Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion

In the Nyāya school of Classical Indian Philosophy, the concept of word meaning is described in detail; however, the theory of metaphor seems to clash with the theory of word meaning. This paper explores the theory of meaning in the early Nyāya theory and whether metaphor is compatible with it. The Nyāya theory of meaning is a 'basis for application' (pravrttinimitta) model: words pick out references because of the conventions and practices of use. Yet, these words can come to refer to something completely different by pushing off its conventional usage and taking on a metaphorical meaning. If the referent is determined on the basis of the properties it possesses, how it is possible that only some properties are applied to a referent in metaphorical cases when, conventionally, a referent must possess all of the properties before the word is applied to it? This paper will investigate three main questions: 1) what is the nature of a referent according to the Nyāya?; 2) what is the mechanism for metaphorical transfer that allow some properties to transfer and not others?; and 3) what are the philosophical implications of the Naiyāyikas understanding of meaning?

This essay presents a critical analysis of Sen's theory of human rights. I pay particular attention to his attack on Jeremy Bentham's denunciation of natural rights and the charge that preexisting universal rights are without foundation. I begin by providing some context for understanding Sen's approach to the debate about human rights. I then present a brief overview of rights theory and define the important terms, and also present Bentham's understanding of the 'foundational problem' and why he regards it as a dangerous problem. I offer a short overview of the human rights movement that covers its progress since Bentham's time. I then present a critique of Sen's defense of human rights and conclude that Sen's efforts to invalidate Bentham do not succeed. Bentham's contribution to the debate over human rights remains relevant.

This cross-disciplinary, cross-cultural paper explores and critiques scientific, philosophical, and psychological concepts of consciousness. It embodies many of the ideas I presented at the First International Conference for the Study of Consciousness Within Science in 1990, a gathering of physicists, neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers, all of whom were trying to come to grips with both the experience and the idea of consciousness in their work.