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articles

1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 3
Kyla Ebels-Duggan

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In the Groundwork Kant asserts that the fundamental moral principle must be a principle of autonomy. He dismisses theistic principles, along with all other competitors to his Categorical Imperative, claiming that they are heteronomous. I argue that the best case for this Kantian conclusion conflates our access to the reasons for our commitments with an ability to state these reasons such that they could figure in an argument. This conflation, in turn, results from a certain Kantian conception of inclination, and its role in our moral psychology. These are views that we ought to reject. Having done so, we will see that a theistic ethics based on desire or love for God need not face a distinctive problem of heteronomy.
2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 3
Joshua Cockayne, David Efird

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People of faith, particularly in the Judeo-Christian tradition, worship corporately at least as often, if not more so, than they do individually. Why do they do this? There are, of course, many reasons, some having to do with personal preference and others having to do with the theology of worship. But, in this paper, we explore one reason, a philosophical reason, which, despite recent work on the philosophy of liturgy, has gone underappreciated. In particular, we argue that corporate worship enables a person to come to know God better than they would otherwise know him in individual worship.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 3
Anthony Bolos

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I challenge the assumption that human uniqueness of the sort motivated by the doctrine of the imago Dei is incompatible with contemporary views in evolutionary biology. I first develop a functionalist account of the image of God and then argue that image bearing is a contingently imposed function. Humans, chosen by God to bear his image, are unique in that they alone possess an ideal range of image bearing capacities. This ideal range makes humans well-suited for the role of image bearing.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 3
Perry Hendricks

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Trent Dougherty has argued that commonsense epistemology and skeptical theism are incompatible. In this paper, I explicate Dougherty’s argument, and show that (at least) one popular form of skeptical theism is compatible with commonsense epistemology.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 3
William Hasker Orcid-ID

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Scott Williams’s Latin Social model of the Trinity holds that the trinitarian persons have between them a single set of divine mental powers and a single set of divine mental acts. He claims, nevertheless, that on his view the persons are able to use indexical pronouns such as “I.” This claim is examined and is found to be mistaken.
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 3
Merold Westphal

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Two reasons are given for speaking of “reason” even where Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, Climacus, speaks of “understanding.” First, we are dealing with a significant contribution to a centuries-old discussion of an issue that goes by the name of “faith and reason.” Second, whereas Kant and Hegel sharply distinguish mere understanding from reason, no such distinction is at work in Kierkegaard’s text. At issue is the quite different distinction of unaided human reason and divine revelation. It is not just any notion of reason that is the target of Kierkegaard’s critique, but an autonomous reason, independent of revelation, that claims hegemony over biblical faith in both its popular and academic forms. This hegemony expresses itself in both outright rejection of and radical reinterpretation of elements of biblical faith.

book reviews

7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 3
Kevin Timpe

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8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 3
Dolores G. Morris

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