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1. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3

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2. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Paul Lewis

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3. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3

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4. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3

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5. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Richard W. Moodey

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Michael Polanyi began thinking and writing about tradition long before he met Edward Shils in 1946. Polanyi’s religious experience in 1913 became part of the background for his thinking about tradition, and tradition entered into his thinking about spontaneous order and moral inversion. Polanyi and Shils both knew Karl Mannheim before they met one another, and had similar criticisms of Mannheim’s sociology. Soon after they met, both Polanyi and Shils were briefly enthusiastic about the Action Frame of Reference, which Shils helped create. Neither of them used the Action Frame of Reference in their later work. One of the reasons was its neglect of tradition, and another was that is was simply too complex to be a useful conceptual tool. Polanyi’s thinking about tradition did not change much after Personal Knowledge, but Shils continued to modify his thinking about tradition until the final years of his life.
6. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Phil Mullins

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This is a brief response to Richard Moodey’s analysis of views of tradition found in the thought of Edward Shils and Michael Polanyi.
7. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Steven Grosby

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In the aftermath of, and improvement upon, Toward a General Theory of Action, there is to be found a philosophical problem lurking in Polanyi’s and Shils’ writings on tradition: in what ways the principle of methodological individualism should be qualified so as better to understand human action.
8. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Stephen Turner

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Edward Shils began as a sociologist under the close mentorship of Louis Wirth, with whom he collaborated on the translation of Karl Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia. After 1940, however, Shils’ career, which had been focused on topics in sociology, notably the class and occupational structure of cities and on German Sociological Theory, took an apparent turn, which in 1946 led him into a relationship with Michael Polanyi, a half-time appointment at the London School of Economics, and a new intellectual direction. Part of the biographical background to this was personal: his relationship with Wirth ended, and with it his expectation of a Ph.D. and his role in the Sociology Department. Yet his new direction had Chicago roots in his work on Mannheim, and his relation to Frank Knight and the planning disputes of the 1930s and 40s.
9. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Richard W. Moodey

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This is a brief response to selected points made by the commentators on my essay.

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10. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Ed Payne

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journal and society information

11. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3

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12. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3

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13. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Phil Mullins, Paul Lewis

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14. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2

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15. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Dale Cannon

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16. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Charles Lowney

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17. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Phil Mullins

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This issue of Tradition & Discovery includes (1) six responses to Tihamér Margitay’s recent criticisms of Polanyi’s hierarchical ontology as well as (2) Margitay’s responses to his critics. This is a brief introduction to this special issue.

18. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Walter B. Gulick

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In a recent article “From Epistemology to Ontology,” Tihamer Margitay argues that Polanyi fails to establish the necessary correlation he claims between the two levels involved in tacit knowing and corresponding ontological levels. I argue that Margitay correctly shows that such a correspondence does not hold in all cases, but I also point out problems in Margitay’s interpretation of Polanyi and suggest additional bases for ontological claims that go beyond Margitay’s analysis.

19. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2

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20. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Gergely Kertész

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In a recent article “From Epistemology to Ontology,” Tihamer Margitay argues, in addition to other things, that the ontological arguments Polanyi provided for his ontological realism with respect to the levels of reality are insufficient. Although Margitay shows this correctly in the case of arguments from boundary conditions, his arguments are not that convincing against the unidentifyability thesis, the thesis that entity kinds on higher levels cannot be identified with descriptions given on lower levels. I argue that here Polányi relies on a version of the multiple realizeability thesis and this argument can be reformulated in a stronger version against which the counterargument Margitay provides is insufficient.