NTU Philosophical Review

This study is divided into three main parts, and additionally includes an introduction, conclusion, footnotes and reference books.The first part deals with the historical development of the social philosophy in the period of the Republic of China. It begins from the revolutional ideology created by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1895, through the revolution in 1911, and ended in 1949, when the republic government escaped from mainland China to Taiwan on the one hand, it propounded by scholars on the other.The second part examines the essential contents of the social principles, prohlems and praxis during this century. Finally in the third part the author attempts a critique onthe values and the limitations of this study of the social philosophy in this period.

In his Essay, John Locke contends, “since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, ... our knowledge is only conversant about them." But it is inconsistent with his realisrn, since the object of human knowlege is the external world itself rather than the idea in the mind. Thus, how can he be sure that he has knowledge of the world?In this paper, the author deals with Locke's concept of knowledge by an investigation of the problem in ideas which is related to criteria of truth.The paper is divded into two parts. The first part deals with Locke's metaphysics. The author contends that Locke develops his theory of knowledge in order to justify his religious faith and metaphysics. Locke is a realist. He establishes his theory of knowledge by way of way of idea. But he does not trust the ability of senses. Mind cannot know the real essence of the material substance. Thus, how can he claim that he knows things, since his theory of truth is of correspondence rather than of cohence?The second part of the paper clarifies Locke's problem of certainty in terms of origin, nature and division of idea. The author contends that Locke holds a causal theory of perception, since he uses the correspondence theory of truth. But It does not help Locke to get rid of the challenge of scepticism in natural science. In mathematics and morals, Locke believes that the human knowledge can be certain.

基督宗教與馬克斯主義大概是人類歷史宜今兩股最強大和其影響 力的意識型態，它們分別地以幕督教會和共產黨組織做為骨幹。隨著共產黨力量的擴張，也就增加了此間的敵意。這樣的敵意其 至還帶來致命的、不諒解的門爭。共產黨迫害基督徒，基督徒咒 罵共產主義，都成了晚近歷史上的常態。這份研究主要是探究它們之間彼此仇視的理由，分別就三方面來展開:.....理論的衝突....實踐的衝突.....權力的因素在此，我們尤其集在虞理關於異化的問題，和權力的因素等等，按我們的理解，這往往就是衝突的原因所在。這項工作的首要部份即是按計劃完成基督宗教和馬克斯主義 之間的對話，我們相信這樣的鋪展，將有助於將來在中國展開基 督宗教與馬克斯主義之間的對話。

In studying the problems of personal identity, we found there are many imaginary cases. Philosophers used these imaginary thought experiments to decide who we are. They used these thought experiments to find out whether the criterion of personal identity is bodily identity or is constituted by psychological factors.But when they described these thought experiments, they have presupposed some criterion of personal identity. J. Perry's story is the good example. It can be described as' body change', it also can be described as' character and personality change'. The way we describe is dependent on what we assume about the criterion of personal identity. It is circular. Therefore, we cannot use these imaginary thought experments to decide who we are and the criterion of personal identity.

This essay contains of two parts. The first is show that the hermeneutical model, referred to as "the ontology of man as subject", on which the most popular contemporary interpretations of {Mencius} and {The Doctrine of the Mean} are based, is inappropriate. I further point out that this ontological assumption is incoherent with the main themes of the works under investigation. In the second part, I propose a new hermeneutical model, "the ontology of Heaven as subject," and I show that the main principles in {Mencius} and {The Doctrine of the Mean} can be well interpreted in this model. Finally, the relationship of these two models is briefly analysed.

Hegel' s concept of education in its development has three aspects. In " Das Leben Jesu", Hegel tries to find in the Gospel, from Platonic and Kantian point of view, a heuristic method of education, based upon a metaphysic of morality a priori. It is in effect a synthetic interpretation of the idea of education in Greek and Hebrew culture. In "Phanomenologie des Geistes", the metaphysic of morality a priori was deepened into a theory of the immanence of "weltgeist", and the heuristic method of education was enlarged to an idea of the education of well-rounded, integrated person. In his Nurnberg period, Hegel considered some actual practices of the educational institution and conteds that the low level vocational education may not achieve such ideal of education and that we should develop the general middle school education as universalas possible. The curriculum of philosophy in middle school is indispensable to the education of the individual person in its entirety, and it is also the best way to develop philosophy.If the middle school has the curriculum of philosophy, evidently the course of introduction to philosophy in Studium Generale should be not a course in beginning philosophy, but must be more advanced and differentiated. The theory of the immanence of "Weltgeist" implies the infinite potentiality of the rnental development of human nature, and therefore expects a complete liberation and freedom of all opportunities of education. In such situation, the form of the course of introduction to philosophy in Studium Generale may be a minor or a second major in philosophy.

It is unquestionable that “rationality" is one of the most important terminologies used in modern philosophy. Philosophers do usually criticize other's statements or acts as“rational" or “irrational". Owing to its tremendous influences on academic discussions and even on ordinary conversations, we are enthusiastic to know what is its meaning and what is the standard when we possess the word to judge.In most cases, people take the logical consistency as a key criterion of rationality. Charles Taylor adjusted this opinion in his paper titled "Rationality". He thought consistency is plainly a necessary condition of rationality.Though logical inconsistency may be enough to explain the most accusations of the irrationality that bandied around in western civilization, rationality involves more than avoiding inconsistency. Peter Winch also mentioned us , in his paper "Understanding a Primitive society", that standards of rationality may differ from culture to culture and we must beware of applying them crossculturally. Charles Taylor did not agree with Winch's plurality of standards of rationality. He still opens the door for transcultural judgments of rationality and insists that the concept of rationality we use is richer.I am not quite satisfied with Taylor's resolution on the problem of rationality. He did not tell us what is the standard we possess to make the judgments of rationality betweentheoretical and atheoretical societies. The only message we got from him is consistency is not enough to explain all the judgments of rationality, especially in transcultural occasions. So I try to review some more comments on rationality. Through the distinction between formal rationality and substantive rationality, Max Weber tried to help people escape from the confusion of making this kind of judgment. In a book "Reason, Rationality, Reasonableness", the author, Tran Van Doan, alleged that these three words should be applied in different aspects of human life. Reason expresses the metaphysical dimension of man. Rationality reflects human technical interest of dominating nature and of deciding human fate. And reasonableness is constructed on human daily life. People become confused only when they misplace these words in improperarea. As to the standard of judgments, Tran said that acceptance or agreement could be the criterion of reasonableness.Contrasting with Taylor's arguments, this paper tries to argue that logical consistency is still the main criterion of judgments of rationality. Consistency is concerned only in itslogical formulation, and is nothing to do with a whole theoretical structure. Things interfering one's judgment are usually happened to be in the theoretical structure or in the presupposition the debater possesses. The confusion of judgments of rationality originates from the different theory people hold, not from the common logical structure they have.

自亞里斯多德以降一般皆認為，必然真值語句需與本質主義 結合。 本文首先闡述訴諸本質主義並非不可完全必兔。 在當代經 驗論尤以 Quine 為首之反對下，必然真值語句似乎愈形不可接 受。 特別是在量子學邏輯之支持下， 邏輯亦是一門經驗科學。 這 些成果在在顯示 Quine 的可修正主義似乎已然確立。作者於本 文中進一步指出，即使吾人接受可修正主義仍叫肯定必然真值語 句。