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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Jeff Speaks
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Stephen Biggs
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This paper introduces a modal epistemology that centers on inference to the best explanation (i.e. abduction). In introducing this abduction-centered modal epistemology, the paper has two main goals. First, it seeks to provide reasons for pursuing an abduction-centered modal epistemology by showing that this epistemology aids a popular stance on the mind-body problem and allows an appealing approach to modality. Second, the paper seeks to show that an abduction-centered modal epistemology can work by showing that abduction can estabhsh claims about necessity/possibility (i.e. modal claims)—where 'necessity' and 'possibility' denote metaphysical necessity and possibility, ways things may or may not have been given how they actually are.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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John Turri
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I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily true. You can know a priori contingent propositions that yourecognize as such. This overturns a standard view in contemporary epistemology and the traditional view of the a priori, which restrict a priori knowledge to necessary truths, or at least to truths that appear necessary.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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David J. Bennett
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I develop a Russellian representationalist account of size experience that draws importantly from contemporary vision science research on size perception. Thecore view is that size is experienced in 'body-scaled' units. So, an object might, say, be experienced as two eye-level units high. The view is sharpened in response to Thompson's (forthcoming) Doubled Earth example. This example is presented by Thompson as part of an argument for a Fregean view of size experience. But I argue that the Russellian view I develop handles the Doubled Earth example in a natural and illuminating way, thereby avoiding the need to posit irreducible experiential 'modes of presentation'. I also address a kind of neo-Fregean 'reference-fixing' view of size experience, that shares features with the Russellian view developed. I give reasons for favoring the latter. Finally, I argue that Peacocke's claim that spatial experience is 'unit free' is not persuasive.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Farid Masrour
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Ephraim Glick
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Alvin Plantinga
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8.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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T.M. Scanlon
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Ralph Wedgwood
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Michelle Mason
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11.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Thomas Hill
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12.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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T.M. Scanlon
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13.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Issue: 2
Jonathan E. Adler
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14.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
Volume >
83 >
Issue: 2
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