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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2017
鄭志忠
Jyh-Jong Jeng
Kant’s Refutation of Idealism
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在《純粹理性批判》B 版的論證(B274-9)中,康德提出一個有說服力的策略,嚴肅地正面回擊懷疑論者對於外在世界真實性的質疑。他直接攻擊懷疑論者的核心假設。首先,康德以懷疑論者都應該能夠接受的自我知識的構想為起點,然後逐步地揭露它的矛盾性。這使得懷疑論者陷入兩難困境。或者他們必須承認,在他們的假設之下,自我知識是不可能的;或者他們必須放棄那個假設,換句話說,他們不僅必須承認自我知識的直接明證性,同時也必須接受作為它的可能性條件的外部事物存在的直接明證性。本文主張:(1)「駁斥」是有說服力的;(2)「駁斥」與「先驗觀念論」的核心主張是相容的。論文分為三大部分。首先,釐清「駁斥」在先驗哲學中的系統性地位,並藉此闡明「現實性設準」的經驗認知意義;其次,批判地分析「駁斥」的論證結構與理由證成;第三,藉由釐清關鍵術語的歧義,來闡明「駁斥」與先驗觀念論的相容性;最後,總結「駁斥」的策略。
In the demonstration of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (B274-9), Kant brings up a persuasive strategy for seriously refuting skeptics’ position concerning the reality of outer world. He attacks directly the core presupposition of skeptics. First of all, Kant takes as a starting point the conception of self-knowledge that should be accepted by all skeptics. Kant then uncovers step by step the sceptics’ contradiction and he hence puts them in a dilemma. Under the sceptics’ assumption, either they must acknowledge the impossibility of self-knowledge or they must give up that assumption. In other words, not only must skeptics acknowledge the direct veridicality of self-knowledge, but also accept the direct veridicality of the existence of outer things as the condition of the possibility of self-knowledge.This paper argues that (1) the ‘refutation’ is persuasive, and (2) the ‘refutation’ and the core theses of ‘transcendental idealism’ are compatible.This essay contains three parts. The first part is to clarify the systematic status of the ‘refutation’ in transcendental philosophy and, by this clarification, to expound the empirically cognitive significance of the ‘postulate of actuality’; the second part is to critically analyze the structure of demonstration and justification of the ‘refutation’; the third part is to expound the compatibility of ‘refutation’ with ‘transcendental idealism’ by clarifying the ambiguity of key terms. The paper ends with a conclusion summarizing the strategy of the ‘refutation’.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2017
陳士誠
Shih-Chen Chen
A Research on the “Unity of Knowing and Acting” and Its Transcendental Explanation Based on Ethics
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知行合一是陽明學核心之一;探求其哲學史根源,以及其倫理學證成方式,以顯其學之規模,即本文之兩個目的。所謂根源,非泛指心學傳統中分析出一種模糊的觀念性連結,而是在確定文本中藉倫理學詮釋尋得文獻根據,以證此知行合一在經典承傳中之一脈相承處。此相承處即是《孟子.離婁上》中所揭示者:知之,即行之,此表示知行間的分析關係,在其中,知,乃智之實:知仁義,即固守仁義;因而,所謂知,即行其所知之遵守義。陽明謂是非心之知,其文本根據即可溯源至此,非如勞思光謂兩者只在詞源上有關而已。這是本文第一個目的。第二個目的乃是藉倫理學證成此知行合一之說。勞思光視「行」為發動義,把「行」一詞之意涵,從常識,提昇到心學與語言哲學位階,但若謂去證成知行合一在倫理學上的必然性,也即,知行何故非合一不可,這問題還需尋求更根本的說明。依本文,這乃基於一相關於使心學所蘊含之倫理學概念成為可能之先驗分析工作,也即,知行合一乃在人之主體同一性中成立,而這同一性則乃是使倫理規範與究責概念成為可能之先在性條件,從而即揭示知行合一之必然性基礎。在這同一性中,知與行在倫理上的屬己性被證立,從而倫理規範與究責之可能性才能被證成。因為,只有在知與行皆屬我的,我才能承認倫理規範之有效性及其可究責性,從而構成一藉主體之自我關係的形式性論證。
The doctrine of the “unity of knowing and acting” is one of the core concerns of Wang Yangming’s philosophy. This paper is trying to elucidate Wang’s theory by investigating: 1. The philosophical origin of this doctrine. 2. The justification of its ethical theory. Regarding the investigation of its “origin”, I will show the philosophical inheritance between Wang’s doctrine and classical texts by the support of relevant textual evidence, instead of examining the linkage between different general ideas in the School of mind. The common ground is revealed in Book 4A of Mencius, of which has been stated clearly that to know is to act. The relationship between knowing and acting is analytic. Since knowing is the richest content of wisdom, and genuine knowing is the observance of action, the knowing of benevolence and righteousness is also the observance of such values. Such Mencius’ idea serves not only the lexical origin as suggested by Lao Sze-kwang, but also as the textual ground of Wang’s understanding of the knowing function of the mind of discerning right and wrong. The second purpose of this paper is to justify the doctrine of the “unity of knowing and acting” by ethical interpretation. Lao emphasizes the significance of activity in the concept of “acting”, and transforms the meaning of “acting” from common sense to the level of school of mind and philosophy of language. Nevertheless, if the ethical necessity of the “unity of knowing and acting” has to be justified, i.e. the reason why knowing necessarily entail acting, a further explanation is needed. In this paper, ideas in School of mind will be explained in terms of ethical concepts in order to achieve a transcendental analysis. The “unity of knowing and acting” is possible in subjective identity, which is the a priori condition to make the concept of an ethical norm and imputation possible. The ethical necessity of the “unity of knowing and acting” can thus be revealed. In the subjective identity, the ethical “ownness” of knowing and acting is justified, and an ethical norm and the possibility of imputation can also be possible. Since knowing and acting belong to one’s own self, the ethical norm and its imputation is then valid. This is a formal argument constituted by the self-relation of one’s subjectivity.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2017
陳斐婷
Fei-Ting Chen
How Does Air Receive Color?
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本文嘗試重建亞里斯多德如何看待中介物空氣容受顏色,給予《靈魂論》第二書第七章418a26-b20 這個段落一個新的詮釋。亞里斯多德分兩個方向進行這項探究。一方面,我論述亞里斯多德嘗試建立一個視覺事件的因果發生序列,顏色是整個視覺事件因果發生序列的動力因起點,使得中介物諸如空氣等透明事物產生變動。而這項變動是一項性質變化。另一方面,透過考察亞里斯多德透過對於光的探究,我指出,處於實現狀態的透明事物,應該理解為展現其與火或此類物體同一的透明本性,是透明事物歷經變動的必要條件。如果上述關於空氣如何容受顏色的解讀是正確的,或許可以為視覺感官如何接受視覺對象的形式(De anima 2.12,414a18-19)提供新的思考方向。
In this paper I reconstruct how Aristotle sees the medium receiving color in De anima 2.7, 418a26-b20 and offer my own interpretation. I argue that Aristotle intends to establish a causal chain for a perception event, which begins with the color of the perceived object as the efficient explanation of the whole causal chain. And color moves the medium, i.e., something transparent such as air, in the manner of alteration. On the other hand, I argue that we should construe the actuality of the transparent thing to be the state of exhibiting the nature of transparency, which air shares with things such as fire. And receiving color in the transparent thing requires the transparent thing to be in actuality. If this line of interpretation is correct, it may reshape the current reading of how the faculty of perception “receives form without matter” (De anima 2.12, 414a18-19).
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2017
陳湘韻
Hsiang-Yun Chen
The Real Problem of Bishop Sentences
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描述性理論(或稱E-型理論)是對「驢子代詞」(donkey anaphora)的一種分析(如:伊凡斯(Evans,1977),韓牧(Heim,1990),尼爾(Neale,1990))。此徑路常為人詬病的一點是無法解釋「主教句型」(bishop sentences)。艾勃(Elbourne,2005)提出一套情境語義學(situation semantics)式的描述性理論,並宣稱該理論不僅能解決傳統描述性理論在說明主教句型時的困難,還能解釋另一種新的主教句型。本文旨在質疑艾勃的分析。我指出艾勃的解法不但使用了未受約束的指代詞(unbound anaphora),且其對新的主教句型的說明也並不適切。
Bishop sentences such as “If a bishop meets a bishop, he blesses him” have long been considered problematic for the descriptivist (or E-type) approach of donkey anaphora (e.g. Evans, 1977; Heim, 1990; and Neale, 1990). Elbourne (2005) offers a situational descriptivist analysis that allegedly solves the problem, and furthermore extends its explanatory coverage to bishop sentence with coordinate subjects. However, I throw serious doubts on Elbourne’s analysis. Specifically, I argue that the purported solution is committed to the use of unbound anaphora, and it cannot sustain the claimed empirical adequacy.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2017
楊德立
Tak-Lap Yeung
A Review of After Hegel: German Philosophy, 1840-1900
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相比十九世紀後半葉的德國哲學,哲學學者與史家一般更注重前半葉的成就。Frederick Beiser 這本著作,正是針對這種情況而寫。他認為十九世紀後半葉被過度簡化和忽略,其實相對於前半葉,後半葉甚至「更重要和哲學上更有趣」,而通過新的敘事和理論重構,該能賦予其應得的重視。為此,作者鑄造了五條不同的歷史線索,包括新「康德主義的興起」、「物質主義的爭論」、「歷史主義的發展」、「現代邏輯的根源」、「悲觀主義的冒起」,讓讀者以不同角度,重新認識這段歷史。他以發掘失落的傳統為己任,對於志同道合的讀者而言,這書當然對味,然而,若要讓讀者公平、恰當地了解當時的思潮,從另一角度而言,書名引來的期望或未盡相符。作者的學術素養無容置疑,本書豐富的資料和清晰的整理,能讓無論是否熟悉該段哲學史的讀者皆耳目一新。若讀者能自行把當中的細節,放到更大的歷史脈絡看,相信會對此書有更正面的評價、獲益更多。
In contrast with the late 19th century German Philosophy, most historians of philosophy emphasize the achievements of the first half of the century. In After Hegel: German Philosophy, 1840-1900, Frederick Beiser stands against this academic current and coins five different narratives, including “the rise of neo-Kantianism”, “the materialism controversy”, “the growth of historicism”, “the root of modern logic”, “the rise of pessimism” to allow readers to reengage with the second half of the 19th century. He takes the responsibility of enlivening the so-called “lost traditions”, and of course, for those readers who have similar taste and interest, this book is their cup of tea. However, if we, by the name of the book, anticipate this work to illustrate a general picture of the “mainstream” philosophical traditions from those times, we may be disappointed. From the academic point of view, this book is certainly well written, with rich references and a comprehensive understanding of the related topics. Through Beiser’s reconstruction of the philosophical controversies, the stiff narratives of the history of philosophy can be softened and refreshed. If the readers themselves are able to incorporate the details provided by the book into the wider historical context and the specific problems in the history of philosophy, the reward can be even bigger.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 53
黃文宏
Wen-Hong Huang
On Hung Yao-Shun’s Conception of “Absolute Dialectics of Alethiology”
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Hung Yao-Shun (1903-1986), one of the major Taiwanese philosophers in the Japanese ruled period, whose research deserves more attention today. My intention in this paper is twofold: First, to clarify some basic concepts of his “absolute dialectics of alethiological dialectics”, and secondly to indicate some possible developments of his logic. The paper is divided into five sections. After a brief introduction to the leading question of my paper (section one), I focus on his main philosophical work “Being and Truth - A Study of Schalwa Nuzubidse’s Alethiology” published in April 1938 (totally 145 pages). Nuzubidse attempts to explicate the traditional metaphysics as an aletheological realism, aiming at the disclosure of the truth-in-itself. Some of the basic concepts of Nuzubidse’s alethiology and Hung’s interpretation are discussed here (sections two, three, four). Through these discussions, we can see that Hung goes deeply into the core of Nuzubidse’s alethiology and radicalizes his alethiological realism step by step to an “Absolute Dialectics of Alethiology”. Finally, Hung’s critique on Nuzubidse is discussed in the last section (section five). Hung’s project remains an unfinished ideal, which makes some of his creative thoughts still obscure. By explicating his concepts and reinforcing his arguments, some of the possible contributions and new perspectives that Hung provided to philosophy will be expounded in this section.
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Issue: 53
Hsiu-Lin Ku
古秀鈴
論極小命題
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Can the idea of a minimal proposition be successfully held? I will first formulate what the minimal proposition is in the minimalist’s mind, taking Emma Borg as the representative. What a minimalist seeks for a minimal proposition is the abstract and skeletal core meaning of a sentence, and this faith is founded on the notion of minimal word meaning—an atomic, code-like, conceptual thing. I show that the problem of this notion of minimal proposition lies in the three features, intuitive read-off, invariantness, and truth-evaluability, that Borg ascribes to it. I shall argue, first, that positing a conceptual-like thing as the invariant minimal content of word cannot support the invariantness of the minimal proposition of a sentence, and second, that the skeletal content, as the minimal proposition of a sentence, is a grammatically analyzed product and thus is hardly truth evaluable. According to the analyses, the idea of a minimal proposition with these three features identified by minimalists cannot be maintained.
本文探討極小命題成立與否的基礎。首先,本文將以Emma Borg 為極小主義之代表,釐清極小主義者所謂的極小命題是種語句本身抽象而結構化的核心意義,並被賦予三種特色:直覺的、不變的、有真假可言的。本文論證具有此三種性質的極小命題是難以成立的。首先針對此主張的基礎─字詞本身的極小內容是一種不可再分、密碼般、概念化的對象─本文論證字詞展現在語句中的意義並非如此不變,因此難以支持極小命題的不變性。其次,本文論證,抽象而結構化的極小命題是邏輯分析後的產物,因此難以有真假值可言。
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 53
Wim De Reu
魏家豪
論巵言─《莊子》之共存與寫作
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This article attempts to reframe the state of research on the notion of goblet words (zhiyan) in the Zhuangzi. Recent studies predominantly view the notion of zhiyan as referring to peculiar stylistic forms exhibited in the Zhuangzi—forms such as dilemmatic questions and paradoxes. In this article, I question the quick identification of these forms as zhiyan. I argue that zhiyan are essentially definite yet provisional simple-form utterances located on the level of everyday interaction and coexistence. On this level, the peculiar stylistic forms do not play their part. However, such stylistic forms do become indispensable in discussing and recommending zhiyan. It is on this meta-level—for the Zhuangzi, the level of writing—that we find these forms employed. Based on structural similarities, we may stretch the label ‘zhiyan’ to include such forms but should keep in mind that any such extension is secondary to the use of language in coexisting with others.
本文嘗試重塑有關《莊子》巵言之研究。近年來,學界大多將巵言視為《莊子》中特殊文體形式,如兩難問題及悖論。本文對於是否能輕易地將這些形式視為巵言存疑,進而試圖論證巵言基本上是簡單形式的言辭,其特色為明確但暫時性的,作用於日常互動與共存上。於此層面,特殊文體形式可謂無用武之地;然而,於探討並進而提倡巵言之時,特殊文體形式便成為不可或缺的一環。正是於此後設之層次─就《莊子》而言,則是寫作之層次─我們發現特殊文體形式之運用。基於結構上之相似度,我們或能將此等文體稱為「巵言」,但同時不應忘記,其乃從屬於與他者共存時所運用之語言。
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Issue: 53
廖育正
Yu-Zheng Liao
Can Zhu Xi’s Theory of Mind Respond to Moral Responsibility?
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在談論道德責任(moral responsibility)歸屬時,一種常被接受的看法是:某人對某事具有道德責任,若且唯若某人在自由意志下,促使了某事的發生。換句話說,若是人無從避免去做一件道德上應受譴責的事情,則不被歸屬道德責任。而朱熹(1130-1200)以心統性情的義理架構,作為其倫理思想的心性論基礎,這樣的系統究竟能否歸屬道德責任?當代學人對此有許多歧見。他們的意見為何產生衝突?朱子心性論可以回應道德責任歸屬嗎?這是本文意欲探究的重點。本文的結論是:當代學人各條研究進路之糾結,大致可以視為相容論與不相容論之爭的中國式展開;對此大哉問,形上學一日不得解,便一日沒有答案。然而在上述糾結之外,若還有回應問題的空間,或許在於以本體工夫論,兼及體驗論的視野,將心詮釋為性情的突現(emergence),去照應涵養省察、格物致知、克己主敬等思想─進而能將Peter van Inwagen 的話改寫為一種中國式的言說:心性情之間,別有一種神秘的工夫。
A commonly held view concerning moral responsibility is that someone has a moral responsibility for some action if and only if someone makes actions freely. In other words, if someone cannot avoid doing actions to be morally condemned, it is not attributable to moral responsibility. Can Zhu Xi’s theory of mind and ethical thoughts─xin-tong-xing-qing 心統性情─respond to the attribution of moral responsibility? Scholars have different opinions and to what extent their disagreement ranges is the focus of this paper.The conclusion of this paper is that the intertwining of these research approaches can be regarded as philosophical problems of the Chinese style concerning compatibilism and incompatibilism. This problem cannot be solved unless its metaphysical problem is dealt with in the first place. However, in addition to the above solution, perhaps we can see xin 心 as emergence of xing-qing 性情, and imagine a special vision of ontological gong-fu 工夫 and experience, taking care of thoughts like han-yang-xing-cha 涵養省察, ge-wu-zhi-zhi 格物致知, ke-ji-zhu-jing 克己主敬. We then adapt the famous statement of Peter van Inwagen as follows: “there is mysterious gong-fu between xin and xing-qing.”
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