Faith and Philosophy

This paper addresses the challenge of the problem of religious pluralism: how can we remain fully committed to our most basic truth-claims about God, and yet take full account of the claims of other world religious traditions? Six possible responses to this problem are delineated and assessed. Among the possible responses, certain strengths are identified in Inclusivism, though it is rejected. Focusing then on Religious Pluralism and Religious Relativism, these two views are extensively compared and contrasted. Finally, Christian Relativism is defended on the grounds that it best incorporates the strengths, without the salient weaknesses, of other possible responses to the conflicting truth-claims of the world religions.

Let us approach the problems of religious pluralism through the claims of the different traditions to offer salvation-generically, the transformation of human existence from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness. This approach leads to a recognition of the great world faiths as spheres of salvation; and so far as we can tell, more or less equally so. Their different truth-claims express (a) their differing perceptions, through different religio-cultural ‘lenses,’ of the one ultimate divine Reality; (b) their different answers to the boundary questions of origin and destiny, true answers to which are however not necessary for salvation, and (c) their different historical memories.

I begin by examining John Hick’s view of the status of the claims of the major world religions about what he calls “the Real,” in particular his view of the status of the theistic claim that the Real is personal, and of the nontheistic claim that the Real is not personalI distinguish Moderate Pluralism, the view that different conceptions of the Real are conceptions of the same thing, from Radical Pluralism, the view that different conceptions all accurately describe the Real. Although there is a bit of uncertainty about this, Hick seems to espouse a version of Moderate Pluralism, a version which I call Noumenal Pluralism. Moderate Pluralism is a coherent view, but Radical Pluralism is not coherent, and the standatd defenses of it ate not convincing. However, the view that the Real has more than one nature, a view which preserves much of Radical Pluralism, seems to be coherent.

The purpose of this discussion is to analyze comparatively the influential argument for religious pluralism offered by John Hick and the argument for religious exclusivism (sectarianism) which can be generated by proponents of what has come to be labeled ‘Reformed Epistemology.’ I argue that while Hick and the Reformed exclusivist appear to be giving us incompatible responses to the same question about the true nature of ‘religious’ reality, they are actually responding to related, but distinct questions, each of which must be considered by those desiring to give a religious explanation for the phenomenon of religious diversity. Moreover, I conclude that the insights of neither ought to be emphasized at the expense of the other.