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The Monist:
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Issue: 4
Stephen Davies
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The Monist:
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Issue: 4
Michael Morris
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The Monist:
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95 >
Issue: 4
James O. Young
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4.
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The Monist:
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95 >
Issue: 4
Bence Nanay
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The Monist:
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95 >
Issue: 4
Stefano Predelli
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6.
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The Monist:
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95 >
Issue: 4
David Davies
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7.
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The Monist:
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95 >
Issue: 4
Aaron Ridley
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The Monist:
Volume >
95 >
Issue: 4
Robert Kraut
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The Monist:
Volume >
95 >
Issue: 4
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10.
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The Monist:
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95 >
Issue: 4
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11.
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The Monist:
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95 >
Issue: 4
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12.
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The Monist:
Volume >
95 >
Issue: 3
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong,
Thalia Wheatley
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13.
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The Monist:
Volume >
95 >
Issue: 3
Walter Glannon
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14.
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The Monist:
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95 >
Issue: 3
Julian Savulescu,
Ingmar Persson
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15.
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The Monist:
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95 >
Issue: 3
Alfred Mele
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16.
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The Monist:
Volume >
95 >
Issue: 3
Robyn Repko Waller
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17.
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The Monist:
Volume >
95 >
Issue: 3
Andrew Fenton
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A recent argument in the neuroethics literature has suggested that brain-mental-state identities (one popular expression of what is commonly known as neuroreductionism) promise to settle epistemological uncertainties about nonhuman animal minds. What’s more, these brain-mental-state identities offer the further promise of dismantling the deadlock over the moral status of nonhuman animals, to positive affect in such areas as agriculture and laboratory animal science. I will argue that neuroscientific claims assuming brain-mental-state identities do not so much resolve the problem of other animal minds as mark its resolution. In the meantime, we must rely on the tools available to us, including those provided by such behavioral sciences as cognitive ethology, comparativepsychology, and ethology as well as the neurosciences. Focusing on captive animal research, I will also argue that humane experimentalists do not doubt that many of their research subjects have minds (in some substantive sense of that term). In that light, to suggest that the resolution of the problem of other animal minds would change the scientific use of animals misses the point at issue. Instead, what is required is a ‘sea change’ in the perceived grounds for human moral obligations to nonhumans. It is difficult to see how brain-mental-state identities could be the deciding factor in this continuing issue in applied ethics.
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The Monist:
Volume >
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Issue: 3
Andy Lamey
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19.
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The Monist:
Volume >
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Issue: 3
Juha Räikkä,
Saul Smilansky
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20.
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The Monist:
Volume >
95 >
Issue: 2
Amie L. Thomasson
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Those working in experimental philosophy have raised a number of arguments against the use of conceptual analysis in philosophical inquiries. But they have typically focused on a model that pursues conceptual analysis by taking intuitions as a kind of (defeasible) evidence for philosophical hypotheses. Little attention has been given to the constitutivist alternative, which sees metaphysical modal facts as reflections of constitutive semantic rules. I begin with a brief overviewof the constitutivist approach and argue that we can defend a role for conceptual analysis, so understood, in ontological disputes against both the general skepticism about the relevance of intuitions, and against the specific worries raised by experimental results. Finally, I argue that even if the constitutivist view is adopted, experimental philosophy may still have quite a useful role to play, though purely empirical inquiries cannot in principle do the ontological work alone.
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