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editorial editorial

1. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Valentin A. Bazhanov, Ilya T. Kasavin, Alexander L. Nikiforov
Валентин Александрович Бажанов
Венский кружок – проект модерна
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The article examines the main ideological content of the work of the community of scientists and philosophers, which entered the history of philosophy under the name “The Vienna Circle”. Representatives of this association viewed their main methodological task in the logical analysis of the language of science in order to eliminate metaphysical – pseudoscientific – concepts. They investigated the structure of scientific theories, the functions of the theory – explanation and prediction, the processes of justification, confirmation and refutation of theories. Their results were widely recognized, set down essential influence on scientific problems as well as style of philosophical and academic studies, and are still included in textbooks on the philosophy of science. The members of the Vienna Circle created the first holistic concept of science, which gave impetus to subsequent developments in the philosophy of science and served as example for the construction of similar concepts. The socio-ideological prerequisite of this philosophical movement was the task of creating a new scientific view of the world, opposing philosophical pessimism and anti-scientism. This worldview, however, was not naive-scientististic, but presented a synthetic project at the intersection of natural science, philosophy, art and social pedagogy.

panel discussion panel discussion

2. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Natalia I. Kuznetsova
Наталия Ивановна Кузнецова
Оксюморон Венского кружка
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It is argued that the legacy of the Vienna Circle played a very important role in the intellectual quest of modern philosophy. No matter how the concept of logical positivism is buried by “continental philosophy”, or ideologically motivated philosophers, or even the latest initiatives of the contemporary philosophy of science, the scientific worldview remains invariant. The traditions of the work of logical positivists remain relevant both for the development of modern philosophy of science and as guidelines indicating the way to get rid of the idle talk (“meaninglessness”) of political slogans and manifestos.
3. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Stanislav M. Gavrilenko
Станислав Михайлович Гавриленко
Венский кружок: парадоксальное наследие
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The proposed text develops a number of provisions of N.I. Kuznetsova’s article “Oxymoron of the Vienna Circle”. Special attention is paid to the intellectual heritage of the Vienna Circle, which is in many ways paradoxical – rejected and simultaneously operational.
4. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Eugene N. Ivakhnenko
Евгений Николаевич Ивахненко
Венский кружок в двух проекциях
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The author proposes to consider the activities of the Vienna Circle from two different perspectives. One approach reveals the intellectual efforts of the Vienna logicians to bring the order of thought in line with the social and political „Ordnung“ in Austria in the 1930s. It also brings to light the clash between the “exact thinking” and M. Heidegger’s „Das Nichts“, as well as the “new order”, whose adherents sought support not in logic, but in the collective unconscious. The other perspective allows one to highlight the problem of ethics and a system of values, as shaped and solved differently by the language of logic, and by the great Austrian writers of the time.
5. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Lada V. Shipovalova
Лада Владимировна Шиповалова
Быть философом – сочетать несочетаемое
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The article attempts to develop the “oxymoron formula” proposed by N.I. Kuznetsova to interpret the ideas and fate of the representatives of the Vienna Circle. The combination of incompatible reveals the content of this formula. The author of the article proposes to see a combination of incompatible, firstly, in the temporal nature of the work of the Vienna Circle, which unites, on the one hand, the desire for finality in solving problems and, on the other, openness to development. Secondly, she describes the combination of incompatible through the relation and difference of the positions of M. Schlick and O. Neurath in the discussion about protocol sentences. The author defines Schlick’s position as a philosophical desire to combine incompatible and offer a translation of affirmations as expressions describing subjective immediate experience into the intersubjective language of science, the meaning of which is emphasized by Neurath.
6. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Vladimir P. Filatov
Владимир Петрович Филатов
Трудная борьба с метафизикой
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The article traces the crisis of intellectual and political situation in which the Vienna Circle operated. It is shown that the struggle against metaphysics was a common task of its participants. Forms and methods of metaphysical criticism are considered. The role of neo-Kantianism in the formation of logical empiricism is evaluated. The origins of the profound rift in German-speaking, and then Western philosophy as a whole, are analyzed.
7. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Natalia I. Kuznetsova
Наталия Ивановна Кузнецова
Ответ моим критикам
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epistemology & cognition epistemology & cognition

8. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Jure Zovko, Ivana Renić
Юре Зовко
Метафора корабля Нейрата
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In our paper, we explore the question of what is wrong with Neurath’s “plank-by-plank” method, which Quine later also adopted with enthusiasm. Shipbuilding experts will confirm that plank-byplank replacement is only possible in the dock and never on the open sea. This is simply empty talk, flatus vocis, often attributed to philosophers. The main problem with Neurath’s ship metaphor is that it is completely alien to the seafarers’ way of life, or even in stark contradiction to it. If it is the task of philosophy to bring order into the house of concepts, the use of metaphors should also be scrutinized. Any practical test of the plank-by-plank methodology would prove unsuccessful, for as soon as one would remove a plank from the ship, the ship would sink very quickly due to the onslaught of the water. If the philosophers argue for empiricist epistemology, as Neurath and Quine do, they should not use such utopian metaphors in which the practical life world is completely ignored. When philosophers argue for an empiricist epistemology, as Neurath and Quine do, they should be more careful in their use of metaphors that exclude empiricism, practice, and the practical world of life. It is rather a vivid example of abstract armchair philosophy to explain how science works. Finally, it remains a problem to elaborate a concept of epistemology by “philosophizing” abstractly about empiricism and empiricist epistemology without referring to concrete life experiences. Neurath’s boat metaphor, praised by Quine, is, unfortunately, an example of epistemology without reference to concrete forms of life, and it is still questionable whether we can achieve anything factually with such non-functional metaphors, let alone make the process of cognition scientifically plausible. The whole thing is reminiscent of the scholastic witty remark about how someone convincingly tries to talk about swimming without jumping into the water. Every sailor knows that a ship could only be serviced and repaired in a dock. Seafaring as a way of life, all the turbulence associated with this form of life, obviously remained unknown to Neurath, who spent most of his life in a continental, mountainous country, so it is fair to say that he used a very unusual metaphor not grounded in the practice of life, which, to make the paradox even greater, is meant to represent a naturalistic-empiricist concept of knowledge.
9. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Dewi Trebaul
Деви Треболь
Переопределяя статус философских высказываний
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In his foreword to the Philosophical papers by Hans Hahn, Karl Menger mentions a controversy about the possibility or impossibility to speak about language within the Vienna Circle in the early 1930’s. He then adds: “Waismann proclaimed that one could not speak about language. Hahn took strong exception to this view. Why should one not – if perhaps in a higher-level language – speak about language? To which Waismann replied essentially that this would not fit into the texture of Wittgenstein’s latest ideas.”1 Thanks to the publication of the protocols of the Vienna Circle by Friedrich Stadler in his book The Vienna Circle – Studies in the origins, development and influence of logical empiricism, we have access to some discussions within the circle in the years 1930 and 1931, that allow us a partial reconstruction of the controversy. In these minutes we attend a very lively discussion on the topic of ‘talking about language’. We would like to make more explicit the tenets of this controversy, starting from the discussions within the circle. We will then focus on the evolution of the positions of different members of the Circle, that reflect different attitudes towards this problem, that are expounded in articles published until 1936. Although its members strived to stay the closest, they could to the landmarks laid down by the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, some of its members broke with them in many respects. The need to admit the possibility of talking theoretically about language became more pressing as the works of Tarski and Godel began to exert an influence on the researches of its members. Two options emerged: talking about a language in another language (Hahn) or in the same language (Carnap). Hahn’s positions, despite their originality, stand close to those of Carnap, who presents in 1931 his meta-logical project. Disagreements with Waismann occured frequently. Neurath remained skeptical about such a development that could, according to him, lead back to metaphysical considerations. The protocols by Rosa Rand give us precious insights on the premises of this debate, symptomatic of the diversity of the positions and of the fruitfulness of the exchanges within the Vienna Circle at that time. However, this debate takes place in a broader setting, namely the discussion of the status of philosophical statements once the rejection of metaphysics is accomplished. The answers provided reflect strong dissenting currents within the circle. For Neurath, to conceive of philosophy as providing elucidations is mistaken. Science shall take the form of an encyclopedia, that contains heterogeneous discourses – exact formulated sentences, as well as piece of ordinary language – and is taken in a dynamic process. No discourse outside science can be accepted. For Schlick and Waismann, there is still room for philosophy as providing elucidations about language. For Carnap, the aim is to attain a logically suitable language for science; discussions in a natural language have only a provisional role, in order to attain an adequate language, in which the logic of science can be formulated.

language & mind language & mind

10. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Alexei Z. Chernyak
Алексей Зиновьевич Черняк
Существование, абстракции и референция
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The article is devoted to the well-known dispute between R. Carnap and W.V.O. Quine on the meaning of statements with names of abstractions, which also revealed their disagreements on the more general question of the nature of the dependence of ontology on the choice of language of knowledge. According to Quine, the choice of language carries with it certain ontological commitments – judgments of existence that must be true for anyone who appropriately uses the language in question. The language of abstractions (using appropriate names and indications) is widely used not only in philosophy and everyday communication, but also in the sciences, including natural sciences. The names of abstractions (or, alternatively, quantification by corresponding entities) cannot be completely excluded from science, as Carnap, in particular, points out. He also considers it wrong to attribute to a scientist with empiricist views the belief in the existence of something that he, as an empiricist, is not ready to consider existing. In his view, the choice of language (framework) does not carry any ontological obligations: it determines what should be the correct answer to the so-called internal questions of the theory but does not affect metaphysical questions. Carnap interprets meaningful statements about abstractions as analytical truths, while Quine believes that most references to abstractions are removable from the language of science, and those that are not removable create additional ontological obligations, which, however, for some reason say nothing about reality itself. But why this is so, if the theory implicating them claims to describe reality, is not clear. This debate about the role of judgments about abstractions in scientific knowledge gave rise to a whole branch of metaphysical and ontological research, best known as metaontology. The main parties in this dispute are realists, who interpret irreducible abstractions as part of reality and denotations of certain names, and anti-realists, who, as a rule, deny the connection of statements with such names with reality, treating them as pseudo-statements or something similar. The solution to the problem, which is proposed in this article, consists in abandoning the belief, widespread both in philosophy and in everyday thought, which can be generally called “The theory of reference” and which consists in the fact that the contribution of names and certain other types of expressions to communication is their denotations. If we assume that names have no denotations at all and their semantic contribution to statements is only their senses or something similar, then the names of abstractions in this respect will be no different from other types of names. In this case, it would be no need to either assume that they designate some “Platonic” entities in order for some statements with them being true, nor interpret these judgments as pseudo-statements or as truths of some special kind that are not related to reality. The interpretation of statements with such names and their evaluation will not pose any special problem for the empiricist with this approach.
11. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Irina N. Griftsova, Natalya Yu. Kozlova
Ирина Николаевна Грифцова
Идеи философии языка Р. Карнапа в контексте концептуальной инженерии
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The past decade has seen notable development of conceptual engineering – a field of analytical philosophy that focuses on the critical evaluation of concepts. Most authors engaged with this area identify Rudolf Carnap’s ideas as its methodological framework and theoretical origin, placing particular emphasis on the philosopher’s method of explication. This article highlights the unquestionable influence Carnap’s thought had on conceptual engineering whilst by no means reducing it to the utilisation and advancement of explication within this field of analytical philosophy: indeed, conceptual engineering has incorporated – and brought to the forefront – much broader tenets of Carnap’s concept. This study draws on a series of the philosopher’s works, as well as his ‘Intellectual Autobiography’, to trace the evolution of his ideas about language and describe the fundamental elements revealing the ‘engineering perspective’ in his reflection. Most clearly, this perspective is evident in his interpretation of logic as a conceptual tool for acquiring and processing knowledge, ‘assembling’ it into a structure and refining the procedures of logic itself. It is shown that the origins of the engineering perspective trace back, on the one hand, to Carnap’s interest in the methodological framework of physics, particularly the measurement problem and its epistemological analysis, and, on the other, his fascination with interpretations of the nature of mathematical theory and the idea of unifying logicism and formalism by introducing the principle of tolerance, which adds a pragmatic dimension to methodology. The article examines in detail the idea of explication and its theoretical origins, which lie, in particular, in Carnap’s intention to exactify the notions expressing the degree of validity and probability. His idea of a link between the results of explication and its goal became the central principle of conceptual engineering, distinguishing it from mere conceptual analysis. It is concluded that, when considered together, Carnap’s two major ideas – explication and the principle of tolerance – can be placed in a broader context of a project seeking a rational reconstruction of the life of society and providing it with knowledge-based underpinnings.

vista vista

12. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Alberto Cordero
Альберто Кордеро
О структуре и накоплении реалистского содержания
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Ever since the heyday of the Vienna Circle, scientific realists have worked hard to document and clarify the structure and growth of truth content in theoretical descriptions. Today, this trait is particularly intense among “selective realists” – realists focused on theory parts with high empirical corroboration rather than whole theories. From their perspective, theories with posits systematically deployed in corroborated novel predictions are, with high probability, descriptively true or contain a proper part that is. Unlike traditional realists, selectivists acknowledge that (a) radical conceptual change is a recurring scientific phenomenon and (b) empirical theories have poor reliability records at the most profound ontological level. At the same time, they point to significant descriptive continuities at intermediate theoretical levels between successful theories and their successors – i.e., a false theory can (and often does) contain parts that succeed as correct descriptions. Selectivists seek to identify those parts. Their approaches limit ontological commitment exclusively to highly confirmed theoretical descriptions; unfortunately, the selection criteria they use seemingly support many regrettable choices. One source of trouble is that extant approaches leave unclear the ontology described by the selected parts. Historical cases and scientific practice gesture toward a functional resolution of this difficulty, but the clues could be more transparent and need elaboration. Otherwise, selectivism has improved in consistency over the last three decades. Current projects emphasize the continuity of well-established scientific content (relating to how entities and processes effectively behave within a specific regime or descriptive level) instead of just the continuity of “structure”. This paper provides some clarifications that arguably clear the road for realist commitment toward functional and effective theoretical content. The proposed functional/effective turn is checked against some plausible objections.

case studies – science studies case studies – science studies

13. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Lev D. Lamberov
Лев Дмитриевич Ламберов
Принципы верификации и проверяемости
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The paper deals with the conception of logical empiricism developed by Eino Kaila. Eino Kaila, being a thinker close to the Vienna Circle, departs from some of the central ideas of logical positivism. He identifies a limited number of problems in metaphysics that are meaningful and need to be solved, but he declares the rest of metaphysics to be a logical fallacy. For Eino Kaila, it is not the principle of verification (as a criterion of meaning) but the principle of testability that plays the most important role. In addition, he revises the principle of translatability, insisting that it is impossible to translate a single sentence into the language of experience, but it is possible to translate the whole theory to which the sentence belongs. This is related to his structuralist position in the philosophy of science and his understanding of scientific theories as ‘rationalisations’ as opposed to simple inductive generalisations. The paper compares Eino Kaila’s views expressed during the period of his active interaction with the Vienna Circle be regarded as a predecessor of later critics of logical positivism (in particular, W.V.O. Quine).
14. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Arthur Sullivan
Артур Салливан
Витгенштейн, Карнап и Коперник
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My point of departure is a passage in which Coffa claims: “Wittgenstein’s and Carnap’s insights on the a priori belong in the same family as Kant’s... What we witness circa 1930 is a Copernican turn that, like Kant’s, bears the closest connection to the a priori; but its topic is meaning rather than experience” [Coffa, 1991, p. 263]. I draw out Kantian resonances in Wittgenstein’s and Carnap’s work on logic, grammar, and theoretical frameworks. In the end, Coffa’s remark comes out as significantly illuminating for a variety of questions, issues, and dynamic historical trends.

interdisciplinary studies interdisciplinary studies

15. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Petr S. Kusliy, Andrey A. Veretennikov
Петр Сергеевич Куслий
Аналитические истины в концепции Р. Карнапа и естественном языке
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The article presents a critical semantic analysis of the so-called analytical truths as they were discussed by R. Carnap and building on some new empirical data that are not fully satisfactorily explained by Carnap’s theory. A theoretical reconstruction of Carnap’s theory of analytical truths is proposed. It is demonstrated how his understanding of analytical truths, as statements that are true in all possible worlds and amenable to a quite obvious definition on a par with the concepts of sense (meaning) and synonymy, applies exclusively to artificial languages of logic. Therefore, Carnap’s theory remains unreachable for the well-known criticism of W. Quine, who, in turn, pointed out the difficulties in defining these concepts for natural languages. A theoretical reconstruction of Carnap’s explication of the mentioned concepts in the theory of meaning for natural languages is carried out. The connection of Carnap’s approach with the perspective of contemporary formal semantics is established. Subsequently, problematic cases and the difficulties they pose for Carnap’s concept are examined. An explanation is proposed for analytical truths as containing in their logical form an (unpronounced) quantifier over possible worlds (situations).

archive archive

16. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Marco Buzzoni
Марко Буззони
Карл Гемпель: мысленные эксперименты между методологическим монизмом и дихотомией открытия/обоснования
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Hempel’s account of thought experiments has been discussed only by a very few authors and, for the most part, with rather cursory remarks. Its importance, however, is not only historical, but also systematic theoretical, because it involves the distinction between discovery and justification, a main pillar of neopositivistic philosophy of science. Hempel raised the question whether thought experiments constitute a methodological component of scientific research or, on the contrary, are merely a heuristic-psychological device for obtaining and/or transmitting new ideas. While conceding a few exceptions in the natural sciences, he argued that thought experiments always have a heuristic character in the social sciences. There is however a fundamental tension in Hempel’s conception of thought experiments, between the thesis of methodological monism and the neopositivistic dichotomy discovery/justification. On the one hand, on the basis of the unity of scientific method, Hempel admits a difference only in degree between the natural and the human sciences, but on the other hand, he draws a principled distinction between thought experiments of the human sciences (which have only a greater or lesser heuristic value) and those of the natural sciences (which may have also a cognitive-justificatory value). If one assumes the unity of method in the minimal sense in which no scientific knowledge can renounce intersubjective controllability, this tension can be removed either by rejecting the discovery/justification dichotomy or by interpreting it differently. Here, following the second path, two senses of the dichotomy are distinguished, one of which must be accepted, while the other rejected. This removes the internal tension in Hempel’s conception of thought experiments and suggests the thesis that any plausible thought experiment, both in the natural and the human sciences, must already contain some justification, implicit or explicit, of the theoretical hypotheses that they formulate.

new trends new trends

17. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Natalya N. Voronina
Наталия Николаевна Воронина
Страстная бесстрастность Венского кружка
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This article represents the author’s reflections on the book by Karl Sigmund “Exact Thinking in Demented Times. The Vienna Circle and the Epic Quest for the Foundations of Science” and the fate of the Vienna Circle. Sigmund paints a vivid portrait of the Vienna Circle against the background of the difficult historical period in which its members lived and worked. The Vienna Circle established the tradition of liberating consciousness and science from metaphysics. But the participants of the Vienna Circle and their entourage did not manage to get rid of the humanistic issues, despite the declaration of strict scientific character. The author of the article draws attention to the internal contradiction between strict scientific topics and the existential-humanistic perception of this topic by the Vienna Circle’s authors and their likeminded people, and by Sigmund himself. The author concludes that it was thanks to this contradiction the Vienna Circle became not only a stage in the development of philosophical science, but also had a broad cultural influence on art, politics, architecture, museums, etc. The historical and philosophical tradition connects the activities of the Vienna Circle with the beginning of the divergence between the philosophical scientific and humanistic traditions in the understanding of philosophy, and the controversy between R. Carnap and M. Heidegger is an important point in this process. But Sigmund’s book gives the impression that this is not the divergence strictly scientific and humanistic traditions, but the difference between two humanistic traditions, one of them tends to express its thoughts strictly analytically.

18. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 60 > Issue: 4
Jubilee of Vladimir N. Porus
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editorial editorial

19. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 60 > Issue: 4
Илья Теодорович Касавин, Владимир Натанович Порус
Ilya T. Kasavin
Philosophy of Science
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The article is dedicated to the identification and analysis of existential dimensions of science, i.e., the dependence of consciousness, activity and communication of scientists on special forms of scientific culture – life-meaning universals (existentials). The article outlines the contours of the problem field of existential challenges rooted in the real life of modern science, in the crisis of the Enlightenment idea of scientific progress, in the mismatch of the norms and ideals of scientists with everyday ideas and needs. The origins of the theoretical formulation of the existential problems of science are found in the dilemma of profession and vocation (M. Weber). This is a controversy that problematizes the relationship between the scientist’s desire for objective knowledge, on the one hand, and the human dimension of scientific activity and communication, on the other. The article singles out the particular types of existing, or boundary situations in science, in which the experiences of scientists are ordered and problematized in relation to archetypal values – freedom, objectivity, creativity, rationality, truth, success, as well as in relation to such ontological categories as space and time, which reveal their value-ladeness. The subjective dimension of science, in which a personality manifests herself as overcoming internal conflicts, a free and thinking being, qualifies as the subject of an emerging research trend – the existential philosophy of science.

panel discussion panel discussion

20. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 60 > Issue: 4
Лада Владимировна Шиповалова
Lada V. Shipovalova
Distributed Scientific Cognition – On the Way to Diversity
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The author explores to the conditions for implementation of science as a public good and connects these conditions with the problem of epistemic injustice. She proposes the hypothesis that in order to implement science as a public good or actualize it as a source of diversity, it is necessary to focus theoretical attention on the concept of distributed scientific cognition and allow for the possibility of relevant practices. The rules of distributed scientific cognition practices can and should ensure both the epistemic constructiveness of science and its epistemic justice, legitimizing the openness of access to scientific cognition distributed outside the scientific community. The text reveals the main characteristics of the concept of distributed cognition, introduced by E. Hutchins. The author proposes additionally take into account two meanings of distributed scientific cognition – extensive and intensive. The first refers to the possibility of unlimited addition of participants in cognition with a reasonable relevance of their positions. The second opens up the perspective of working on a distribution that has not yet happened and suggests that any epistemic position can be distributed. She also demonstrates the applicability of the concept to relevant scientific practices related to both professional scientific communication and public communication of science.