Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 1-20 of 1626 documents


past president’s panel: ancient philosophy

1. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Scott Aikin Orcid-ID

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
2. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Lucy Alsip Vollbrecht

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
What is the value of Pyrrhonizing skepticism today? As an epistemologist, I am sympathetic to skepticism, but as a feminist, I am concerned by it. In this short paper, I’ll interrogate the troubled relationship between skepticism and feminism. More specifically, I’ll ask: Can feminists be skeptics? In the first half of the paper, I’ll articulate one feminist objection to skepticism. In the second half, I’ll suggest a pathway forward by which feminists can harness the power of the skeptical method to antiskeptical ends. Part 1 of my analysis engages Brian Ribeiro’s recent book Pyrrhonizers (2021), and Part 2 engages Jennifer Saul’s “Skepticism and Implicit Bias” (2013).
3. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Julian Rome

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
4. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Gabriella Cunningham

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
5. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
G. M. Trujillo, Jr.

view |  rights & permissions | cited by

articles

6. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Emily McGill

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The concept of self-gaslighting has recently become prevalent in popular discourse but has yet to be subjected to detailed philosophical analysis. In this paper, I examine one context in which self-gaslighting is often discussed: situations in which someone has experienced trauma. I argue that the phenomenon currently described as self-gaslighting fails to display core features of manipulative gaslighting and that therefore we should seek other conceptual resources for understanding such cases. I suggest that self-gaslighting, at least in some paradigmatic cases, amounts to either extremely successful interpersonal gaslighting or to internalized oppression. Utilizing these concepts instead of self-gaslighting avoids conceptual difficulties and also has a significant practical payoff. By moving away from the language of self-gaslighting we can move away from feelings of self-blame that so often accompany trauma.
7. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Jasmine Wallace

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
8. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Jerry Green

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
9. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Matthew Marzec

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
There is an enigma that plagues the modern world. On the one hand, access to information is more abundant than ever. On the other, knowledge seems all the more difficult to come by. The world is divided on numerous fact-based questions regarding nutrition, exercise, public policy impact, sickness prevention, mental wellness, and more. What accounts for this phenomenon? Likely, these disagreements and difficulties cannot be accounted for by a single factor, and the elements in play vary from question to question and subject to subject. This paper will focus on one possible factor: eroding trust in subject matter experts.
10. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Cody Harris

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper discusses the non-historicist structural ownership condition on moral responsibility forwarded by Benjamin Matheson. The structural ownership condition requires that a morally relevant action be grounded or partly grounded in psychological states that are generally coherent. While Matheson does not mean to settle the debate on historicism vs. non-historicism, he does mean to secure the position of the ownership condition against the problems that structuralist theories have faced in the past. This paper will focus on how the ownership condition handles cases of ambivalent agents. Intuitively, ambivalent agents should be responsible for what they do as long as what they do is expressive of their cares or commitments, or their authentic character. At a first glance it appears that the ownership condition follows intuitions about ambivalence, but with a closer look we can see that Matheson has provided a potential counter example to this position.
11. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Robyn Gaier

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Amoral actions are actions outside of the moral domain. To establish a way of understanding amoral actions, I will draw upon Dale Dorsey’s agency view which, in sum, maintains that an agent must have a reason to perform an action and be able to perform the action in question based upon that reason. Dorsey focuses upon both cognitive and circumstantial limitations to establish the fact that moral agents can (and do) perform amoral actions. In this paper, however, I will focus upon a kind of deficiency of knowledge that is imparted socially. Some actions of persons suffering from autism seem to fall into the category of amoral actions that I have in mind but, so too, would some actions of persons who suffer from a moral injury. In sum, I aim to expand upon the category of amoral actions among moral agents.
12. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Megan Kitts

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
13. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Justin Wooley

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
14. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Emily C. McWilliams

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Concepts like testimonial injustice (Fricker, 2007) and testimonial violence (Dotson, 2011) articulate that marginalized epistemic agents are unjustly undermined as testifiers when dominant agents cannot or will not hear, understand, or believe their testimony. This paper turns attention away from these constraints on uptake, and towards pragmatic, social, and political constraints on how dominant audiences receive and react to testimony. I argue that these constraints can also be sources of testimonial injustice and epistemic violence. Specifically, I explore a kind of injustice that I call testimonial withdrawal, which occurs when a would-be speaker chooses to remain silent because they know or reasonably expect that there is pragmatic risk associated with speaking, given their unjust marginalization. I argue that this unjustly undermines epistemic agency, and that expanding Fricker and Dotson’s umbrella concepts to accommodate this idea results in a better understanding of the moral and epistemic contours of both testimonial withdrawal and these broader categories.
15. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Akira Inoue

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The purpose of this paper is to show the plausibility of John Rawls’s treatment of efficiency within the system of justice. While in political philosophy efficiency is often treated as an independent condition for establishing justice, or more precisely, as a necessary condition for establishing justice, Rawls considers efficiency as a non-negligible factor that has normativity in general circumstances. This is similar to the view that efficiency is a presumptive condition for evaluating social arrangements. However, Rawls’s view is salient in a more substantive way. This paper demonstrates the salience of Rawls’s view of efficiency by responding to G. A. Cohen’s Impure Justice Objection to Rawls’s theory of justice. This shows that there is no impure connection between Rawls’s justice and efficiency. Moreover, the combined thesis of Rawls’s justice and efficiency is superior to Cohen’s pluralist theory of justice, making it a fruitful approach.
16. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Mike Jostedt, Jr.

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
17. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Pedro Brea

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The following paper puts the history of race and colonialism in conversation with the history of the concept of energy. The objective is to understand what a critical decolonial perspective can teach us about the central role that energy plays in western culture, materially and epistemologically. I am interested in how this approach to political, epistemological, and ontological questions demands that we reconceptualize energy to account for the historical particularity of the concept and the phenomena of history and intersubjectivity, which are eschewed in a purely materialistic and quantitative conception of energy. We will see how energy has been complicit in the racialization of black and indigenous bodies, and how the privileged place that the concept of energy has occupied in the canon of western physics has served to obscure the theological, metaphysical, and cultural assumptions that constitute it.
18. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Guy Crain

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
19. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Laura J. Mueller

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
20. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Michael H. Hannen

view |  rights & permissions | cited by