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series introduction

1. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Ioanna Kuçuradi

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volume introduction

2. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Luca Maria Scarantino

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article

3. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Alain Beaulieu

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Depuis le milieu des annees 1960, les etudes spinozistes ont pris un nouvel essor sous l'impulsion du courant marxiste qui a vu dans le programme de liberation des collectivites pense par Spinoza le projet politique le plus apte ä assurer une reponse ä la crise de legitimite du marxisme. Dans la foulee de certaines intuitions de Althusser, et ä la lumiere de la conceptualite spinoziste, plusieurs penseurs (notamment Deleuze, Negri, Macherey, Matheron et Virno) ont ainsi propose un nouveau modele d'organisation de la vie en commun. Ces acteurs de la renaissance spinoziste redigent, en quelque sorte, le chapitre conclusif de la derniere ceuvre de Spinoza (i.e. le Tratte politique reste inacheve) en definissant les nouvelles conditions de la democratic ä l'heure de la deterritorialisation generalisee marquee par l'abolition des frontieres nationales (economie mondiale, reseaux informatiques, etc.). Ce contexte offre l'occasion de repenser la politique en radicalisant les propos de Spinoza et en faisant jouer les notions de "puissance" et de "multitude" non seulement contre les concepts de "pouvoir" et de "peuple" qui en sont venus ä dominer le champ de la reflexion en philosophic politique, mais egalement contre les philosophies de l'histoire fondees sur la dialectique et la teleologie. Apres avoir decrit brievement quelques-uns des principaux enjeux de la politique spinoziste et avoir presente les nouveaux ennemis du spinozisme (neo-liberalisme et marxisme ideologique), nous ferons une genealogie de la refondation neo-spinozienne de Marx (Althusser, Deleuze, Negri) avant de repondre ä la question "Que faire?". II s'agira alors de determiner le role de l'Etat et de situer cette pensee politique par rapport ä l'utopie revolutionnaire. Ce parcours contribuera ä mieux definir les fondements et les implications de la democratic non-representative qui est au cceur des revendications de la renaissance spinoziste.
4. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Murat Baç

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In this paper I present Pluralistic Kantianism as a viable alternative to other prominent accounts of the determination of the truth conditions of our ordinary empirical statements. I further claim that this sort of Kantianism is capable of handling certain theoretical difficulties faced by any scheme-based semantics. Moreover, Pluralistic Kantianism can shed some light on such crucial issues as cross-cultural communication and understanding. As a result, if the account offered here is on the right track, we may get a palatable alternative to both restrictive monism and apathetic relativism, both of which ultimately fail to explicate or enlighten the successful and unsuccessful instances of cross-cultural understanding.
5. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Martha Zapata Galindo Orcid-ID

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Im Folgenden werden die unterschiedlichen Nietzsche-Bilder der deutschen Philosophie skizziert und insbesondere wird nach ihrer Bedeutung im nationalsozialistischen Kontext gefragt. Dabei geht es nicht darum, festzustellen, ob Nietzsche ein "Wegbereiter" des Nationalsozialismus war oder nicht. In der Hauptsache sollen die wichtigsten Nietzsche- Interpretationen - aus den Jahren zwischen 1930 und 1945 - in konkreten politischen und gesellschaftlichen Lagen und Verhältnissen sichtbar gemacht werden. Daher werden die konkreten historischen Bedingungen, unter denen Nietzsches Denken gedeutet wurde, zum Ausgangspunkt gemacht. In diesem Vortrag wird auf die wichtigsten Schnittstellen für die Faschisierung von Nietzsches Philosophie hingewiesen. Unter Faschisierung ist eine bestimmte Reorganisation der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft zu verstehen, bei der die Parteien und Organisationen der Arbeiterbewegung ausgeschaltet und die Instanzen der Zivilgesellschaft als Apparate des Führer-Staates refunktionalisiert werden. Als ideelle Vergesellschaftungsmacht leistete die Philosophie hier ihren Beitrag zur Stabilisierung der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft, indem sie eine zustimmende Wahrnehmung der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse organisierte. Gerade in dieser Richtung leistete die Nietzsche- Interpretation zwischen 1933 und 1945 einen wesentlichen Beitrag nicht nur zur Konstitution eines nationalsozialistischen Subjekts, sondern zugleich zur Reproduktion der Herrschaft.
6. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Patricia Verdeau

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Comment l'humanite peut-elle resoudre les problemes d'une cite close ou d'un monde clos? Un des problemes essentiels pose est celui de l'agrandissement, qui rend les societes difficilement gouvernables et dangereuses, et qui renvoie done ä la question de la guerre. En 1932, Bergson est un des premiers philosophes ä pressentir la possibility de l'extermination, du genocide. Quelle est la place de la democratic d'une part et d'une societe des nations d'autre part dans la resolution des problemes mondiaux? Pour Bergson, la democratic est la conception politique la plus eloignee de la nature, la seule qui transcende, dans ses intentions au moins, les conditions de la societe close. Est-ce que les organisations de cooperation efficaces sont mondiales? Les problemes mondiaux se resolvent, mais seulement si, explique Bergson, une portion süffisante de l'humanite est decidee ä les surmonter. L'humanite, qui n'a cesse de contredire la nature, est capable, pourtant, explique Bergson, de fournir l'efTort necessaire pour depasser ce qui reste clos en 1'homme, de l'ordre de l'immobilite de l'espece. Or cet effort vise la mobilite meme, une conscience synonyme d'invention et de liberte. Penser l'humanite et ses problemes n'a pas pour ambition de decouper des essences, mais d'intervenir dans un processus humain en mouvement. Les problemes mondiaux ne sont ni speciflquement anthropologiques ni speciflquement politiques, mais ä l'articulation des deux, dans une jointure entre theorie et pratique, la ou l'humanite est consciente et, partant, agissante. La conscience des problemes de l'humanite, reels et possibles, est chez Bergson plus metaphysique qu'anthropologique, dans le sens ou il ne s'agit pas d'envisager l'humanite dans l'ensemble de ses determinations, mais d'appliquer ä certains de ses evenements la double perspective du voir et du vouloir propre ä l'intuition metaphysique.
7. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Sandor Kariko

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The studying of Marx, said Gyorgy Lukäcs at the beginning of the 1920s, does not mean the uncriticised recognition of the results of his researches, nor the <faith> set in well-defined theses, the interpretation of a <sacred> book. One has to become absorbed in the ceuvre of Marx, so that then, as a second step, one can commence the systematic elaboration of the problems of our age. It is unjust that in western philosophies, especially in the Anglo-Saxon concerning literature the name of the old-age Lukäcs does not appear, or is present as that of some Stalinist inquisitor, the indisputable pillar of Marxism and the Bolshevik movement. Yet his late piece of labour, his vast ontology experiment convincingly shows how one can penetrate the original texts of Marx and at the same time preserve one's conceptual souvereignity, sense of reality, and one's capacity, at least in a latent way, to judge or surpass the thoughts of one's master. This study aims to interpret the problem of Lukäcs's relation to Marx through the analysis of the labour concept of Lukäcs, and would like to prove that the rereading of Lukäcs (and Marx) can serve with surprises, new meanings and morals even today.
8. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Tibor Szabó

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According to our opinion, Lukäcs's way does not lead to Marx but to himself and his independent philosophy and in spite of its inconsistency and mistakes it is still one of the most significant achievements of the XXt h century.
9. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Elif Çirakman

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In this paper, I examine how and why Heidegger's early conception of freedom as the ground of the self-appropriation of Dasein had been gradually transformed after 1930. The approach of Heidegger to the issue of human freedom displays how his thinking proceeds from Kant's formulation of the problem in "The Third Antinomy" of the first Critique to Sophocles' tragedy of Antigone. I argue that the reason behind this transformation resides in the attempt of thinking the relation between freedom and natural necessity over and beyond the constraints of critical philosophy. What seems pivotal in this transformation is Heidegger's growing concern with the "tragic" in which he envisages the possibility of a genuine exposure to the "truth" of the conflict between freedom and necessity and, more primordially, to the "abode" wherein the encounter between man and Being {Sein) occurs. Here, the "tragic" is pointing to the limits of representation and what is presented. In other words, it exhibits the limits of human freedom in its relation to the truth of Being. In the passion for disclosure of Being {aletheia), man is driven into the freedom of instituting its truth. In Heidegger's late thinking, human freedom is determined not any more by the obligation of choosing oneself but by the necessity of clearing the truth of Being. Human freedom is tragic in the face of this necessity that it has to answer. Therefore, man is envisaged as having no right or mastery over his freedom for there is no total clearing of its origin. Finally, I argue that it seems impossible to understand the transformation in Heidegger's concept of freedom without an appeal to his emphasis on the "tragic" as being an attempt to deepen and to transfigure the problem as treated in Kantian critical philosophy. In its tragic sense, Heidegger's concept of human freedom displays what lies beneath the Kantian antinomy: the incomprehensible origin of human freedom conceived as the event of the historical appropriation of Being {Er-eignis).
10. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Jesús Adrián Escudero

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The present text shows the hidden root of the question of being in Heidegger's Early Writings. His first logic and epistemological investigations in a neokantian atmosphere moves to ontological interests: he gives up the notion of transcendental subject, and asks for the historical and temporal background of live. In this sense, the young Heidegger gives his work a new direction by searching for the hermeneutical pressupositions that allows philosophy to formulate again the question of being from a radical point of view.
11. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Wanda Torres Gregory

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In his Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (GA 65), Heidegger claims: "Making itself intelligible is the suicide of philosophy" (435). He defines intelligibility in terms of the modern metaphysical forms of thinking and speaking about beings as objects of representation. Moreover, intelligibility involves a uniform accessibility for the inauthentic. anybody of an age marked by thoughtlessness. Thus, Heidegger upholds and tries to adhere to a principle of unintelligibility for the thinkers in the crossing from the first beginning to the other beginning of philosophy. Thinkers in the crossing are essentially ambiguous and indefinite in their attempt to move through and away metaphysical thinking toward a be-ing-historical thinking. Their only option is to say the metaphysical language of beings as language of be-ing, and this involves a transformation of language and thinking through a "turning around" of the meaning of metaphysical words. Unintelligibility is an essential feature of this transformed and transformative effort to carry out the ultimate task of "the bringing back of beings from the truth of be-ing" (11). If philosophy makes itself intelligible, then it fails to accomplish its mission in the age of the abandonment of be-ing by beings. Unintelligibility in Heidegger, as he defines it and as it occurs in his own writing, suggests the concomitant demand on us, the philosophers of today, to make the effort to interpret the language of beings as language of be-ing.
12. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Talip Karakaya

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Ce que nous voulons faire dans ce travail, est de presenter des concepts differents de terme de l'existence chez Martin Heidegger et Jean-Paul Sartre. Parce que cette analyse nous donnera la possibility de bien comprendre les principales idees de ces penseurs dans la Philosophie contemporaine.D'abord, nous devons remarquer que le terme d'existence retient une place centrale chez eux. Comme nous l'avons expose dans notre travail, la filiation entre ces penseurs est construite particulierement sur cette idee. Dans ce travail, nous avons pose differentes questions, et nous livrons leurs reponses. D'ailleurs, on voit que chez Heidegger, l'essence du dasein reside dans son existence, et chez Sartre l'existence precede l'essence. En plus, quand Sartre parle d'existence, c'est de maniere abstraite, autrement dit l'existence est un concept analytique. L'existence sartrienne etant la facticite, elle exprime la condition humaine d'un etre pour lequel dans son etre il y va de son etre. D'un autre cote, l'existence pour Heidegger n'est pas un cadre abstrait, un autre mot pour dire la condition humaine mais un lieu etrange et inquietant.Brievement, l'une des plus grandes caracteristiques de l'existence chez Heidegger est qu'elle n'est pas connaissable objectivement, et n'est pas definissable tout court. Mais chez Sartre, l'existence, c'est avant tout d'etre dans ses actes et par ses actes.
13. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Altaf Hossain

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Hermeneutics, in its phenomenological mode, has become one of the dominating issues in contemporary philosophical discours. Hans-Georg Gadamer, the leading exponent of phenomenological hermeneutics, develops his theory in his monumental work Truth and Method1, by regarding hermeneutics as an exploration of both the archaeology of human understanding and constitutive role of language in experience. In this paper, we have presented a brief exposition of Gadamer's views, giving an emphasis on how human understanding of objects inevitably mingles with its traditions or prejudices. Following Gadamer, we also have offered a systematic account of the role of language upon our overall understanding and building of an impersonal criterion of the truth and meaning of experiences. And finally we have critically examined Habermas* critique of Gadamer's failure to see language as a camouflage of domination of stronger experiences and the fact that the history of understanding is systematically distorted by this domination.
14. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Carmen Segura Peraita

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Las criticas a la filosofia moderna, vertidas desde el pensamiento actual, son sobradamente conocidas. Algunas de ellas han querido hacer realidad un proyecto de destrucciön radical. Ahora bien, tal destrucciön solo resultarä verdaderamente eficaz si, como de hecho estä sucediendo, va seguida de propuestas alternativas que se atengan de manera mäs adecuada a la realidad humana y a la estricta tarea de la filosofia. En esta Hnea de contribucion positiva se encuentra, a mi juicio, la particular aportaciön de la hermeneutica filosöfica contemporänea, encaminada a la rehabilitaciön de la razön practica. En esta ponencia se harä menciön especial a la comprensiön de Hans-Georg Gadamer, el pensador alemän fallecido en 2002, que tan decididamente ha marcado el curso de la filosofia actual.Tal rehabilitaciön parece un paso necesario en el camino conducente a una comprensiön mäs acertada de la tarea filosöfica y de su objeto. El reconocimiento de algunos aspectos de la razön, tales como la flnitud o su caräcter situacional, puede contribuir a una vision mäs ajustada de su esencia y posibilidades. Elimina, ademäs, el peligroso riesgo que supone la pretension de lo absolute* e incondicionado. Admitir lo que podriamos denominar los Umites de la razön no significa ineurrir en posiciones relativistas ni eseepticas; constituye, tan solo, un necesario ejercicio de atenimiento a lo real.
15. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Linda Fisher

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The issues of difference, diversity, otherness, and the possibility of community have emerged as leading philosophical and socio-political questions in recent times. An increasing theoretical emphasis on issues of difference and alterity, with a corresponding convergence of topics like globalization, have brought into renewed focus not only the question of otherness, but more fundamentally, the question of how the encounter with the Other is to take place. My paper examines the treatment of issues of difference and otherness within a perspective of philosophical hermeneutics. In recent writings, Gadamer has suggested that the principles of his philosophical hermeneutics can prove beneficial in reflections on contemporary social problems of diversity and cultural difference. In examining these claims, I question whether Gadamer acknowledges sufficiently the challenges and resistance of otherness. At the same time, I also question the claims of some theorists who maintain that it is never possible to bridge difference and otherness. In the end I suggest that while the resistance of difference might be underestimated, there are nevertheless promising approaches for thinking difference and diversity to be found in a hermeneutical perspective.
16. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Antonio Gallardo Cervantes

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Levinas pretende liberarse de la esclavitud del subjetivismo moderno. En realidad, de lo que se trata es de salir del ser por una nueva via. Estamos ante una Filosofia de la Liberaciön.
17. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Ferda Keskin

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Foucault argued in his retrospective writings that it is possible to give an overall interpretation of his work around the question of subjectivity and that his individual books are historical analyses of the constitution of certain subjective experiences that he finds characteristic of modernity. Furthermore, he called this history of the emergence, development and transformation of subjective experiences a 'history of thought.' Hence understanding the sense in which Foucault uses the notion of thought seems to be crucial for an interpretation of his writings within the framework he provided in his retrospective accounts. In this paper I will argue that the Foucaultian notion of thought is Kantian in fundamental ways, and that this Kantian framework is present throughout his entire work. This argument will provide the background for a rejection of the claim that Foucault's individual writings are specific and marginal. Finally, I will claim that the standard periodizations of Foucault's work under the headings of archaeology, genealogy and ethics have to be reconsidered and revised.
18. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
AÏm Deüelle Lüski

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My lecture is concerned with a presentation of the method of Deleuzian thought, which - I would like to contend - well represent the change that has taken place in postmodernist thought. Deleuze is unique in calling himself a "classical metaphysicist," i.e. a restorer of classical thought, albeit via the screen - thought which has managed to survive and overcome the obstacle of modernity. The Deleuzian unification of pre-modern thought and modernist critique with Nietzsche's theory of eternal repetition gives rise to a method, whose utter meaning is an attempt to provide thinkers with sharp tools for successfully opposing later capitalism and globalization, something that stands at the very heart of Deleuzian metaphysics. This opposition, which in effect is also a new doctrine of moral aesthetics, lies at the core of this present lecture. I would like to present the special combative nature of Deleuzian thought, and through him to present a different radical angle of the post-modern paradigm.
19. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Constantinos V. Proimos

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This paper concerns Jacques Derrida's reading of S0ren Kierkegaard's interpretation of the biblical story of Abraham's sacrifice. Abraham's decision to listen to God's command and sacrifice to Him his beloved son is based on his personal faith which conflicts with general morality. On the basis of this story, Derrida argues that we often witness similar conflicts between religion and morality, demonstrating that responsibility is ultimately based on something irresponsible, i.e. something secret. The paper finally discusses Derrida's logic of ultimates.
20. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Daniel W. Smith

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This paper will attempt to assess the primary differences between what I take to be the two primary philosophical "traditions" in c o n t e m p o r a r y French philosophy, using Derrida (transcendence) and Deleuze (immanence) as exemplary representatives. The body of the paper will examine the use of these terms in three different areas of philosophy on which Derrida and Deleuze have both written: subjectivity, ontology, and epistemology. (1) In the field of subjectivity, the notion of the subject has been critiqued in two manners, either by appealing either to the transcendence of the other (Levinas, Derrida) or to the immanent jlux of experience itself, in relation to which the Ego itself is trancendent (Deleuze, Foucault, Sartre, James). (2) In the field of ontology, a purely "immanent" ontology would be an ontology in which there is neither a "beyond" or an "otherwise" Being, nor "interruptions" in Being, both of which would require an appeal to a formal element of transcendence (Deleuze). Such a "transcendent" and aporetic structure, which can never appear or be present as such within Being, is what lies at the basis of the project of deconstruction, with its attendant aporias (Derrida). (3) This distinction, finally, finds parallels in Kant's epistemology, for whom the possible experience is conditioned by purely immanent criteria (Deleuze), whereas what goes beyond the limits of possible experience is transcendent (Derrida). Drawing on these three thread of analysis, the paper concludes with an assessment of what is at stake in the ethical differences between the two traditions. The question of "transcendence" is "What mast I do?", which is the question of morality (a duty or obligation that is beyond being, an "ought" beyond the "is"). The question of "immanence" is "What can I do?" (my power or capacity as an existing individual within being). For Levinas and Derrida, ethics precedes ontology because it is derived from an element of transcendence (the Other); for Deleuze, ethics is ontology because it is derived from the immanent relation of beings to Being at the level of their existence (Spinoza).