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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2007 >
Issue: 33
傅佩 榮
Pei-Jung Fu
The First Chapter of Lao Zi
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《老子》首章的斷句問題,一直存在著爭議。本文依據帛書本《老 子》,並參考王弼注本,斷其內文為「無名,有名」,「無欲,有欲」, 並且申論其義理之合宜性。目的是希望學術界研究《老子》者,今後 能在ㄧ可靠的文本上進行深入研究。
The reading of the first chapter of Lao Zi is still debatable. Based on Bo-shu Lao-Zi, the earliest edition of Lao Zi which recorded this first chapter, and Wang Bi’s edition of Lao Zi, the present article would maintain that the reading of “wu ming” (without a name) and “yo ming” (with a name), “wu yu” (without desire) and “yo yu” (with desire), is more justifiable than the reading of “wu” (non-being) and “yo” (being).
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 33
杜保 瑞
Bau-Ruei Duh
The Metaphysics of Chu-Hsi
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本文討論朱熹形上思想,說明其有繼承北宋儒學的必要性及義理 創作的特殊性,更有與其工夫論不同思路的獨立性。首先討論勞思光 先生及牟宗三先生對朱熹的批評意見,對於勞先生的心性論中心之解 釋架構對朱熹存有論義的形上學的批評,指出勞先生的心性論中心亦 須包含形上學議題之意旨,而朱熹之形上學意見可以不混入工夫論 而有其獨立意義。對於牟宗三先生以朱熹存有論不負擔創生實踐功 能,指出牟先生的問題意識是工夫實踐以至境界完成而非存有論思 路,而朱熹是在談論存有論,因此不必受到這樣的批評。其次討論形 上學概念在當代學界的使用定義,藉由區分實踐哲學的功夫境界論及 形上學的宇宙論本體論和存有論的概念使用意義,以說明朱熹形上思 想遭受批評的原因,並為朱熹澄清。接著說明朱熹特殊具有創造性意 義的存有論形上學觀點,討論朱熹的理氣概念架構以說天地萬物的存有論架構,指出這是特殊的形上學論題,並毋須與工夫論議題混為一 談。並就人存有者而言,說明朱熹以性善說為宗旨說本體論及人性論、 並藉性氣結構說人的為惡現象、以及在人的氣稟限制中說命定論、及 朱熹對整個儒學史的人性論理論意見之重整系統、最後落實於以心統 性情說以確立道德實踐主體的存有架構,文中指出這一部份的討論正 是朱熹集北宋儒學之大成,並最能徹底解決儒家性善說的形上學問題 的創作系統,應予清晰解讀及準確理解。本文藉由形上學問題意識的 釐清,來說清楚朱熹所談的形上學問題,用以區隔朱熹工夫論的發言,並避免當代學者從工夫論進路批評朱熹不如象山及陽明學的意見。
Neo-Confucianism has now been well-known by the western society, for its influence on Chinese culture is immense. Among its proponents, Master Chu-Hsi is the most influential among them, the reason of which can be attributed to his fully speculative viewpoints and his comprehensive senses of philosophy problems. In Chu-Hsi’s theory, metaphysics is his most creative contribution to Confucianism. However, it is susceptible to being miss-understood by his contemporaries and today’s scholars, for his basic concerns about the metaphysics are so much different from the other Confucians. While the theory of the reality and the value are concerned by all the Confucian philosophers and they had provided many different yet profoundly metaphysical systems, Master Chu-Hsi notices the problems of the definitions of all the concepts concerning the reality and the ultimate value and develops a new metaphysical system discussing the problems of the reality of the whole Being in the universal, the moral potential difference between people and the animal.In this article the author is going to introduce Master Chu-Hsi’s metaphysical constructions and creations. The discussion will be proceeded as follows: (1) the reflection of the modern interpretational systems, (2) the definition of the concept of metaphysics in Chinese philosophy, (3) the original questions of Chu-Hsi’s metaphysical thinking, (4) the theory of the whole Being of the Universal, (5) the theory of human nature and the explanation of why the moral ability is different in the human beings, (6) the existential difference between human creatures and the animals, and (7) the meaning of the contribution of Chu-Hsi’s metaphysics in the history of the development of Confucianism.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2007 >
Issue: 33
苑舉 正
Jeu-Jenq Yuann
The Understanding of Ignorance: Socrates and Rousseau’s Two Views of Virtue
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「無知的理解」(the understanding of ignorance)可以視作一種對 於蘇格拉底思想的表達方式。盧梭即曾經在他的〈論科學與藝術〉中,直接以這種表達方式,作為蘇格拉底有關「德行」論述的代表思想。本文主要的論證,在於說明,盧梭引用蘇格拉底在《辯護篇》(Apology) 中的章節,並非全然為發展自己觀點所作,而確實符合蘇格拉底有關 「德行」的看法。然而,在如是說的同時,我們並不因此而認為蘇格 拉底與盧梭抱持著相同的「德行觀」。我們企圖指出,雖然這兩位哲學 家的德行觀皆與「無知」相關,但是在針對「德行為何?」這個問題 上,兩人各自有不同的看法。所以,我們擬在「無知的理解」的這個 主要標題之下,區分這兩位哲學家有關「德行」的論述。在行文過程 中,我們先看盧梭的引文,並且提出一些文獻,說明針對這一部份所 引發的對立觀點。然後,我們將針對蘇格拉底的「德行觀」做論述。我們將先針對「蘇格拉底的思想」與「以蘇格拉底為代表所表達的柏 拉圖思想」之間作區隔後,解析「統一的德行即知識」與「無知的理 解」這兩個概念。然後,我們將依照類似的架構,闡述盧梭的「德行觀」。最後,我們將從盧梭的角度,說明在其〈論科學與藝術〉中,引用蘇格拉底的觀點,成功地將「無知即德行」引伸成為「自然賦予 人德行」觀點外,也表達了他本人與蘇格拉底在「德行觀」上的精神 契合。
“Ignorance” is generally considered a simplified form of expressing Socrates’ philosophy. Rousseau, once cited this expression in his Discourse on the Sciences and Arts, has explicitly portrayed it as the core idea of Socrates’ view of virtue. The main argument of this paper will proceed to prove that passages of Apology cited by Rousseau are not made intentionally to further develop his own ideas. Instead, they do manifest an essential part of Socrates’ view of virtue. Having proved so, we nonetheless aware also that Socrates and Rousseau remain to be different concerning their views of virtue. They both hold “ignorance” being crucial in ethical significance; yet differ in its reference.Hence, we endeavor to distinguish their views on the basis of the label “understanding ignorance to be virtuous”. In the order of this article, we will proceed to see first of all Rousseau’s citation of Socrates’ words. Then, we move to a documentary analysis concerning the divergent opinions about this citation. After that, we illustrate Socrates’ view of virtue by distinguishing Socrates’ own thought from that of Plato in the persona of Socrates. With this distinction, we then approach to an examination of “the unity of virtue is knowledge” and “the understanding of ignorance”. With a similar structure of analysis, we finally come to the exposition of Rousseau’s view of virtue. We will vindicate that inDiscourse on the Sciences and Arts, Rousseau successfully extended Socrates’ ideas from “admitting ignorance” to that “nature makes all people virtuous”. With this success, this article, while making explicit the divergence of their views of virtue, demonstrates a “spiritual correspondence” between Socrates and Rousseau.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2007 >
Issue: 33
王文 方
Wen-Fang Wang
Comments on Theories of Subjunctive Conditionals
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本文解釋、並評論了從1940 年代至1970 年代中幾個重要的、有 關於虛擬條件句的理論。這些包括可共同性支撐理論、嚴格條件句理 論、世界選擇語意論、集合選擇語意論、與範圍語意論。我駁斥了可 共同性支撐理論、嚴格條件句理論與世界選擇語意論,同時論證說,某種形式的集合選擇語意論或範圍語意論是到目前為止最為合理的理 論。連帶地,我論證說,VW 系統是到目前為止最合理的虛擬條件句 邏輯系統。在本文的餘論中,我進一步指出了這些語意論在科學哲學、小說討論、與確定描述詞理論中的可能應用。
This paper explains and comments on the most important theories of subjunctive conditionals from 1940s to 1970s. These include cotenability theory, strict conditional theory, world selection semantics, class selection semantics and sphere semantics. I refute cotenability theory, strict conditional theory and world selection semantics as inadequate, while argue that some versions of class selection semantics or sphere semantics are the best semantic theories among all that we have seen for subjunctive conditionals. Accordingly, I also argue that Lewis’s VW is the most satisfactory logic system for subjunctive conditionals among all the systems we have checked. In the final part of the paper, I point out some applications of these semantic theory to fiction discourse, definite descriptions and topics in philosophy of science.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 33
林遠 澤
Yuan-Tse Lin
The Consensual Structure of the Categorical Imperative in Kantian Ethics -An Explication of the Transcendental Norm Logic from the Perspective of a Rational Agent
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本文嘗試把康德在《道德底形上學之基礎》中對於「定言令式」 的分析,理解成一門闡釋道德判斷之理性基礎的「先驗規範邏輯學」。在涉及行動決定的倫理學領域中,理性討論的證成活動被康德理解成 一種純粹意志的根源性行動。這種在定言令式中表達出來的純粹意志的 根源性行動,為我們的意志決定與行動的正當性提出理性的證成基礎。本文將分別透過純粹意志的「理念」與「原則」,說明康德如何基 於定言令式的理念,闡發吾人做為一理性存有者所必然擁有的先天道 德判斷知識,以及他如何透過定言令式在不同程式中的表達,建構了 關於道德正確性的具體判斷原則。透過對於康德先驗規範邏輯學的闡述,本文將進一步指出,康德 以「定言令式」做為道德的基本原則,在其可普遍化的道德判準中,事實上隱含了一個追求共識的理想化討論結構。這與當代學者試圖將 康德倫理學轉化成開放地參與公民社會的正義理論,具有內在的理論 一致性。
In this article I interpret Kant's "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten" as a transcendental norm logic. The rationality of moral judgements is seen to be based on the idea and the principle of pure practical reason. But we find also that Kant does not succeed in separating this idea and principle from psychology and anthropology.The rational authority of moral duty can be shown only in actually open discourse which consists of giving good reasons for actions. The consensus structure of the pure will allows for the universalization of moral judgements. My attempt is to draw this connection in a reconstructive manner.
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