Cover of Phenomenology 2005

Phenomenology 2005

Selected Essays from Euro-Mediterranean Area Part 2
2007, ISBN 978-973-88633-4-7

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Displaying: 1-20 of 27 documents


1. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 2
Pau Pedragosa

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The purpose of this paper is an attempt to interpret Architecture from the point of view of Phenomenology. We consider that the work of architecture reacquires it self such a way of approaching. We will take Husserl’s phenomenology as the reference because of his extraordinary attention to the senses, the sensibility, the perceptual world, the body and its movements; these are the “materials” the architect works with. We will also study some relevant aspects of Le Corbusier’s Ville Savoie—a masterpiece of the XX Century Architecture—which will serve us as an exemplary case study.

2. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 2
Laurent Perreau

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This article tries to distinguish several types of “social ontology,” i.e., several types of answers to the question of the essence of social reality. As phenomenology and the social sciences are both concerned with this problem, it seems interesting to follow the historical sequence that links Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, Schutz’s theory of the lifeworld, and Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology. These theories help to identify or to illustrate tree types of social ontology: philosophical ontology, common and ordinary knowledge ontology, and sociological ontology.

3. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 2
Andrea Pinotti

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The essay discusses the role played by touch in relation to sight within Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of the body. In particular this issue will be analyzed in the context of Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics of painting, taking into consideration his criticism of Berenson’s concept of “tactile values,” volumetric feelings of a third dimension that painting should be able to arouse in spite of its bi-dimensional nature. In rejecting Berenson’s tactile values Merleau-Ponty’s position appears rather closer to the German theorists of pure visibility (reine Sichtbarkeit) in insisting on the exclusive optical destination of painting, a real “total part” which monadologically expresses “la folie de la vision.”

4. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 2
María-Luz Pintos

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It is our aim in this essay to acknowledge a debt we owe to Aron Gurwitsch. In fact, we aim to recall the important contribution he made to phenomenology during his years of exile in France (1933–40). While there, he introduced the thought of Kurt Goldstein, and was the first to understand that a new approach in the human and social sciences was emerging and converging with Husserl’s new phenomenological philosophy: a tendency toward things as they are lived and handled by subjects. Th is spirit of confluence between phenomenology and the sciences is something he passed on to his younger colleague, Merleau-Ponty—who, however, failed to acknowledge Gurwitsch as a major “source of inspiration” for his thought. Some evidence of Merleau-Ponty’s unpaid debt to Aron Gurwitsch is presented in this essay.

5. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 2
Delia Popa

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The essay confronts the objective conception of reality with the phenomenological one in order to observe the implication of imagination in the constitution of our sense of the real. Though fantasy seems to be the opposite of the real perception, as Jean-Paul Sartre showed it in his book “L’imaginaire”, the paper argues, following the arguments of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Henri Maldiney and Marc Richir – but also the ancient argument of Aristotle concerning the sensible appearance – that it participates in an active and necessary way at the subjective foundation of reality.

6. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 2
Nicoleta Szabo

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This essay proposes a phenomenological interpretation of Konrad Fiedler’s philosophy of art. He’s a Nineteenth century German philosopher who’s theory of visibility (die Sichtbarkeit) and body (der Leib) comprises, in many aspects, a phenomenological view avant la lettre. We compare Fiedler’s account of visibility with Husserl’s phenomenology of the visual representation and we argue that the artistic visibility and the activity of the body proposed by Fiedler may be considered as a phenomenological solution for the problem of artistic creation. Finally, we underline the conceptual affinity between Fiedler’s theory of the body implicated in the making of artistic works and the Merleau-Ponty’s own view of it.

7. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 2
Carole Talon-Hugon

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The fourth part of L’Essence de la manifestation is devoted to the sentiments and consitute a quite unique sort of treatise on the passions. Through the analysis of this text, I here show why, according to Michel Henry, scientific treatment of Descartes and the contemporary neurobiologists who are his heirs claim to submit the passions is necessarily mistaken ; why the traditional objectivistic discourses of ph are inevitably deficient ; and finally why Henry’s reflection on the sentiments finds at once its expression and fulfillment in literature.

8. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 2
Jacques Taminiaux

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The purpose of the essay is to demonstrate that Plato’s political thought, such as it is exposed in the Republic, played a decisive role in Heidegger’s implication in national-socialism. The demonstration is divided into three stages: 1. the analysis of the Platonist elements regarding politics in Heidegger’s thought before 1933; 2. the development of his views during the years following the famous Rectoral Address of 1933; 3. a critical reflection in the light of Hannah Arendt on the prejudices involved in the Platonist approach of political matters.

9. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 2
Luca Vanzago

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In my paper I examine the question of temporality in Merleau-Ponty’s later phenomenological ontology. The aim of this discussion is to show that Merleau-Ponty’s earlier model of temporality, displayed in his Phenomenology of Perception, is not totally rejected but significantly reworked. While in his earlier work Merleau-Ponty maintains the substantial coincidence of temporality and subjectivity, thus bringing together Husserl’s and Heidegger’s analyses into a creative synthesis, in his later development Merleau-Ponty is no longer satisfied with this result. Accordingly he deepens the aspect of passivity and the bonds that attach the subject to (Raw) Being.

10. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 2

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11. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 2
Ion Copoeru, Hans Rainer Sepp

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12. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 1
Hans Rainer Sepp, Ion Copoeru

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13. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 1
Denisa Butnaru

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In this communication we have tried to underline the main ideas in the constitution of the system of relevances, using as a support Alfred Schutz’s approach. Their importance in the consolidation of experience at the subjective and especially intersubjective level is to be understood as well in terms of a continuous constitution that they engender. They entertain a relation of interdependence with types and the typification processes. This aspect is also important because it confirms the mobility of the significative “organization” of the consciousness, and more than that, the interaction between this one and the surrounding world, where the other subjects are as well to be included.

14. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 1
Cristian Ciocan

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In this paper, I discuss about two major Romanian philosophers: Constantin Noica and Alexandru Dragomir. I narrate their spectacular biographies, in order to show how powerful can be the resistance through philosophy, even in the hard times of political totalitarianism, as they were, for the Eastern Europe, under the communist dictatorship. It is true that Noica and Dragomir are two of the most infl uential personalities for the history of phenomenology in Romania. However, their lives also seem to be exemplary for the philosophical life as such, which reveals its intrinsic value when facing the asperities of misfortune.

15. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 1
Ion Copoeru

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The concept of intersubjectivity has undergone a strong critique for the fact that the other appears to be constituted by a singular ego through extrapolation from its own “sphere of originality.” Our hypothesis is that the difficulty does not regard the theory of constitution itself, but the fact that the other and the community are thought only in terms of representation. In order to transcend the supposed representational framework of Husserl’s phenomenology, we shall consider the concept of intersubjectivity as an interplay of representational and non-representational modes of encounter.

16. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 1
Natalie Depraz

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Husserl’s genetic phenomenology is relied on to make sense of the emergence of attention such as it arises, on the one hand, from bodily gestures and, on the other hand, according to the hypothesis of attentionality as a modulation such as it has begun to be developed through the historical and contemporary contributions of psychology and neurobiology. We attempt to show how the static framework initially advanced is in continuity with the genetic logic that allows us to deepen the hypothesis in questions by confronting the empirical analyses of Stumpf, James, Kulpe, and Tichner.

17. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 1
Jesús M. Díaz Álvarez

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This article tries to explain the relationship between transcendental phenomenology and psychology, particularly phenomenological psychology, in the work of Aron Gurwitsch. Following Husserl, Gurwitsch shows the paradoxes of phenomenological psychology and the necessity to perform the transcendental reduction in order to overcome them. This technical issue will help us to see in a very clear way why Gurwitsch is a transcendental phenomenologist and why, from a Husserlian and Gurwitschean point of view, every philosophy that remains in the natural attitude—and for the author of The Field of Consciousness this is the case of the philosophy of existence (Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty)—is not philosophy in the more radical sense of the word.

18. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 1
Eliane Escoubas

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Painting paints the conditions of visibility in accordance with their historical modalities and not the conditions of the reproduction of the real. That is why the whole Phenomenology, speaking about Painting, speaks of “phenomenon,” i.e. of “appearing” of that which appears.

19. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 1
Dimitri Ginev

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Th is paper proposes a phenomenological approach to the constitution of biological objects of inquiry. It argues that such an approach can be built upon an extended version of Heidegger’s existential conception of science. Five main thematizing projects of constituting biological objects of inquiry are under examination. Finally, the paper suggests the view that despite the disunity of biology on the level of the main thematizing projects, there is a dynamic and mosaic unity of interrelated practices of scientific research.

20. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 1
Joan González

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In this paper we intend to lay the grounds for a Phenomenology of money. We start from the pre-theoretical comprehension of money as an “entity for”, that is to say, as a tool. Within this pre-theoretical comprehension, money is always understood according to its teleology (money is always “something to buy with”). Also, in this pre-theoretical framework money is hardly ever defined as “something to sell with”, or as “something being the result of my work”. Thus, in our daily experience the being of money becomes undistinguishable with the act of purchasing, which in turn underlines the deeply projective nature of money’s essence. In order to grasp this projective quality, we will have to develop a phenomenlogy of the purchasing act. “To purchase” is “to get something by means of money”. But, what is this thing that we get anyway? Whatever it is, it has a distinctive character: it is a merchandise. Through the appropiate phenomenologial descriptions, we will try to show how the description of the spatiality of the merchandise is essential to understand the effects of money upon the spatiality of the surrounding world.