Environmental Ethics

I argue for the possibility of a creative relationship between man and nature which will inform the basic decision makings that confront us in the concrete concems of environmental ethics today. This relationship, which I call “natural reverence,” is essentially an attitudinal one which recognizes the togethemess of man and nature in freedom. Contrasting Kant’s treatment of the sublime with certain ideas to be found in Indian philosophy-namely, the idea of a radical discontinuity, thought to obtain between “reality” and “nature” (māyā in Vedānta), and the idea of karman as involving modes of human making-I show the manner in which nature can become value laden and how we can work with nature in a manner analogous to that of an artist working with his/her medium in a kind of creative play.

Although ecology is neither a universal nor foundational science, it has metaphysical implications because it profoundly alters traditional Western concepts of terrestrial nature and human being. I briefly sketch the received metaphysical foundations of the modem world view, set out a historical outline of an emerging ecological world view, and identify its principal metaphysical implications. Among these the most salient are a field ontology, the ontological subordination of matter to energy, internal relations, and systemic (as opposed to oceanic) holism. I treat moral psychology as a special case of the metaphysical implications of ecology. Ecology undermines the concept of a separable ego or social atom and thus renders obsolete any ethics which involves the concepts of “self” and “other” as primitive terms.

The problems of environmental ethics are so basic that the exploration of an alternative metaphysics or attendant ethical theory is not a sufficiently radical solution. In fact, the assumptions entailed in adefinition of systematic philosophy that gives us a tradition of metaphysics might themselves be the source of the current crisis. We might need to revision the responsibilities of the philosopher and think in terms of the artist rather than the “scientific of first principles.” Taoism proceeds from art rather than science, and produces an ars contextualis: generalizations drawn from human experience in the most basic processes of making aperson, making a community and making a world. This idea of an “aesthetic cosmology” is one basis for redefining the nature of the relatedness that obtains between particular and world-between tao and te.

How the Tao applies to the ecological understanding of the human environment for the purpose of human well-being as well as for the hannony of nature is an interesting and crucial issue for both environmentalists and philosophers of the Tao. I formulate five basic axioms for an environmental ethic of the Tao: (1) the axiom of total interpenetration; (2) the axiom of self-transformation; (3) the axiom of creative spontaneity; (4) the axiom of a will not to will; and (5) the axiom of non-attaching attachment. I show that each axiom generates important consequences for environmental ethics and that together they provide a necessary foundation for environmental ethics.

I highlight the philosophical standpoints of two traditions, one from the East and the other from the West, that seem to avoid any form of reductionism resulting from the search for ultimate objectivity in human knowledge and understanding. I compare the pragmatic teachings of the Buddha and William James in order to show how both accommodate the human perspective as an inalienable part of the philosophical enterprise, and, further, how these perspectives contribute to their humanistic approaches and to the valuing of the environment in a way that is essential for human survival.

Philosophers have paid little attention to the distinction between conservation and preservation, apparently because they have accepted John Passmore’s suggestion that conservationism is an expression of anthropocentric motives and that “true” preservationism is an expression of nonanthropocentric motives. Philosophers have therefore concentrated their efforts on this distinction in motives. This reduction,however, is insensitive to important nuances of environmentalist objectives: there are a wide variety of human reasons for preserving natural ecosystems and wild species. Preservationist policies represent a concem to protect biological diversity from the simplifying effects of human management and are motivated by the full range of values (consumptive, aesthetic, scientific, and moral) attached to a diverse biota.Conservationists and preservationists differ mainly in their emphasis on resilience measures versus predictability measures of stability, respectively. The distinction between anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric motives loses importance as emphasis is placed on the longest term values humans place on the proteetion of biological diversity.

Ecological rationality is a concept important to most environmental and natural resources policy and to much policy-relevant literature and research. Yet ecological rationality as a distinctive form of reason can only be understood and appreciated in the context of a larger body of work on the general concept of rationality. In particular, Herbert Simon’s differentiation between substantive and proceduralrationality and Paul Diesing’s specification of forms of practical reason are useful tools in mapping and defining ecological rationality. The significance and characteristics of ecological rationality suggest that it is a fundamental kind of reason, having precedence over others.

Environmental ethics would greatly benefit from an adequate metaphysical foundation. In an attempt to demonstrate the value of Whitehead’s metaphysical system as such a foundation, I first discuss five central tenets of his thought. I then compare aspects of his philosophy with Peter Singer’s utilitarianism, Tom Regan’s rights theory, Aldo Leopold’s land ethic, and Spinoza's system in order to indicate how aWhiteheadian approach can solve the difficulties of the other views as currently developed, and provide the basis for an environmental ethics which values individual entities in themselves and in their connectedness in a purposive natural order.

Deep ecology has been criticized for being anti-anthropocentric, ignorant of feminism, and utopian. Most of the arguments against deep ecology, however, are based on uncritical use of these terms. Deep ecology places anthropocentrism, feminism, and utopianism into a proper perspective--deep anthropology-which pennits understanding of the human relationships with other beings in nature, in a total-fieldmodel, without accepting unhealthy extremes. The principles of deep ecology are concerned with creating good places, rather than the “no places” of modem industrial cultures.