Philosophy and Theology

Since the Second Vatican Council (1962-65), particularly its Pastoral Constitution on the Church and the Modern World, many Catholic theologians, including J. B. Metz, Karl Rahner, and Edward Schillebeeckx, have taken note of the need to see the practical implications of our theoretical doctrines. Taking its cue from a remark of Karl Rahner (1970) that the theological as such must be a principle of action, this article studies the implications of this for Christology, soteriology, and ecclesiology. The Christological implications are rooted in the long overdue recovery of the faith and hope of Jesus himself as the basis of the church’s faith in Jesus. The soteriological implications are rooted in recovering Jesus’ proclamation of the reign of God as the center of Christian soteriology. Finally, the ecclesiological implications are rooted in seeing the church as existing not for itself, but for the sake of the ongoing proclamation and realization of God’s reign in the present.

This article analyzes a single paragraph in John Milbank’s The Word Made Strange that criticizes Bernard Lonergan’s understanding of Thomas Aquinas’ theology of the trinitarian processions. It demonstrates that the criticisms are unsubstantiated by the texts referenced in the footnote citations and are thus, in all probability, baseless. In doing so, it calls into question the level of argumentation adopted in Milank’s works.

William Norris Clarke, S.J., one of the leading Thomist scholars in the United States, came to the Philippines recently and delivered a series of lectures in the Ateneo de Manila University and the University of Santo Tomas on various philosophical topics inspired by the thought of St. Thomas. Fr. Clarke is now a Professor Emeritus of Philosophy in Fordham University. He was co-founder and editor (l961-85) of the International Philosophical Quarterly and is the author of some 60 articles, plus the following books: The Philosophical Approach to God, The Universe as Journey, Person and Being, Explorations in Metaphysics: Being—God—Person, and The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics (Fall, 2000).He continues to fulfill his mission of propagating the thoughts of St. Thomas—-the “creative retrieval of St. Thomas,” as he puts it—-in and out of the U.S.An brief excerpt from this interview was originally published in Budhi: A Journal of Ideas and Culture1/3, 1997.

Against the prevailing interpretations that perceive John Locke as either a rationalist or as contradictory on the issue of faith and reason, this paper contends that Locke consistently argued for a compatibility of faith and reason. From his perspective, faith and reason are not two distinct “side by side entities, but instead they permeate each other’s realm in a fashion that does not violate the integrity of either one of them. Particular attention will be given to Locke’s distinctions between knowledge and faith and their respective probabilities. Locke’s position will be placed within the seventeenth-century theory of probability that followed the Aristotelian principle that different subject matters require different proofs, and a reasonable person should be satisfied with proofs appropriate for each subject.

This article offers a general “immanent” critique of Derrida’s Deconstructionism, whose positive outcome is an argument for the continuing viability of a Hegel-oriented idealistic metaphysics. Derrida’s thought is construed as an unspokenly skeptical and nihilistic development of Heidegger’s existential ontology and of the sensu latiori “structuralist” trend of contemporary human sciences. The main difficulties pointed out hinge on (§ 1) the relationship deconstructionism establishes between thought and language, speech and writing, and phonetic and non-phonetic writing, (§ 2) its paradoxical concept of “transcendental writing” as the “origin” of empirical writing and of the “trace” as more “original” than original reality; and, finally, (§ 3) its specification of the alleged “radical other” to metaphysical thought as writing, difference, and literature.

The impression is frequently given that the static description of the 4-dimensional world given by a tenseless theory of time adequately accounts for the world and that a tensed theory of time has nothing to offer. In fact, the tenseless theory of time leaves us incapable of specifying the direction of time, whereas a tensed theory of time enables us to do so. Thus, the tensed theory enjoys a considerable advantage over the tenseless view.

There follow four documents that I hope will be found useful by students of la nouvelle théologie, the theological movement that flourished in France around 1950 and that in various ways prepared the way for the Second Vatican Council. The first is my translation of the Conclusion of Henri de Lubac’s Surnaturel: Études historiques (Paris: Aubier, 1946), pp. 483-94. This excerpt was arguably the main place in which he expounded his theology of the relation of nature and grace. The second document is my translation of an article titled “Ein Weg zur Bestimmung des Verhältnisses von Natur und Gnade,” by an anonymous writer known only as “D,” who purported to convey de Lubac’s theology on this matter in systematic style, as distinct from de Lubac’s own more rhetorical approach. This article appeared in Orientierung, vol. 14 (1950), pp. 138-41. Karl Rahner replied to it in the same issue in the immediately succeeding pages, 141-45, and in slightly amended form this reply constitutes his important essay “Concerning the Relationship between Nature and Grace,” in vol. 1 of his Theological Investigations (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961), pp. 297-317, translator Cornelius Ernst. My amendments to the Ernst translation of this essay form the third document of the present group. The final document is my identification of D. Without further ado let us proceed to the documents.