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1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Thomas P. Flint

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2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
W. Matthews Grant

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A well-known objection to divine simplicity holds that the doctrine is incompatible with God’s contingent knowledge. I set out the objection and reject two problematic solutions. I then argue that the objection is best answered by adopting an “extrinsic model of divine knowing” according to which God’s contingent knowledge, which varies across worlds, does not involve any intrinsic variation in God. Solutions along these lines have been suggested by others. This paper advances the discussion by developing and offering partial defenses of three such models.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Katherin A. Rogers

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Incompatibilists hold that, in order for you to be responsible, your choices must come from yourself; thus, determinism is incompatible with responsibility. One way of defending this claim is the Controller Argument: You are not responsible if your choices are caused by a controller, and natural determinism is relevantly similar to such control, therefore . . . Q.E.D. Compatibilists dispute both of these premises, insisting upon a relevant dissimilarity, or allowing, in a tollens move, that since we can be determined and responsible, we can be controlled and responsible. Positing a divine controller strengthens the argument against these two responses.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Lydia Jaeger

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It is often assumed that contemporary physics is more hospitable to divine action (and human freedom) than classical mechanics. The article criticizes this assumption on the grounds of both physics and theology. Most currently discussed models of divine action do not challenge the physicalist assumption that physics provides a true and complete description of nature’s causal web. Thus they resemble physicalism-plus-God. Taking up suggestions from Herman Dooyeweerd and Henri Blocher, I propose an alternative framework for divine action in the world. It takes creation as the starting-point to understand the world and leads to a non-reductionist, multidimensional picture of reality.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Brian Leftow

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I have used a time travel story to model the “Latin” version of the Trinity. William Hasker’s “A Leftovian Trinity?” criticizes my arguments. This piece replies.
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
William Hasker Orcid-ID

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Brian Leftow has replied to the objections I raised against his trinitarian views in “A Leftovian Trinity?.” I explain why I don’t find his replies persuasive, and add some additional points based on his recent response.
7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Brian Leftow

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William Hasker has rejected my rejection of his criticisms of my “Latin” account of the Trinity. I now reject his rejection.
8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Stephen R. Palmquist

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After reviewing the history of the “affirmative” approach to interpreting Kant’s Religion, I offer four responses to the symposium papers in the previous issue of Faith and Philosophy. First, incorrectly identifying Kant’s two “experiments” leads to misunderstandings of his affirmation of Christianity. Second, Kant’s Critical Religion expounds a thoroughgoing interpretation of these experiments, and was not primarily an attempt to confirm the architectonic introduced in Kant’s System of Perspectives. Third, the surprise positions defended by most symposium contributors render the “affirmative” label virtually meaningless. Finally, if Kant is read as constructing perspectival philosophy, not theology, the compatibility of his positions with Christianity stands.

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9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Thomas L. Carson

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10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Aku Visala

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11. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Joseph Shaw

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12. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Robert MacSwain

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13. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Rebecca Konyndyk Deyoung

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14. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Michael T. McFall

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