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The Acorn

Volume 17, Issue 1, Spring/Summer 2017

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1. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Greg Moses

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features

2. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Corey L. Barnes

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Cosmopolitanism seems to appeal to liberal neutrality because both are committed to core values such as reciprocity, autonomy, respect for the individual, personal accountability, and inclusivity. Further, cosmopolitanism is legitimate for many only insofar as it endorses value-pluralism in open societies, which is a staple of liberal neutrality. And yet, one might think that there is a moral obligation to create a cosmopolitan community. One can think of this as moral (normative) cosmopolitanism. To the end of creating a cosmopolitan community, certain values ought to be fostered in laws and public policies, and certain attitudes ought to be cultivated. This leads to a potential impasse, namely if cosmopolitanism is committed to neutrality then it cannot promote its normativity, and if it is not committed to neutrality then it cannot promote value-pluralism. I propose a solution to this potential impasse by examining several of the democratic and cosmopolitan commitments of Alain Locke. What I take from Locke is his grounding of both pluralism and moral cosmopolitanism in democratic, time-honored principles that exist in all acts of free association, namely: liberty, equality, and fraternity. These values, of necessity, pervade all political conceptions of good lives because all political conceptions require what acts of free association allow, namely community with others. To this end, I provide an argument for how someone can consistently be committed to both moral cosmopolitanism and liberal neutrality.
3. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Sanjay Lal

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Having freedom from the fear of death is a quality needed not just by peace activists; however, it is in particular need of affirmation by those espousing a philosophy of nonviolence. A rich philosophical literature explores the supposed harmfulness of death, but the topic is scarcely discussed by peace theorists. This paper shows the significance of the topic for highlighting the attractiveness of nonviolent philosophy given certain non-religious understandings of death that are well suited for advancing nonviolence. Classic Stoic and Epicurean disavowals of the harmfulness of death are presented, criticisms of the Epicurean position are outlined, and the example of Mahatma Gandhi is provided as an ally to Epicureans in response to the criticisms discussed. The second part of the paper more concretely illuminates the implications that a Gandhian rejection of the harmfulness of death has for living nonviolently in everyday life.
4. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
John Nolt

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Reflections on anger, despondence, and nonviolence are prompted by student responses to the 2016 election, especially given the likely implications for climate change policy. The author reflects on the value of nonviolence, environmental activism, and participation in a national climate march.
5. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Anthony Sean Neal, Dwayne A. Tunstall, Felipe Hinojosa

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book reviews

6. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Sanjay Lal

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7. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Bat-Ami Bar On

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8. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Rick Werner

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9. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Court D. Lewis

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10. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1

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