NTU Philosophical Review

This essay analyzes the concept of time in the philosophy of Heidegger and Gadamer in order to show its relationship with both philosophers’ discussion on “Being”. I point out that no matter in his early or later writings, Heidegger’s concept of time is in conflict with his concept of understanding. Therefore, Heidegger’s quest for the meaning of Being cannot be accomplished. In contrast the Gadamerian concept of time makes the understanding of the meaning of Being possible.In the first part of this essay Heidegger’s concepts of time are revealed by an analysis on his two major works: Being and Time and On Time and Being. I argue that the concept of time revealed in these two books makes the understanding of Being impossible. In the second part Gadamer’s concept of time is discussed by an investigation on the following terms: contemporaneity, time in festival and fulfilled time. I show that the Gadamerian concept of time is in harmony with the understanding of Being. ThereforeGadamer’s philosophy can accomplish the task of illuminating the meaning of Being. Finally I show that it is justified to accept the Gadamerian concept of time in the interpretation of Being.

There is a important principle in the problem of free-will. This principle is called “the principle of alternate possibilities” (hereinafter : PAP) which states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. Harry G. Frankfurt has presented a series of putative counterexamples to PAP. (“Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” Journal of Philosophy 66,1969,pp.829-39)The “Frankfurt-style” examples have evoked considerable discussion. One general form of response to the examples is in the examples there are alternative possibilities. Our aim in this paper is to discuss that whether Frankfurt –style examples undermine PAP? (1) Are there alternative possibilities in Frankfurt–style examples? (2) Is an agent moral responsible for a decision although he could not have avoided making it? Or whether Fischer on alternative possibilities and responsibility is correct? (3) And we also discuss Van Inwagen’s three principles which is established the link between ability to do otherwise and responsibility.

The present study examines Buddhist doctrine of "neither increase nor decrease in the realm of sentient beings" in the Anūnatvâpūrṇatva-nirdeśa in terms of a doctrinal development focusing attention on keywords from the realm of sentient beings (sattva-dhātu), dharma-dhātu, dharma-kāya, to tathā-gatagarbha. The Mahāyāna has sometimes been associated with the doctrine that there is neither increase nor decrease in the realm of sentient beings, a doctrine which is often linked to the Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras or the Mādhyamika school. In this paper, I look into just such a doctrine, as it is found in a Chinese traslation of the Anūnatvâpūrṇatva-nirdeśa, a Buddhist scripture translated by Bodhiruci in 525. Several passages of this scripture were cited in the Ratna-gotra-vibhāga, a treatise still preserved in Sanskrit, Chineseand Tibetan, and give us textual sources for research into the Chinese translation of this scripture.In the Anūnatvâpūrṇatva-nirdeśa, the very way in which the doctrine of neither increase nor decrease in the realm of sentient beings is defined and verified through the employment of the dharma-dhātu theory, a theory which, in turn, is verified by reference to theories of dharma-kāya and tathā-gatagarbha. So in order to understand this scripture's discursive construction of the doctrine of neither increase nor decrease in the realm of sentient beings, we must explore its conception of such keywords as dharma-dhātu, dharma-kāya, and tathā-gatagarbha.It is my hope that an examination of such a scripture with the focus on the doctrine of neither increase nor decrease in the realm of sentient beings may contribute to the study of the various ways in which the contours of the Mahāyāna have been drawn from a doctrinal perspective.

The dilemma we are in when we reflect on the free power of choice in our person and our place in the causal world can be dissolved if the relationship between action and event causation is appropriately described and explained. The present study examines three approaches to the dilemma: The first is based on how to interpret freedom given event causation, the second based on having leeway given probabilistic causation, and the third based on a postulation of agent-causation. None of them is found satisfactory.By finding out and negating their common assumption, the present study proposes a way of fine-tuning our conceptualization of what it is to act, and to choose, in a world enmeshed with causality. The core idea of the proposal is that, at bottom, event causation and the ways we act and choose are inseparable from each other in our embodiedinteractions with the environment. The philosophical basis of the proposal is made explicit and defended.