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1.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
25
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2.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
25
Daniel Garber
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3.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
25
Maria Rosa Antognazza
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4.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
25
Kyle Sereda
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In this paper, I address a topic that has been mostly neglected in Leibniz scholarship: Leibniz’s conception of number. I argue that Leibniz thinks of numbers as a certain kind of relation, and that as such, numbers have a privileged place in his metaphysical system as entities that express a certain kind of possibility. Establishing the relational view requires reconciling two seemingly inconsistent definitions of number in Leibniz’s corpus; establishing where numbers fit in Leibniz’s ontology requires confronting a challenge from the well-known nominalist reading of Leibniz most forcefully articulated in Mates (1986). While my main focus is limited to the positive integers, I also argue that Leibniz intends to subsume them under a more general conception of number.
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5.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
25
Paul Lodge
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The question of Leibniz’s relationship to mysticism has been a topic of some debate since the early part of the 20th Century. An initial wave of scholarship led by Jean Baruzi presented Leibniz as a mystic. However, later in the 20th Century the mood turned against this view and the negative appraisal holds sway today. In this paper I do two things: First I provide a detailed account of the ways in which Leibniz is critical of mysticism; second, I argue that there is, nonetheless, an important sense in which Leibniz should be regarded as an advocate of mysticism. However, the approach that I take does not focus on an effort to overturn the kinds of considerations that led people to reject the views of Baruzi. Instead, I try to reframe the discussion and explore more complex and interesting relationships that exist between mysticism and Leibniz’s philosophical theology than have been articulated previously. Here I draw on some recent discussions of mysticism in the philosophical literature to illuminate Leibniz’s own distinction between “false mysticism” and “true mystical theology” and his assessment of the views of a number of other people who might plausibly be identified as mystics.
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6.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
25
Mark Kulstad
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7.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
25
Mogens Lærke
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8.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
25
Stephen Steward
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9.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
25
Mogens Lærke
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10.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
25
Christina Schneider
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11.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
25
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12.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
25
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