NTU Philosophical Review

萊特（Crispin Wright, 1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1992, 1998）在近 年來提出一個重要的立場，認為意義與意向在形上本質上應被視為次 性（secondary property）。萊特的立場建立在一個所謂的「判斷依決理 論」（Judgment-Dependence Account）上，其基本主張為，如同某物是 否屬於某顏色概念之外延，須得取決於認知主體對此物所做之相關反 應或判斷，人所使用文字之意義與人所擁有心理意向之內容，亦須由 人對它們所做的相關判斷所決定。柏哥席恩（Boghossian, 1989）在後續的討論裡，對萊特理論提出 一個重要的批評。柏哥席恩指出，萊特的理論無法滿足一個內部的限 制條件，即獨立性條件，因而此理論無法成立，對意義與意向之解釋 而言，亦是一個無效的理論。筆者首先釐清柏哥席恩批評的要旨、以 及其效力，並進一步指出，萊特的判斷依決理論在理解上有模糊性， 一旦釐清此模糊性，我們發現，萊特理論的其中一個理解版本會受到 柏哥席恩的攻擊，然另一個理解版本將可恰當地避開。本文的主要目 的在藉由上述之討論，給出一個較為可行與合理的判斷依決理論之版 本，並以此版本，闡明萊特理論的基本精神與內容，並於結論裡，評 析將語意與意向定位為次性在哲學上的意涵與前瞻性。

本文探討人類胚胎具有怎樣的形上與道德地位，是許多生命倫理 議題共同的基礎問題。文分四部分，首先，先說明問題的背景與重要 性，指出本問題無論是對傳統的墮胎課題，或對當今最熱門的胚胎幹 細胞研究或人類複製的倫理探討，都是不可規避的問題。其次，本文 在討論這個問題之前，將先界定問題的精確意涵。這裡其實有兩個息 息相關但卻不太一樣的問題，一個是胚胎形上地位的問題，一個是胚 胎道德地位的問題。形上地位的問題要問的是胚胎是否是位格，而道 德地位問題則是胚胎是否因而具有位格的尊嚴。由於位格尊嚴仍是相 當籠統的觀念，本文將問題聚焦在一個具體的問題上，亦即在正常情 境下是否可以為了醫學研究而殺害胚胎？界定好問題意涵後，本文最 主要的論述在第三部份。這裡先探討位格是什麼，然後以此為基礎來 處理「人類胚胎是否是位格」這個根本問題，最後再輔以「謹慎論證」 指出：人類胚胎是位格，或至少，在沒有充分證據顯示它不是位格的 情形下，應將之視為位格。第四部分是結論，根據前一部分之討論， 若人類胚胎應被當成位格來看待，那麼，在正常情境下，為了促進醫 學研究與人類福祉而殺死胚胎是不合乎倫理的。

本文之目的在於經由對當代學者理解《荀子》哲學的兩組框架── 「性惡論」和「天人之分」的解構之嘗試，來探索建構荀子哲學之另一 種可能性。本文的探討主要分為兩個部分。在前半，先評述針對此問題 的日本荀子研究成果，再與目前開創著《荀子》研究的新視野之三位臺 灣學者──蔡錦昌、王慶光、以及劉又銘先生──的主要見解進行對 話，將「性惡論」與「天人之分」兩項此核心主張之「核心」一詞放入 括弧之後，進行以此兩大核心主張為主要內容的《荀子》哲學之解構。 在後半，本文將以「性惡論」與「天人之分」的觀點無法掌握的《荀子‧ 不苟》中的「誠」概念為例，試圖發現《荀子》思想的整體性面貌，藉 此探索重建更具有綜合性的《荀子》哲學體系之可能性。

Consider two of the central debates in the contemporary philosophy of mind: the debate between representationalism and anti-representationalism about phenomenal character, and the debate between conceptualism and nonconceptualism about the content of experience. The former, the qualia debate, centers on whether the phenomenal character of conscious experience is exhausted by its representational content. The latter is about whether conceptual capacities are constitutive of the representational content of perceptual experience such that the only kind of content that perceptual experience possesses is conceptual content. Most philosophers consider these two debates as unrelated, or at least should be treated separately. In this paper, I argue that there is an obvious and important sense in which the two issues are related. More specifically, if one accepts conceptualism, it would impose a significant constraint on what position one is allowed to take in the qualia debate. First, I suggest that once it is made clear that conceptualism can be considered as a particular version of representationalism, the conceptualist would have to take a certain stance on whether there are nonintentional qualia. The reason why the conceptualist needs to worry about the qualia issue is that if in addition to intentional content perceptual experiences also contain nonintentional qualia as constituents, then perceptual experiences cannot be fully conceptual. Second, I argue that although in McDowellian conceptualism the content of perceptual experience is construed in terms of Fregean sense rather than internal mental representation, it still faces challenges from the Inverted Earth argument against representationalism. My goal is not to show that conceptualism fails, but to show that it is a serious issue that the defenders of conceptualism have to take into consideration.

This paper explores Kant's account of force, a topic that was of central philosophical concern in his day, but which he does not explicitly address in any of his Critiques. Just as with the nature of space and time and the nature of the human will, the nature of force was under dispute by the philosophers and natural scientists to whose legacy Kant was responding. Yet, Kant does not make force an explicit topic of his Critiques, and thus provides no explicit transcendental account of force. Nevertheless, I will argue that one can indeed find in Kant a transcendental account of force, one that is a synthesis of empiricist and rationalist accounts, but in an unexpected place; the third Critique, in the discussion of the principle of purposiveness