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1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 9
Jeffrey Sanford Russell

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The existence of mereological sums can be derived from an abstraction principle in a way analogous to numbers. I draw lessons for the thesis that “composition is innocent” from neo-Fregeanism in the philosophy of mathematics.

2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 9
Yannig Luthra

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This paper argues that you have non-observational warrant for beliefs about the body in action. For example, if you mean to be drinking a cup of water, you can know independently of observation that you are moving your body in a way that is effective in enabling you to drink. The case I make centers on the claim that you have default warrant to trust your agency. You do well to trust your agency just in virtue of your status as an agent, and are not required to earn permission to trust your agency through making use of evidence about how well your agency works. You have non-observational warrant for beliefs about the functioning of your agency, including beliefs about your body in action, inasmuch as those beliefs reflect trust in your agency.

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3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 9
Timothy Williamson

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4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 9
Thomas Hofweber

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5. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 9
R. A. Briggs

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