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articles

1. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 4
Philipp W. Rosemann

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2. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 4
David C. Greetham

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Textual criticism and the scholarly editions it produces have all too often been regarded by academics as well as general readers as “objective” (or even “scientific”) applications of a fi xed set of procedures, designed to create a “definitive” text. But such editions are just as much a reflection of cultural and ideological expectations as are any other “critical” activities. Thus, the Jeauneau parallel-text edition of Eriugena’s Periphyseon, with its presentation of “matièe en fusion” and its embrace of a continually evolving work in “perpétuel devenir” is to be seen as an appropriate postmodernist celebration of the “supplément,” the marginal, the incomplete, and the fragmented. In this promotion of the “scriptible” (or “open,” “writerly”) text over the “lisible” (“closed” or “readerly”), Jeauneau stands in contrast with the precedent edition of Eriugena by Sheldon-Williams, which is a modernist attempt to arrive at “satisfaction” and the positive.
3. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 4
Paul Edward Dutton

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The ninth-century Irish philosopher, theologian, and speculative grammarian Eriugena invented a number of words, chiefly in order to accommodate Greek terms in Latin. Filiolitas or “sonship” was one of these and a particularly distinctive new word, which almost no one but Eriugena seems to have used. Indeed it appears in all the works ascribed to him and serves both as a word for adoptive sonship in a theological context and as a relative noun in grammatical references. The appearance of the word in a letter of King Charles the Bald may also suggest Eriugena’s authorship of that letter.
4. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 4
Catherine Kavanagh

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The Aristotelian categories are a fundamental element in Eriugena’s philosophical system on account of his realist view of dialectic. He received his texts concerning the categories from Boethius and the De decem catagoriis, but key ideas in his treatment of them—namely, the metaphysical importance of dialectic, the unknowability of essence, and the origin of being in place and time, ideas fundamentally rooted in Byzantine developments of the Christology of Chalcedon—are taken from Maximus the Confessor. Eriugena’s work on the categories represents an attempt, much misunderstood, to assimilate the richness of the Eastern tradition to Western philosophical and theological method. This paper examines the synthesis of Maximus’s ideas with Ciceronian and Boethian elements in Eriugena’s striking treatment of the Aristotelian Categories.
5. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 4
Valery V. Petroff

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This article discusses the development of John Scottus Eriugena’s teaching on the spiritual body. In his early treatise De praedestinatione, as well as in the Periphyseon, John Scottus understands the spiritual body as ethereal or aerial. This conception tacitly assumes that men and angels are connatural. Moreover, Eriugena’s angelology and demonology compel him to localize Hades in the air—a teaching in which he follows a well-established ancient and Christian tradition. John Scottus is influenced by ideas of Origen and Gregory of Nyssa in maintaining that there are two different kinds of human bodies; the interpretation of the biblical “coatsof skin” as the earthly human body plays an important part in this. According to Eriugena, the soul in a sense creates an earthly body for itself. In later passages from the Periphyseon, he abandons the idea of individual subtle bodies, accepting a complete transformation of body into spirit at the resurrection. However, he remains ambiguous on this point as his position would contradict Christian doctrine. The Periphyseon culminates in a paraphrase of a section from Ambigua ad Iohannem XXXVII. In the light of the latter text, the nature of the eight gradual unifications from the epilogue of the Periphyseon becomes clear.
6. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 4
L. Michael Harrington

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Apparently alone among medieval Christians, Eriugena argues that all life is immortal. He relies on Plato’s Timaeus as his primary source for this claim, but he modifies the argument of the Timaeus considerably. He turns Plato’s cosmic soul into the genus of life, thereby taking a treatise that originally dealt with cosmology and using it to explore the ontological significance of definition. All species that fall under the genus of life must be immortal, because a mortal species would contradict the genus. No later medieval author would take up Eriugena’s arguments explicitly, although Aquinas comes close. The two thirteenth-century thinkers to address universal immortality seriously—Aquinas and Bonaventure—argue against it, but they are more faithful than Eriugena himself to a literal reading of the Timaeus.
7. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 4
Avital Wohlman

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Most commentators fi nd Eriugena’s On the Division of Nature to be a variation on the theme of emanation, which flows from the One and back to it, bypassing concrete reality. My intention is to highlight the Christian traits of the four divisions of nature as the spiritual itinerary destined to lay bare the ontology of Augustine’s saeculum. Following Augustine, Eriguena identifies true philosophy with true religion. The central value of concrete reality, the third division of nature, is rooted in the mystery of the Incarnation. Reason’s conclusions and rules of true religion prepare man to envisage the aporia of freedom of will as the euporia revealed by grace.
8. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 4
Philipp W. Rosemann

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This article offers a reading of Eriugena’s thought that is inspired by Heidegger’s claim according to which being is constituted in a dialectical interplay of revelation and concealment (ά-λήθεια). Beginning with an analysis of how “causality as concealing revelation” works on the level of God’s inner-Trinitarian life, the piece moves on to a consideration of the way in which the human soul reveals itself in successive stages of exteriorization that culminate in the creation of the body, its “image.” The body, however, conceals as much as it reveals true human nature. Moreover, it is shown that for Eriugena all of reality, as theophany, possesses this character of (un)concealing its fundamental truth. These insights lead Eriugena to a recognition of radical human finitude, as genuine wisdom requires an acknowledgement of our fundamental ignorance.

books received

9. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 4

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contents of volume

10. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 4

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articles

11. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 3
Roopen Majithia

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The gathering consensus on the inclusive/exclusive debate regarding happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics seems to be that both sides of the story are partly right. For while the life of happiness (understood as the total life of an individual) is inclusive of ethical and contemplative virtue among other things, the central activity of happiness is exclusively contemplation. The discussions of the Eudemian Ethics, on the other hand, seem to suggest that this text is broadly inclusive. The view I defend here is that the Eudemian text is no more and no less inclusive that the Nicomachean version, although there are significant differences between them in terms of the life of contemplation. That is, I argue that the Eudemian Ethics is concerned with the political life and the actualization of theōria in this context, and suggest that the Nicomachean Ethics is concerned with contemplation in the context of both political and philosophical lives.
12. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 3
Benjamin Brown

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Th is paper examines St. Bonaventure’s arguments for the impossibility of a beginningless world, taking into consideration their historical background and context. His argument for the impossibility of traversing the infinite is explored at greater length, taking into account the classic objection to this argument. It is argued that Bonaventure understood the issues at hand quite well and that histraversal argument is valid. Because of the nature of an actually infinite multitude, the difference between the infinite by division and the infinite by addition collapses and a beginningless past entails a day infinitely distant from the present, as Bonaventure claims. Because such a chasm is not traversable, as virtually everyone admits, Bonaventure’s conclusion that the world must have a beginning is correct.
13. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 3
Jan A. Aertsen

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This essay examines Aquinas’s analysis of the human desire to know, which plays a central role in his thought. (I.) This analysis confronts him with the Aristotelian tradition: thus, the desire for knowledge is a “natural” desire. (II.) It also confronts him with the Augustinian tradition, which deplores a non-virtuous desire in human beings that is called “curiosity.” (III.) Aquinas connects the natural desire with the Neoplatonic circle motif: principle and end are identical. The final end of the desire to know is the knowledge of God. (IV.) Aquinas also connects the end of the natural desire to know with Christian eschatology, teaching that man’s ultimate end is the visio Dei. This end, however, is “supernatural.” (V.) Duns Scotus severely criticizes central aspects of Aquinas’s account. (VI.) As a rejoinder to Scotus’s objections, we finally consider Aquinas’s view on the proper object of the human intellect.
14. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 3
Craig A. Boyd

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Interpreters of Aquinas’s theory of natural law have occasionally argued that the theory has no need for God. Some, such as Anthony Lisska, wish to avoid an interpretation that construes the theory as an instance of theological definism. Instead Lisska sees Aquinas’s ontology of natural kinds as central to the theory. In his zeal to eliminate God from Aquinas’s theory of natural law, Lisska has overlooked two important features of the theory. First, Aquinas states that the desire for God is a primary precept of the natural law and thus constitutes a critical aspect of his ontology. Secondly, Aquinas’s theory of natural law must be seen in the larger context of his theory of participation since he says, “The natural law is the rational creature’s participation in the eternal law.”
15. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 3
Ian Leask

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This article situates Levinas’s reading of Kant in terms of his opposition to Heidegger. It suggests that, although Levinas and Heidegger both put great stress upon the affective aspect of Kant’s philosophy, ultimately they diverge sharply over the issue of finitude: where Heidegger’s Kant suggests that there is “nothing but finite Dasein,” Levinas stresses the significance of transcending finitude, ethically. In this respect, Levinas’s Kant-reading converges strongly with the interpretation Heidegger so strongly opposed—Cassirer’s. And, as such, Levinas’s anti-Heideggerian position commits him—perhaps surprisingly—to a kind of neo-Kantian Manichaeism: on the one hand, finite and sense-less Being; on the other, an ethical intrigue beyond ontology. The article concludes that Levinas thereby maintains (rather than “deconstructs”) central schisms of High Modernity.
16. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 3
John Deely

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As modernity began with a redefinition of the human being, so does postmodernity. But whereas the modern definition of the human being as res cogitans cut human animals off from both their very animality and the world of nature out of which they evolved and upon which they depend throughout life, the postmodern definition as semeiotic animal both overcomes the separation from nature and restores the animality essential to human being in this life. Semiotics, the doctrine of signs suggested by Augustine and theoretically justified by Poinsot, developed in our own day after Peirce, introduces postmodernity by overcoming the Kantian epistemological limits on the side of ens reale and showing the social constructions superordinate to ens reale as essential to animal life.

review articles

17. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 3
Thomas Williams

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In her volume on Aquinas for Routledge’s “Arguments of the Philosophers” series, Eleonore Stumps aims at an interpretation of Aquinas that is historically faithful but also responsive to the concerns of contemporary philosophers. I assess her success in attaining this twofold aim by examining in detail Stump’s overview of Aquinas’s metaphysics, which engages with contemporary debates over constitution and identity, and her interpretation of Aquinas’s account of justice, which brings Aquinas into dialogue with Annette Baier and Thomas Nagel. I conclude with a brief evaluation of the merits of Stump’s twofold aim.
18. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 3
Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen

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After a brief sketch of the state of Buridan studies, this review article examines the recent study, by Benoît Patar, of a commentary on Aristotle’s Physics that is generally attributed to Albert of Saxony, but which Patar believes to have been authored by John Buridan (the text is preserved in the manuscript Bruges, Stadsbibliotheek 477, fols. 60va–163vb, and was edited by Patar himself in 1999). Patar is utterly convinced that the Bruges Quaestiones represent Buridan’s prima lectura, that is, his first course of lectures on the Physics, which preceded the two other redactions that are traditionally attributed to him. However, there is no textual evidence in support of this assumption, but only speculative circumstantial evidence. The article therefore rejects Patar’s thesis as highly problematic.

book reviews

19. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 3
Johannes Fritsche

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20. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 3
Christopher Kaczor

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