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1. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
James Hatley

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2. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Anthony Lioi

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3. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Christian Diehm

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This essay examines how becoming familiar with trees in their specificity might impact how we position ourselves in the ongoing debate among environmental philosophers regarding anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric approaches to environmental ethics. It begins with an analysis of what the process of learning to identify trees entails, and a discussion of how this often involves the development of non-instrumentalist evaluative attitudes towards them, an axiological orientation at odds with the instrumental reductivism characteristic of anthropocentric views. It is then argued that a basic concern we might have with anthropocentrism is that it does not admit what are perhaps the most significant values that emerge in relationship with other-than-human entities.
4. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Joan Maloof

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Knowing the Latin binomial name for a species opens up a world of knowledge, but there is another way of knowing that does not involve names.
5. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Janet Fiskio

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Recent efforts among environmental theorists to think past human alienation from nature have made the question of the animal central, as Agamben and Derrida have shown. Expanding this question beyond the concern with suffering, Donna Haraway’s investigations of companion species take seriously the interspecies relations of work, play, and joy. The engagement of plant-human coevolution in the work of ethnobotanist Gary Paul Nabhan complicates these questions, revealing the porous boundaries between human cultures and the plant companions that sustain them. This essay proposes Nabhan’s work as a response to Haraway’s questions, exploring four mutually constitutive relations between humans and plants: lures, tricks, grief, and sacrament.
6. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Laura Geuy Akers

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Interactions with yellowjackets offer opportunities to reflect on what it is to encounter radical alterity and the conditions that are necessary for the limited empathy such encounters afford us. Effort must be made to set aside automatic judgments, and neither simulation nor theorizing can be sufficient to give us reliable insights, but mindful attentiveness can at least help us attend to the possibilities of interaction and tentative interpretation.
7. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Patricia Monaghan

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8. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Deborah Bird Rose

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In this essay I examine four modes of thinking about the betrayals involved in the planned mass deaths of animals, specifically the wild donkeys of North Australia. I consider the wild, but in contrast to the positive valence this concept has acquired in environmental literature, I work with a set of negative connotations that I encountered in conversations with Aboriginal people in North Australia. I explore the wild as a form of narcissism, to use Hatley’s terminology, and I engage with animal mass deaths as an outcome of processes of disconnection and catastrophe. My analysis examines how the colonising wild is the tearing apart of the fabric of life and death on earth.
9. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Lisa Kemmerer

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10. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Glen Mazis

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This essay details wolves sense of their surround in terms of how wolves perceptual acuities, motor abilities, daily habits, overriding concerns, network of intimate social bonds, and relationship to prey give them a unique sense of space, time, belonging with other wolves, memorial sense, imaginative capacities, dominant emotions (of affection, play, loyalty, hunger, etc.), communicative avenues, partnership with other creatures, and key role in ecological thriving. Wolves are seen to live within a vast sense of aroundness and closeness to aspects of their surround (compared to humans), a highly charged intimacy and cooperation with other wolves, and a caring and non-aggressive attitude that goes beyond the pack, despite their loyalty and defense of territory. The cultural myths and history that absurdly demonize the wolf are explored in their self-righteous attempts to exterminate wolves, which I call “speciocide” and probe for projections of human viciousness. The supposed rapaciousness of wolves is re-examined by expanding Barry Lopez’s sense of the silent dialogue of death with other creatures to be reconsidered as a kind of respect, assertion of vitality, recognition of mortality, and cooperation.
11. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Judith Roche

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12. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Jacob Metcalf

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Using grizzly-human encounters as a case study, this paper argues for a rethinking of the differences between humans and animals within environmental ethics. A diffractive approach that understands such differences as an effect of specific material and discursive arrangements (rather than as pre-settled and oppositional) would see ethics as an interrogation of which arrangements enable flourishing, or living and dying well. The paper draws on a wide variety of human-grizzly encounters in order to describe the species as co-constitutive and challenges perspectives that treat bears and other animals as oppositional and nonagential outsides to humans.
13. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Cheryl Lousley

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The essay discusses the significance of narrative for environmental ethics by attending to the conventions of autobiography in Farley Mowat’s anti-whaling text, A Whale for the Killing. A tension emerges in environmental nonfiction narrative between the desire to transcend the self and its expression in autobiographical form, which necessarily places the self at the centre of the narrative. I trace the construction of the narrator’s and whale’s ethical personae to argue that even as Mowat’s narration of a subject-to-subject encounter challenges the ontological and ethical divide between “human” and “animal,” it nevertheless reconstructs a liberal-humanist notion of subjectivity.
14. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Daniela Elza

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15. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2

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book reviews

16. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Timothy M. Costelloe

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17. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Scott Samuelson

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18. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Jason Wirth

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19. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Kirsten Jacobson

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20. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Keith Peterson

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