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1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 2
Bryan Pickel, Moritz Schulz

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Quine challenged traditional views of the a priori by appealing to two key premises: that any statement may be held true “come what may” and that no statement is immune to revision in light of new experience. Chalmers has recently developed a seemingly compelling response to each of these claims. The critique is particularly threatening because it seems to rest on the Bayesian premise that upon acquiring evidence E, a rational agent will update her credence in any statement S to equal her prior conditional credence in S given E. We argue that Chalmers’s criticisms misfire. When properly understood, Quine’s two theses are largely consistent with Bayesianism.

2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 2
Kieran Setiya

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Opposing conventional wisdom, I argue that the ethics of killing and saving lives is best described by agent-neutral consequentialism, not by appeal to agent-centered restrictions. It does not follow that killings are worse than accidental deaths or that you should kill one to prevent more killings. The upshot is a puzzle about killing and letting die.

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3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 2
Bill Brewer

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4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 2

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