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1. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 3
Blake McAllister

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I examine Leibniz’s version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason with respect to free will, paying particular attention to Peter van Inwagen’s argument that this principle leads to determinism. Ultimately I conclude that Leibniz’s formulation is incompatible with free will. I then discuss a reformulation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason endorsed by Alexander Pruss that, I argue, manages to both retain the strength of Leibniz’s formulation and remain consistent with free will.

2. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 3
Alex Haitos

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I am trying to develop an account of possibility that is consistent with the changing world of our experience. Possibility is often viewed as something that has the same form as actuality, minus existence. Or it is taken that what a possibility is, is a (re)combination of the elements of actuality. Neither of these views of possibility can countenance radical novelty. Using Bergson and Whitehead, I begin to construct an account of possibility compatible with genuine novelty.

3. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 3
Alicia M.R. Donner

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The planet’s swiftly growing population coupled with the lack of food security and the degradation of natural resources has caused many demographers to worry about the ramifications of unchecked population growth while many philosophers worry about the ethical issues surrounding the methods of population control. Therefore, I intend to argue a system of encouraging a decrease in personal fertility rate via financial incentives offers a solution that is both viable and not morally reprehensible.

4. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 3
Mark Bowker

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The lottery puzzle can elicit strong intuitions in favour of skepticism, according to which we ordinary language-users speak falsely about knowledge with shocking regularity. Various contextualist and invariantist responses to the puzzle attempt to avoid this unwelcome result and preserve the competence of ordinary speakers. I will argue that these solutions can be successful only if they respect intuitions of a certain kind, and proceed to judge competing solutions by this criterion.

5. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 3
Said Saillant

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I endeavor to show that Descartes’ attribute-mode distinction cannot be characterized in terms of the determinable-determinate relation. I identify the latter’s formal and modal properties in order to determine whether the former shares them, which ultimately shows distinctness. I then indicate which property accounts for the differences. I conclude that the relation that unites modes under an attribute is weaker than that which groups determinates under some determinable, respectively, the relations of inherence and incompatibility.

6. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 3
Thomas Jared Farmer

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This paper attempts to demonstrate that special responsibilities exist as a necessary and fundamental component of relationships. It seeks to show that, while special responsibilities may be superseded by other relevant concerns, they remain absolute. The paper attempts to demonstrate further that, even in cases of repugnant conclusion, special responsibilities exhibit a residual nature. It argues that such obligations are not always voluntary entered, but nevertheless represent prima facie duties to those parties involved.

7. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 3
Kyle Shaffer

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This paper seeks to critique Pyrrhonean skepticism by way of language analysis. Linguistic aspects of Pyrrhonism are first examined utilizing the later writing of Wittgenstein. Pyrrhonean language-use is then critiqued using H.P. Grice’s concept of implicature to demonstrate shared knowledge between speakers. Finally, a teleological model of communication is sketched using ideas from Jerry Fodor. If the Pyrrhonist denies speaking to communicate mental states, we are justified in questioning why we should listen to what she says.

8. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 3
Nancy Rankin

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This paper examines Ideal Observer Theory and uses criticisms of it to lay the foundation for a revised theory first suggested by Jonathan Harrison called Ideal Moral Reaction Theory. Harrison’s Ideal Moral Reaction Theory stipulates that the being producing an ideal moral reaction be dispassionate. This paper argues for the opposite: an Ideal Moral Reaction must be performed by a passionate being because it provides motivation for action and places ethical decision-making within human grasp.

9. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 3
Jared Lincourt

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This paper compares Buddhism with the philosophies of Friedrich Nietzsche and speculates how he would have reacted to Buddhism if he had understood it more accurately. I will focus the discussion on two central philosophies of Buddhism, which Nietzsche misinterpreted: Nirvana and suffering. It will be shown through an examination of selected writings and key philosophies of Nietzsche that if he had a better understanding of Nirvana and suffering then he would have been significantly more favorable towards Buddhism and would have found it to have close similarities to his own beliefs.

10. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 3

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