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1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Sandra L. Menssen, Thomas D. Sullivan

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In this paper we evaluate two sets of theistic arguments against the traditional position that Cod created with absolute freedom. The first set features several variations of Leibniz’s basic proof that Cod must create the best possible world. The arguments in the second set base the claim that Cod must create on the Platonic or Dionysian principle that goodness is essentially self-diffusive. We argue that neither the Leibnizian nor the Dionysian arguments are successful.
2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
John Peterson

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The view of Aristotle and Brentano that ‘true’ applies straightforwardly to statements (judgments, beliefs, propositions) and derivatively to other things makes for awkward and unintuitive definitions in the cases of derived truth. This is corrected by construing ‘true’ as applying analogically to statements and other things. Under this view, six senses of ‘true’ are distinguished. Following the logic of analogy, these senses are partly the same and partly different. These six senses also exhibit an analogy of proportionality. This yields three groups, paired as follows: moral truth is to sentenial truth as productive truth is to ontological truth as cultural truth is to lawful truth.But behind every analogical prediction is a derivative predication. This implies that there is a primary referent of ‘true’ behind moral, productive and cultural truth on the one hand and sentential, ontological and lawful truth on the other. In the case of the former three, it is evidently the human mind. In the case of the latter three, a reasonable hypothesis, shared by Aquinas, is that it is God’s mind.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Robert Greg Cavin

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A number of Christian philosophers, most recently Gary R. Habermas and William Lane Craig, have claimed that there is sufficient historical evidence to establish the resurrection of Jesus conceived as the transformation of Jesus’ corpse into a living supernatural body that possesses such extraordinary dispositional properties as the inability to ever die again. I argue that, given this conception of resurrection, our only source of potential evidence, the New Testament Easter traditions, cannot provide adequate information to enable us to establish the historicity of the resurrection---even on the assumption that these traditions are completely historically reliable.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
David O'Connor

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In a recent contribution to this journal William Hasker rejects the idea, long a staple in philosophical debates over God and evil, that the existence of gratuitous evil is inconsistent with the existence of God. Among his arguments are three to show that God and gratuitous natural evil are not mutually inconsistent. I will show that none of those arguments succeeds. Then, very briefly, and as a byproduct of showing this, I will sketch out how a potentially vexing form of the problem of God and natural evil is facilitated by Hasker’s distinction between types of gratuitous natural evil.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Timothy P. Jackson

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I defend in this essay the seemingly uncontroversial thesis that God is just. By highlighting the kenotic nature of God’s essential goodness, I rebut arguments by Marilyn Adams, Thomas Morris, and William Alston to the effect that God is too sublime to be bound by obligations to creatures. A straightforward acknowledgement that the God who is Love has freely chosen to be (not merely seem) just, is required by fidelity to Scripture as well as by religious experience. Thus is Christianity’s incarnational faith unHellenized ... again.
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Huston Smith

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Accepting Lyotard’s “incredulity toward metanarratives” as its definition of postmodernism, and Derrida’s “openness to the other” as deconstruction’s contribution to it this essay distinguishes three species of postmodernism: minimal (we have no believable metanarratives), mainline (they are unavailable in principle), and polemical (“good riddance!”). It then argues that the religious impulse challenges all three of these contentions. Contra polemical postmodernism, metanarratives/worldviews are needed. Contra mainline postmodernism, reliable ones are possible. And contra minimal postmodernism, they already exist - in the world’s great, enduring religious traditions.
7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
William Hasker Orcid-ID

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Keith Chrzan claims to have found a flaw in the central argument of my essay, “The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil.” I point out that Chrzan misstates my views on several key points, and argue that his comments fail to create any difficulty for my argument.

book reviews

8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Christopher Hughes

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9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Thomas D. Senor

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10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Alan Padgett

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11. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Daniel Howard-Snyder

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12. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Frances Howard-Snyder

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notes and news

13. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3

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