor’s argument of moral felt intuition is also defended.