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1. Hume Studies: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Ruth Weintraub

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According to Hume, the paradigm type of inductive reasoning involves a constant conjunction. But, as Price points out, Hume misrepresents ordinary induction: we experience very few constant conjunctions. In this paper, I examine several ways of defending Hume’s (psychological) account of our practice against Price’s objection, and conclude that the theory cannot be upheld.
2. Hume Studies: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Karl Schafer

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Hume’s discussion of the role of reason in the practical sphere is often read to imply two broad, negative claims: first, that passions and actions can (at most) only be regarded as responsive to reasons in so far as they are either in agreement with or contrary to the instrumental implications of other passions or desires. And second, that there is no properly practical form of inference or reasoning. I argue that Hume’s general understanding of practical reason does not support either of these claims. Rather, Hume’s explicit discussion of these issues—like his discussion of the nature of probable inference—is intended to lay the foundation for a naturalist account of practical thought that we would today regard as embodying a substantive, non-instrumentalist theory of practical rationality. This account will, indeed, make reason the “slave of the passions,” but in a very different sense than the one familiar from most contemporary discussions of Hume.
3. Hume Studies: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Peter Knox-Shaw

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While numerous sources have been found for the ideas expressed by Cleanthes and Demea in the Dialogues, Philo’s thoughts have commonly been taken to originate with Hume. It is clear, however, both from internal and external evidence, that Hume drew for his (sometimes wayward) spokesman on that mid-century ferment in the life sciences that Denis Diderot described as a “revolution.” The restoration of this context—obscured by the late publication of the Dialogues—suggests that Philo’s celebrated critique of theism is merely one face of a discourse that centres in new ideas about generation and evolution. On this reading the Dialogues emerges as a conjectural as well as analytic work, one that offers in addition to its demolition of the argument from design an argument about design, built on the premise that natural order can be independent of a creator. The philosophical definition that Hume brings to ideas that first surfaced in the works ofMaupertuis and Buffon makes the Dialogues the most potent pre-Darwinian work of its period.
4. Hume Studies: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Emil Badici

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It has been argued that Hume’s denial of infinite divisibility entails the falsity of most of the familiar theorems of Euclidean geometry, including the Pythagorean theorem and the bisection theorem. I argue that Hume’s thesis that there are indivisibles is not incompatible with the Pythagorean theorem and other central theorems of Euclidean geometry, but only with those theorems that deal with matters of minuteness. The key to understanding Hume’s view of geometry is the distinction he draws between a precise and an imprecise standard of equality in extension. Hume’s project is different from the attempt made by Berkeley in some of his later writings to save Euclidean geometry. Unlike Berkeley, who interprets the theorems of Euclidean geometry as false albeit useful approximations of geometrical facts, Hume is able to save most of the central theorems as true.
5. Hume Studies: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
M. A. Box

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symposium: rachel cohon, hume’s morality: feeling and fabrication

6. Hume Studies: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Rachel Cohon

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7. Hume Studies: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Don Garrett

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8. Hume Studies: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe Orcid-ID

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9. Hume Studies: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Rachel Cohon

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book reviews

10. Hume Studies: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Sophie Botros

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11. Hume Studies: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
David Fate Norton

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12. Hume Studies: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
John P. Wright

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13. Hume Studies: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Michel Malherbe

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bibliography

14. Hume Studies: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
James Fieser

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15. Hume Studies: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2

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16. Hume Studies: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2

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articles

17. Hume Studies: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Jennifer Welchman

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Hume’s readers love to hate the Sensible Knave. But hating the Knave is like hating a messenger with bad tidings. The message is that there is a gap, on Hume’s account, between our motivations and our obligations to just action. But it isn’t the Knave’s character that is to blame, for the same gap will be found if we turn our attention to alter egos, such as Robin Hood, the benevolent “Prince of Thieves.” Replacing self-interest with benevolence not only does not make the gap go away, it makes it harder to bridge. Of thetwo, it is benevolence, not self-interest, that actually poses the more serous challenge to Hume’s account of justice.
18. Hume Studies: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Mikko Tolonen

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This article analyses Hume’s notion of politeness as developed in a letter he wrote in Paris in 1734 and the account of the corresponding artificial virtue in the Treatise. The analysis will help us understand Hume’s admiration for French manners and why politeness is presented as one of the central artificial virtues in the Treatise. Before the Treatise, Hume had already sided with Bernard Mandeville’s theoretical outlook which stood in contrast to the popular eighteenth-century understanding of politeness as a natural quality of human nature. In the Treatise, Hume developed these notions about the artificial nature of politeness into one of the cornerstones of his account of human sociability.
19. Hume Studies: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Nathan Brett, Katharina Paxman

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Hume is famous for the view that “reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions.” His claim that “we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself vanishes” is less well known. Each seems, in opposite ways, shocking to common sense. This paper explores the latter claim, looking for its source in Hume’s account of the passions and exploring its compatibility with his associationist psychology. We are led to the conclusion that this view—that desires vanish when fulfilment is deemed impossible—endows reason with a power over the passions that is at odds with its role as slave, and ultimately incompatible with a proper understanding of emotions such as grief. Such emotions involve continuing to want what one believes to be impossible. The human (and Humean) imagination can sustain desires without the belief that fulfilment is possible.
20. Hume Studies: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Annette C. Baier, Anik Waldow

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We discuss the variety of sorts of sympathy Hume recognizes, the extent to which he thinks our sympathy with others’ feelings depends on inferences from the other’s expression, and from her perceived situation, and consider also whether he later changed his views about the nature and role of sympathy, in particular its role in morals.