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symposium on philosophy for children

1. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Jana Mohr Lone

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2. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Gareth B. Matthews

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This paper illustrates some of the exciting and interesting philosophical discussions we can have with children when we let them develop the thread of the conversation in their own ways. The author discusses the virtue of patience when doing philosophy with children, and the importance of letting the rhythms of the discussion unfold without undue adult interference. Adults (and especially teachers) often attempt to control the ways in which children discuss issues with one another. The author reminds us of how powerful it can be for a philosophical conversation among children to develop organically. and of how allowing silences to occur can inspire further philosophical explorations among the children.
3. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Michael S. Pritchard

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This paper discusses the growing prominence of character education and the role moral philosophy can play here. It examines the place of inquiry in character education, and the ways in which moral philosophy can help young people to develop the virtue of reasonableness. Reasonableness, as herein described, takes into account the views and feelings of others, the willingness to allow one’s views to be scrutinized by others, and the acceptance of some degree of uncertainty about whether one’s views are necessarily right. The paper illustrates ways in which philosophical exploration about morality can help children to cultivate reasonableness.
4. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
David A. Shapiro

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This paper suggests that young people can explore moral philosophy in ways that will help them both think and act in ways that are consistent with good moral reasoning. It describes several games and exercises that allow children to explore various moral principles in their behavior toward others. Participating in activities that give children practice in making moral decisions helps them to appreciate the role of principles in moral reasoning. The author contends that it is important for young people to examine ethical dilemmas from the “inside out”; that is, not by listening to the wisdom of philosophers telling them how to approach these issues, but by facing them head on themselves.
5. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Elizabeth Baird Saenger

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In this paper, the author describes some of her experiences over the past almost twenty years discussing ethics with children. She gives many examples of children’s literature as sources for inspiring moral reflection and imaginative thinking on the part of children. She notes that stories allow children to take risks in thinking about ethical decisions. They provide young people with ways to empathize with others who are living very different lives from the ones they live.

symposium on philosophy and emotions

6. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Kristján Kristjánsson

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The virtue ethicist Rosalind Hursthouse has recently admitted that the commonly supposed link between a belief in the moral significance of human emotions and an adherence to virtue ethics may rest on a “historical accident,” and that utilitarians could, for instance, be equally concerned with emotions. The present essay takes up Hursthouse’s challenge and explores both what utilitarians have said and what they should say about the moral justification of emotions. Mill’s classical utilitarianism is rehearsed and applied to the emotions, some relevant objections to utilitarianism are rebutted, and a link is suggested to Aristotle’s conception of happiness. Finally, the essay discusses the scope of utilitarianism as a naturalistic strategy, and explains how naturalistic moral reasoning on the emotions must, in practice, be answerable to empirical research and, hence, interdisciplinary.
7. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Peter B. Raabe

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The theoretical nature of academic philosophy has led to the assumption that a philosophical inquiry is not an appropriate means by which to explore the emotional issues encountered in everyday life. But a closer examination of various conceptions of the emotions leads to the conclusion that a person’s unwelcome emotions don’t simply erupt unexpectedly out of the unconscious and for no reason, but rather that they are generated in large part by a person’s unexamined assumptions and beliefs about himself and the world in which he lives. Therefore philosophical inquiry into these unexamined assumptions and beliefs, as it is conducted in philosophical counseling, has the potential to alleviate the pain and suffering of undesired emotions.

articles

8. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Emrys Westacott

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When is gossiping morally acceptable? In order to explore and develop a principled answer to this question, I pose the problem in a simplified, abstract form: What considerations govern what it is permissible for A to say to B about C? My approach involves first constructing a decision tree out of questions that apply general moral principles to any particular case. These principles filter out talk which, under normal circumstances, would be widely regarded as impermissible, such as breaches of confidence, deliberate falsehoods, or talk likely to produce more future harm than good. They also declare talk which is not contrary to C’s wishes, or which is likely to bring about some tangible further good, to be morally acceptable.The most interesting and controversial type of case is the kind that is not resolved by any of these considerations. People who view gossip in general with suspicion would presumably hold all such talk to be objectionable. I consider and reject several arguments in support of this view. I then look at reasons, mainly utilitarian, for declaring all such talk to be morally acceptable. I argue that these are not sufficient, either individually or collectively, to establish this universal conclusion; there are too many additional variables rendering our moral deliberations irreducibly complex. But they do bring out the many positive aspects of gossip that are often overlooked.
9. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
S. K. Wertz

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Jean-François Revel is the first philosopher to take food seriously and to offer a topology for food practices. He draws a distinction between different kinds of cuisine -- popular (regional) cuisine and erudite (professional) cuisine. With this distinction, he traces the evolution of food practices from the ancient Greeks and Romans, down through the Middle Ages, and into the Renaissance and the Modern Period. His contribution has been acknowledged by Deane Curtin who offers an interpretation of Revel’s conceptual scheme along Platonic lines. In this essay the author reviews Curtin’s interpretation, finds it wanting in certain respects, and develops an alternative reading of Revel along Hegelian lines. This interpretation, the author believes, does greater justice to Revel’s topology for food practices.
10. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Stephen Kershnar

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The moral theory justifying punishment will shape the debate over numerous controversial issues such as the moral permissibility of the death penalty, probation, parole, and plea bargaining, as well as issues about conditions in prison and access to educational opportunities in prison. In this essay I argue that the primary goal of the criminal justice system is to inflict suffering on, and only on, those who deserve it. If I am correct, the answer to issues involving the criminal justice system should be answered in large part by considering whether the practice in question furthers the infliction of suffering on, and only on, those who deserve it.

revenge as a form of justice: a book review and author response

11. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Michael Davis

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Barton’s view in Getting Even: Revenge as a Form of Justice (Open Court Chicago, 19991 is that revenge -- in the form of victim participation in trial. sentencing, and punishment -- should have a large place in criminal justice. I argue that what he suggests in the way of reform has no essential relation with criminal justice.
12. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Charles Barton

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In his review of Getting Even: Revenge as a Form of Justice (Open Court: Chicago. 1999). Michael Davis challenges the view put forward in the book that revenge is personal retributive punishment. Davis also claims that “the purpose Barton seeks to achieve under the banner of ‘victims rights’ has no more to do with punishment than with revenge.” In my response, I argue that Davis’s views and conclusions are based partly on a misreading of Getting Even, and partly on mistaken assumptions about the nature of victim rights, justice, punishment, and revenge.