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1. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4

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2. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Marion Hourdequin

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Many environmental policies seem to rest on an implicit distinction between doing and allowing. For example, it is generally thought worse to drive a speciesto extinction than to fail to save a species that is declining through no fault of our own, and worse to pollute the air with chemicals that trigger asthma attacks thanto fail to remove naturally occurring allergens such as pollen and mold. The distinction between doing and allowing seems to underlie certain versions of the precautionary principle, and insofar as the precautionary principle rests on this distinction, it diverges from direct consequentialist approaches to risk management.There are two ways in which such reliance on the doing/allowing distinction may be defended: by appeal to indirect consequentialist considerations, and by appeal to deontological considerations. Neither approach is unproblematic; however, retention of a distinction between doing and allowing in environmentalpolicy is consistent with the widespread intuition that there is something prima facie valuable about the world as we find it.
3. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Robin Attfield

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The Earth Charter is largely a wholesome embodiment of a commendable and globally applicable ecological ethic. But it fails to treat responsibilities towardfuture generations with sufficient clarity, presenting these generations as comparable to present and past generations, whose members are identifiable, whenin fact most future people are of unknown identity, and when the very existence of most of them depends on current actions. It can be claimed that we still haveobligations with regard to whoever there will be whom we could affect, and in addition, all the possible people of the future whom we could affect have moralstanding, as well as corresponding members of other species. These obligations clash with the person-affecting principle, which considerably restricts suchobligations and the scope of moral standing at the same time. Finally, there are implications for sustainability, at least with regard to sustainable levels ofpopulation and with regard to global warming, and thus a need for further clarification of the content of responsibilities toward future generations.
4. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
William J. FitzPatrick

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Despite widespread agreement that we have moral responsibilities to future generations, many are reluctant to frame the issues in terms of justice and rights.There are indeed philosophical challenges here, particularly concerning nonoverlapping generations. They can, however, be met. For example, talk of justiceand rights for future generations in connection with climate change is both appropriate and important, although it requires revising some common theoreticalassumptions about the nature of justice and rights. We can, in fact, be bound by the rights of future people, despite the “non-identity problem,” and the force of these rights cannot be diluted by “discounting” future costs. Moreover, a rights-based approach provides an effective answer to political arguments against taking mandatory measures to curb greenhouse gas emissions when these are unpopular with a democratic populace.

discussion papers

5. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Murray Sheard

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How do we weigh the claims of current and future people when current exercise of rights to property conflict with sustainability? Are property rights over theseresources more limited due to the claims of posterity? Lockean property rights allow no right to degrade resources when doing so threatens the basic needs offuture generations. A stewardship conception of property rights can be developed, providing a justification for sustainable management legislation even whensuch law conflicts with the rights an owner would have, were the resource under more full-blown ownership. A protection indicator can be developed that is sensitive to a range of empirical factors such as scarcity, renewability, importance of the resource, and seriousness and reversibility of potential harm. The stewardship conception of rights over environmental resources can be applied in policy settings, for example, in decisions over emissions limits and land-use patterns. Such harnessing of Lockean intuitions to argue for environmental protection is in sharp contrast to Locke’s usual employment by those keen to show that such protection violates owners’ rights.
6. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
David K. Goodin

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As the last great philosopher of the will, Albert Schweitzer rejected the radical individualism of Nietzsche and the pessimistic-mystical detachment of Schopenhauer, and instead sought to create a true social ethic. Schweitzer’s particular contribution was to move further than Nietzsche to reconcile philosophy with natural science while simultaneously preserving and transforming the sense of mysticism and higher world-order principles from Schopenhauer. He joined this new cosmology to the virtue ethics of Aristotle, and recovered one key element of his ontology of becoming to transcend the Humean “is/ought” gap for ethics.The result is a philosophy that is as much biographical of Schweitzer himself as it is systematic. This result is both the strength and greatest weakness of hisreverence-for-life ethic. It is tailor-made for contemporary environmental ethics: it has applications in many strands of environmental thought, including deepecology, ecofeminism, and ecotheology, and may attract considerable interest from environmental movements that seek to cultivate deep personal conviction.

book reviews

7. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Deane Curtin

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8. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Willis Jenkins

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9. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Allen Thompson

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10. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Elizabeth Reynolds

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11. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Gail Stenstad

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12. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Anna L. Peterson

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13. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Jerome A. Stone

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14. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Steve Vanderheiden

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referees

15. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4

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index

16. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4

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news and notes

17. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3

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features

18. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Paul Veatch Moriarty

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Philosophical naturalists deny the existence of anything supernatural, such as God, souls, demons, ghosts, angels, witchcraft, miracles, etc. They believe that human beings are animals whose existence is entirely governed by the same laws which govern the rest of the natural world. However, some environmentalists value nature intrinsically and aesthetically, and in doing so conceive of nature as that which is distinguished from the products of human culture. Some philosophical naturalists have claimed that any attempt to distinguish nature from the products of human culture in this way stems from a pre-Darwinian world view in which humans are conceived as being separate from and superior to the natural world. They suggest that this distinction involves an implicit denial of philosophical naturalism. Furthermore, J. Baird Callicott and others have argued that it contributes to environmental destruction by espousing human superiority over the natural world. To the contrary, the nature/culture distinction is not the cause of either of these offenses. It is consistent with philosophical naturalism, fundamental to our ordinary conception of nature, and useful in promoting environmental protection.
19. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Richard J. Evanoff

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Although nonhuman entities are indeed incapable of entering into contractual relations with humans or of participating in social dialogue on ethical norms, they can nonetheless become the objects of moral consideration on the part of humans. Moral consideration need not be extended universally to all nonnatural entities, but only to those entities with which humans interact. Rather than regard some or all of the natural world as having “intrinsic value,” considered judgments must be made regarding which parts of nature can be legitimately used for human purposes and which should be left alone. What needs to be justified are not attempts to preserve nature but rather any human interventions which infringe on the autonomy of nature.

discussion papers

20. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Aaron Simmons

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In her book, Moral Status, Mary Anne Warren defends a comprehensive theory of the moral status of various entities. Under this theory, she argues that animals may have some moral rights but that their rights are much weaker in strength than the rights of humans, who have rights in the fullest, strongest sense. Subsequently, Warren believes that our duties to animals are far weaker than our duties to other humans. This weakness is especially evident from the fact that Warren believes that it is frequently permissible for humans to kill animals for food. Warren’s argument for her view consists primarily in the belief that we have inevitable practical conflicts with animals that make it impossible to grant them equal rights without sacrificing basic human interests. However, her arguments fail to justify her conclusions. In particular, Warren fails to justify her beliefs that animals do not have an equal right to life and that it is permissible for humans to kill animals for food.