NTU Philosophical Review

T'his article deals with modern ethical values. The author tries to use the phenomenological method to analyse the differences and the possible coincidence between normative ethics and meta-ethics.The normative ethics which concentrates its heavy point in the practical part of philosophy, and the meta-ethics, which maintains the cognitive function would be more fundamental in moral philosophy, inspires the same moral subject, namely the human being, according to the descriptive phenomenologicol point of vievv.In the transcendental phenomenology this moral subject practises its cognition, volition and all other inner activities as a pure subject in its transcendental milieu.The volition as one of the human inner activities brings not only the intentional act, creates also all bonum sibi and consequently any bonum alteri. Bonum sibi and bonum alteri constructe the perfect goal of moral philosophy.Thus in the constititive phenomenology the moral subject contents all the subjective intention and volition, and at the same time all the objective goods both for himself and for others.The moral subject, the ethical person, stands in the middle point of the ethical values. It would be the possible coincidence and conformity between normative ethis and meta-ethics.

I explore the concepts of existence and substance in the present paper. "To be" is the pivotal concept of ontology. Aristotle says that "there is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes whic belong to this in virtue of its own nature." Descartes treats being as a perfection, but Kant clams that "to be" is not a real predicate. In the practice of modern logic "to be" is distinguished between the following three senses: identity, predication, and existence.In the second section, I discuss the various senses of Aristotle's uses of "things are said to be". All of these uses can be presented in the formula of quantificational logic. In the remaining part, I discuss Ariatotle's conceptof substance. In particular, the distinction between species, genus, and accidental properties are clarified, the general structural features of substance are explicated.

John Rawls argues, in his renowned book A Theory of Justice, that the concept of right is prior to the concept of the good. It seems the underlying idea is that he takes the diversity of comprehensive philosophical or moral doctrines as an enduring fact of the public culture of the contemporary constitutional democracy. Therefore, he attempts to construct his conception of justice without presupposing any particular comprehensive ideal of the good. This article tries to show that Rawls does assume a controversial conception of the good, namely, the individualistic ideal of the person, as one of premises in developping his theory of justice. In other words, Rawls cannot consistentlyholds the priority of right over the good.

To have "faith" in a person is to say to him, "You will never betray me!" To be "faithful" to a person is to say to him, "I will never betray you!" Faith and fidelity which seem to be two separate iterns, are nevertheless sprung from the same loy lng-presence of an "I-Thou Relationship". They simply are two different foci of the same mutual call and response. In addition to the horizontal-human dimension of faith and fidelity between two human persons, we also have the vertical-transcendent dimension of faith and fidelity between man and God. The one cannot be separated from the other any more than love of neighbour can be separated from love of God. Those unbelievers who live in fidelity create a climate in which belief in God can grow just as small trees create a climate in which a forest of large trees can grow.The article is divided into three main parts:Part I meditates on Marcel's analysis of the meaning of Faith.Part II discusses about Marcel's description on the meaning of Fidelity.Part III is a synthetic explanation of the combined meaning of Faith and Fidelity together. An emphasis is placed on the connection between the horizontal aspect and the vertical aspect of the two notions.

One basic problem of epistemic justification is the regress problem. The externalist attempts to solve the regress problem by claiming that the acceptance of beliefs satifying the externalist conditions is epistemically justified. They claim that the person for whom the belief is justified need not himself has any cognitive grasp at all of the reasons. This paper introduces D. M. Armstrong's and A. Goldman's theories and analyses the arguments in favor of or against the theories. I argue that externalsim is not sufficient forepistemic justification.

In dealing with the relation between existence and value, the author first gives an analysis concerning the meaning of existence and value respectively, then bases his argument on the Confucian theory of human nature, and his conclusion goes on as follows: 1) value, the act of evaluation, or the Haught to be" is significant only for human being because the condition for evaluation is freedom to choose; 2) thus, the criterion of value, or the sense of good and evil, must be inside human nature; 3) this "inside" must be understood as a propensity rather than an entity; and 4) the idea of human nature as "tending toward goodness" is Confucian's original standpoint and is competent to interprete the essence of humans.

( I ) The Aim of Learning and the View of Values of the Neo-Confucianists of the Sung Dynasty.When we investigate the. school of Neo-Confucianists of the Sung dynasty, the first vivid impression upon us is its aim at sagehood; i. e., to become sages is the goal in life of the Sung Neo-Confucianists. The Neo-Confucianists all agree that all men can, in principle and in practice, become sages, at least, by learning. But what is the ideal type of a sage? and how to become a sage? These become urgent questions to be answered. To the first question the easy and too easy answer is that what the Neo-Confucianists mean by sagehood is nothing but the traditional one of the Confucian sagehood-a perfect personality of the moral world, an "internal sage and external king" who is well versed in music and rites and who can elevate and transform the people and the customs of the whole nation as described in the Analects, the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean and the Book of Mencius. However, after some contemplation and deliberation I am of the opinion that this could not be the case. For from Mencius' time till the early Sung dynasty there had one thousand and two hundred years elapsed and in between there were Taoism developed and Buddhism introduced into China and, thus, more or less the Taoistic idea of "true man" and Buddhistic ideas of "Buddha" and "bodhisattva" could exert some influence in the conception of sagehood for the NeoConfucianists, although the Neo-Confucian sagehood still retains its original moral character.Next, how to become a sage? Although accordance to the Neo-Confucianists each and every person could become a sage, it is in fact hardly so. This is the case mainly because most persons are sooner or later lost in the ocean of human or, worse, animal desires. Here the Neo-Confucianists emphasize very much the crucial distinstion between human desires and Heavenly Order or Principle. Hence, how to get rid of human or anirnal desires and to follow only the Heavenly Order-this is the gate to sagehood-becomes the most urgent problem for the Neo-Confucianists. Here, however, atnong the Neo-Confucianists they differ quite a los in their methods of how to attain sagehood. Thus, to Chou Lien-hsi the method is: "Be tranquil and establish the Ultimate", to Shao Kang-chieh the method is: "View things as things viewing themselves", toChang Heng-chü the method is: "make acquaintance with humanity" and "Calm the human nature", to both Cheng Yi-chuan and Chu Hsi the method is: "hold fast to seriousness and exhaust all principles" and "investigate things and entend knowledge" and, lastly, to Lu Hsiang-shan the method is: "cultivate the original mind." Although the Neo-Confucianists differ in their methods of how to attain sagehood, they all agree that the Heavenly Order or Principle is inherent in us and when it manifests in our moralactions it reveals as Humanity (jen), Righteousness (yi), Propriety (Ii) , Wisdom (chih) and Faithfulness (hsing). Anyway, to the Chinese people "Heavenly Order and conscience" has thus become the most universal and popular standard of moral judgements.( II ) Sage as the One who Acts in accord with the Heavenly Order and Sage as the One who is a Successor in the Lineage of the Tao Era.According to the Neo-Confucianists the period of Chinese history from Mencius' time till the early Sung dynasty was a dark age where there appeared hardly a single sage and a period only human or animal desires prevailed. They diagnose the period as a time of the popularization of ( i ) egoistic utilitarianism as well as ( ii ) Zen Buddhism.( i ) Egoistic utilitarianism is rejected by the Neo-Confucianists mainly because they consider that it roots on selfishness which is regarded as a drive that would lead to disturbance, disasters and, even, destruction. According to the Neo-Confucianists sages are just those who can get rid of, and would help us to get rid of, such a human desire of selfishness on the one hand and vvould follow only the Heavenly Order on the other hand. In short, they regard sages as those who are going to build a humanistic kingdomfor us by following the Heavenly Order and purifying the human desires.( ii ) The Neo-Confucianists reject Zen Buddhism for two reasons. First, the Neo-Confucianists consider that Zen Buddhism does not understand Heavenly Order, for it has a very negative attitude towards life and human civilization. Secondly, Zen Buddhism abandoms moral life, despises or neglects social duty and cares or pursues only personal peace of the mind-this is a typical attitude of selfishness according to the Neo-Confucianists and thus does not go with the Confucian ideal of "jen" or benevolence.Here the Neo-Confucianists responded to the far-distance call of Han Yü (768-824 A. D.) to go back to the original Confucianism as proclaimed in his "An Inquiry on Tao". Thus they coined a new concept of "Tao-t'ung " or "(the lineage of) the Tao era", which puts in succession Emperor Yao, Emperor Shun, Emperor Yü , Emperor Shang, Emperors Wen and Wu, Duke Chou, Confucius and Mencius as the representatives or sages of "Tao-t'ung" or "the lineage of the Tao era". However, this lineage of the Tao era had been interrupted according to the Neo-Confucianists for, alas, more than one thousand years and, then, it was revived again and succeeded by, perhaps, theNeo-Confucianis. Chu Hsi further interprets "Taot'ung" "the lineage of the sages' transmission of the mind". And in due course Tao-t'ung becomes the orthodox standard of (judging) the cultural, political, historical as well as the social values and exerts profound influence on Chinese thoughts, although in modern time we have to reflect on it again under the Western challenge.

本文以「預知」為討論的焦點，以亞里士多德〈詮釋〉第九 章為討論起點，展開決定論的論辯。首先，邏輯決定論者以任何事件都是邏輯必然的發生或不發 生，故推論預知乃是必然。而亞里士多德則依「可能性J、「精思 熟慮J 、「行為J 等概念的分析來駁斥邏輯決定論的論證無效。其次，律則決定論則以現代科學為基礎，強化了決定論的立 場，對道德責任造成更大的街擊。然本文則以「波柏一韓佩爾 科學解釋的演繹律則模式」為主要舉隅、來說明律則決定論的立 場，並以波柏對精確度之可計量原則來質疑律則決定論的立場，並結論出:不論知識是基於科學的或神論的律則，皆不可能獲得 全然的預知。

佛教在人人皆有佛性的前題下，主張眾生平等。然而在佛典 及僧團制度，均不免有貶抑女性之處。中國佛教各宗派因其各自 偏重之教義，對婦女之定位亦有所不同。本文專就禪宗比丘尼之 神悟經驗及其地位加以討論。本文第一部份探討從原始佛教到大乘佛教典籍中，婦女地位 如何漸次提昇。第二部份探討女性禪師的證悟經驗和受肯定的原因9 並舉例 說明之。

This paper presents an analysis of the concept of Technik in Heidegger's philosophy, especially of its relationship with Being and with man. It is divided into three sections: (1) Technik as a Mode of Unconcealment. Here the author shows that Technik is not a way of human making, it is instead a kind of the unconcealment of Being. But, what is the nature of this unconcealment? Section (2) shows that the nature of Technik is Gestell, a term that cannot be correctly translated into English. In Heidegger, Gestell is thecollective noun of a group of "stellene", e.g. bestellen, umstellen, aufstellen, darstellen, sicherstellen, nachstellen and verstellen··· etc. Section (3), its title is "The Relationship betwveen Gestell and Man interprets how the thinking of man is dominated and endangered by Gestell, and how man escapes its domination.