Epistemology & Philosophy of Science

The article deals with the dramatic opposition of psychologism and anti-psychologism. Due to the evident success of classical branches of mathematical logic in XX century psychologism was eliminated for its conceptual insufficiency. However, nonclassical logics and recent neuroscience vigorous development have contributed to the renaissance of psychologism. Author makes an attempt to analyze the reasons for the revival of psychologism and some prospects for keeping its leading position among the other modern cognitive science conceptions. Author claims that the revival of psychologism is closely connected with current neuropsychological studies. The ontogenetic mechanisms of acquisition of socio-cultural experiences by defining the general principles of the construction and configuration of neural circuits of the brain are responsible for the shaping of psychological organization and the nature of the cognitive activity. An analysis of the epigenetic landscape of different people and cultures makes it possible to use the notion of social psychologism. This notion is aimed to reflect some cognitive qualities in their connection with the epigenetic features of certain social communities.

Thought experiments are traditionally associated with physics. In this science we can find a lot of wonderful examples of this method, especially in periods of scientific revolutions. But in the last decade in physics thought experiments are becoming increasingly rare, but in the social sciences and philosophy, they are widely used. What gives thought experiments, what is their value for scientific knowledge? Is it possible to use them to obtain new knowledge or they are just visual or paradoxical illustrations of any problems? The key issue, which I propose to discuss is the possibility to get with the help of thought experiments a priori knowledge. I will try to prove that it was impossible, that thought experiments have other functions in cognition.

Author discusses the possibility of thought experiment to produce a priori knowledge. Author analyzes some arguments which come from the critics of a priori. In this paper he examines the ontological and epistemological role of thought experiment in natural science and humanities. Author claims that the concept of 'apriorism' should be considered as a crucial point for classical understanding of cognition, especially within the empiricism and rationalism tradition. However, nowadays 'apriorism' loses its epistemological meaning within some modern epistemological traditions.

Author treats an issue on getting a new knowledge from thought experiments. A history of the notion of thought experiment is presented in a few words. Author considers a concept of instinctive knowledge, which Ernst Mach used in his investigations of the thought experiments. He puts a question on about the cultural conditionality of “instinctive knowledge". In conclusion author makes a conjecture on the method of thought experiment as a tool for selection of the new knowledge patterns of the world.

Thought experiments can be used in various ways. A part of them seems to have a special epistemic value: they can give us a new, unknown information about reality. One of the most famous thought experiments of that kind is the thought experiment of Galileo which demonstrates that two bodies of the same kind should fall with the same speed. However, an analysis of this argument shows that it is based on several ontological presuppositions. Therefore it's not the thought experiment itself that has a significance, but its correspondence to real experience.

This paper considers the article by V.P. Filatov from the perspective of the role played by logic in a thought experiment. It is shown that this role depends on the way reasoning ant its correlation with logical inference are interpreted. It is suggested to view a model developed within informal logic as the most relevant to the role V.P. Filatov assigns to a thought experiment (turning the layer of implicit knowledge into explicit).

Author sums up the discussion of the “Thought experiments and a priori knowledge" Vladimir Filatov supports the idea of the necessity of special consideration of the thought experiments problem in social sciences and human studies. Nevertheless, he rejects the “elimination thesis" and insists on the structural affinity between thought and real experiments.

At first glance the Idea of the “Unity of Science" seems to be of interest for historians of science only. However, given the expectations especially social scientists face today, to provide simple answers and feasible solutions to pressing social problems a revival of the idea is not unlikely. In particular “reductionist" ideas, aiming to adopt theoretical and methodological insight from the natural sciences thrive. This puts not only the project but also the very idea of a social philosophy of science in jeopardy. For, in consequence two of its main pillars, (1) considering the social and historic circumstance of knowledge production and (2) the need for developing a philosophy of the social sciences are equally rendered irrelevant. This contribution focuses on the fundamental flaws and shortcomings of such reductionist models, argues in favor of the disunity of science and thus defends the idea of a social philosophy of science.

Standard semantics of proper names assigns them the function of reference to individual things. This presupposes that to understand the meaning of a proper name is to understand what it denotes in the context of its referential use. But unambiguous identification of the referent of a proper name in its normal (referential) use looks like an unsolvable problem. Senses associated with referential uses of such names don't allow ascribing them singular referents in their contexts; and what concerns contexts themselves, they either don't contain proper referents at all or contain more than one, thus being referentially ambiguous. Some philosophers of language believe that the main problem for the standard semantics of proper names is that they assign them referents of wrong kind: that these, for instance, should be rather abstract entities, i.e. sets, than individual things. In this paper I try to argue that the choice of an alternative semantics for proper names does not solve the main problem with their meanings, i.e. that of their referential ambiguity. On the one hand even in the most transparent contexts there is always available an alternative referent to be assigned to the proper name's use along with some standard or default one; the fact that we prefer some standard interpretation (when we actually do) over alternative ones reflects at best that certain semantic theories contribute more substantially to ordinary communication in comparison with others. This does not yet imply that they better explain meanings of proper names. On the other hand there is also no good explanation of a phenomenon of reference to a particular thing as such: we still don't understand how a name may become referring to one and the same particular thing in many different situations for many different agents of its use etc., and how the thing may literally become a bearer of a name.

The paper deals with the enactivist approach to the problem of consciousness. The problem of consciousness is the problem of naturalistic explanation of phenomenal aspects of our experience. According to classical cognitive science, we can explain all mental states as functional, representational states. Many philosophers disagree with this view. They demonstrate that phenomenal qualities of conscious states cannot be understood in terms of mental representations. Contemporary debates about the nature of phenomenal qualities are the debates between representationalists and anti-representationalists. The arguments proposed by anti-representationalists demonstrate the insufficiency of classical representational approach. But it doesn't mean that we should accept the existence of qualia - special nonrepresentational phenomenal properties. It is possible to defend representationalism by reconsidering the nature of mental representations. This article examines the transformation of the concept of mental representation in cognitive science over the last few decades. It demonstrates that the notion of representation in action discussed in enactivist theories can help us to provide the foundation for naturalistic understanding of conscious experience.

The problem of time is not an entirely physical problem. Physics itself does not contain a “time theory". That is particularly true in the sense that physics has not made any direct attempts to find the natural-science definition of the notion of time. Nevertheless, the concept of time emerges in science one way or another and still requires an explanation. Time fulfills an important role in the physics of XX and XXI centuries, though often a hidden one. Such a statement could be applied to both theories of macrocosm and microcosm. In the theory of relativity, time has been established as a secondary feature, a derivative of velocity and mass. However, it exists (although, as an illusion) and yet evokes the need of its philosophical interpretation. In quantum field theory time also (though implicitly) occurs according to the interpretation of the experiment results - for example, “where the particle was before its observation". Such “before"-cases indicate the very presence of time (more precisely, the observer's perception of its presence). Further theories, which have been the attempts to solve the problem of incompatibility of general relativity theory and quantum mechanics, such as the theory of loop quantum gravity, superstring theory, Shape Dynamics and others, also mention the concept of time. Time fulfills there a definite role and again evokes the question of its explanation in the frameworks of these theories. Most importantly, to find an exact meaning of this “time" term used here. This article deals with the problem of time in the context of several theories of modern physics. In particular, it attempts to give a definition of the term of time in relation to the philosophy of physics (physics itself does not characterize it). Such a task formulation has its relevance and novelty due to the facts that the discourse on the nature of time is still stipulated by Zeno's paradoxes, and the philosophy of science uses the obsolete vocabulary while describing the term. However, evidence suggests that modern physics has developed the new rules, or to be more precise, has stated the new principles, which the philosophy of science can not take into consideration without changing its vocabulary (the last also involves the modernization of intellectual intuition).

The article examines the question whether the economic discipline can be regarded as a kind of natural science it strives to be, taking into consideration the interpretation of an economic model as a kind of a thought experiment and closer connection between thought experiment and experimentation. The authors turn to epistemological analysis of thought experiments both in natural sciences and in economics and consider the historical background of this research tool and its relations with the experimentation practice. The study shows that the use of thought experiments in the economic theory and in natural sciences are fundamentally different. In natural science the thought experiment has never been detached from the material experimentation. On contrary, in economics it is used as an isolated procedure. However, isolated thought experiment is not a full-fledged research tool for studying the reality, as in that case it will affect some troubles with realism and practical efficiency of the research results. Rather, it constitutes the instrument for structuring or «mapping» the field of inquiry and can give results with social-constructive capacities.

Author analyzes the phenomenon of commoditization of human body in the context of the scientific development. It is argued that since the start of the development of biotechnologies human body has become a very attractive object for economic «investments» in the majority of developed countries. Author considers some anthropological foundations of the body commodification problem and some classifications of the relationships between individuals, science and society. The following dimensions of these relationships are examined in the paper: 1) an opposition of the individual and science; 2) an altruistic dimension; 3) a compensatory dimension. The “oppositional" dimension describes science as an institute that is not focused on the benefits of a certain person through the in- strumentalization and commoditization of corporality but is aimed to find the solution to some common social problems. Within the second (altruistic) dimension the individual seeks to make a contribution to the development of science and has no objection against the use of his biomaterials. A shady side of the altruistic dimension is the so-called “false altruism": a person is encouraged to donate biomaterials without any information about some possible risks and dangers for his health as well as about commercial interest of the researchers. The compensatory dimension comes from the material or moral damage compensation to the individual or his relatives for the use of his/her body (cells, substances, body parts) for biotechnological purposes.

The article is devoted to the analysis of theoretical bases of G. Bateson's anthropology. The author focuses on the concept of pattern by tracing the origins of this concept in the Goethe's morphology, the Gestalt psychology, the Benedict's anthropology, the Cybernetics and the Communication theory. In the context of the Communication theory “pattern" appears as a synonym of the engineering term “redundancy" that makes possible to consider it as a necessary condition for anticipation of communication sequences and economy of description. In addition, the pattern (redundancy) as a information organization form stands as the main criterion for sig- nal/noise ratio distinction. According to Bateson, the “pattern" can also be seen as an approximate synonym of “meaning". Applying of this interpretation to Bateson's analysis of the culture makes possible a more rigorous view at the problems of anthropological observation and description. The analysis demonstrates the need for anthropological observation, detecting patterns of two levels: the first one is valid within cultural systems (basic ideas, values and symbols of culture), the other one is valid within the system «culture + the observer» (abstract models). Thus, recognition of the pattern of the first level belonging to the language of the observed culture makes possible the interpretation of cultural events and facts. The pattern of the second level is not recognized but it is constructed, in a language more abstract than both the language of the observed culture and the language of culture of the observer. It is an explanatory scheme, in which mapping the fragments of description.

Author considers cognitive assumptions of practical consciousness: some preconditions on which an interaction with the social and natural objects is based. Author follows the “constructivist" program in social theory in its classic version which is represented by social phenomenology and phenomenological sociology of knowledge (A. Schutz, P. Berger, T. Luckmann). Author analyzes some latent axioms and presuppositions, “idealizations" and mechanisms of everyday consciousness which constitute individual social experience at the level of micro-interactions with the objects and the “others". This analysis also refers to the intellectual heritage of classical theory of knowledge (epistemological ideas of I. Kant, E. Husserl). Author considers the status of the Other in the elementary systems of social interaction; discusses the necessity to assume the relative constancy and uniformity of the objective world elements including the existence of an integral self-identical “I" (actor's personality). The organized process of social experience uninterruptedly operated by cognitive schemes of practical consciousness is considered as one of the main conditions of reproduction of coordinated routines which support social order and institutional structures of the society.

The text continues the translation series of William Whewell's (1794-1866) book «The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, founded upon their history» (Book III The Philosophy of the Mechanical Sciences, Chapter VI On the Establishment of the Principles of Statics). The chapter devoted to the establishment of such concepts of statics and dynamics, as equilibrium, measure of statical forces, gravity, oblique forces, and the parallelogram of forces. Whewell substantiates the fundamental principles of mechanics by analogy with the axioms of geometry, but his justification of the necessity of mechanical laws is based on the idea of causality. Translated by A.L. Nikiforov, comments by I.T. Kasavin and T.D. Sokolova.

Review represents a new edition of the Moscow seminar on philosophy of mathematics works. The book deals with two interrelated problems: the problem of “the incomprehensible effectiveness" of mathematics and the problem of the ontological status of mathematical objects. The conditions of applicability of mathematical theories in the natural, social and human sciences. Ideas and themes proposed by the authors of articles have goal to reveal perspective analysis of the subject, which allows detect its previously implicit sides. This approach makes possible to put different questions related to the foundations of mathematics and provide an additional impetus to research in this area.

The new book by Professor David J. Stump explores and develops the theories of the a priori, which are rarely considered in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science: the theories of pragmatic and functional a priori, proposed in the early XX century by Clarence Irving Lewis and Arthur Pap. The author begins with the analysis of «constitutive elements of science» and Henri Poincare's conventionalism. He consistently and historically examines the approaches towards the theories of the a priori within the philosophy of science in the XX-XXI centuries, and also develops his own original approach to a priori based on the philosophy of science.