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philoSOPHIA

Volume 10, Issue 1, Winter 2020

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1. philoSOPHIA: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Alyson Cole, Kyoo Lee

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essays

2. philoSOPHIA: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
MD Murtagh

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A metaphysical strand of C. S. Peirce’s American pragmatism resonates deeply in potential alliance with “incorporeal feminism”: a transcontinental philosophy with origins in Luce Irigaray’s ethics of sexual difference. A psychoanalyst trained by Lacan himself, Irigaray analyzes the unconscious of various philosophical systems, revealing dualism as an underlying phallic structure. In the dualism between idealism and materialism, she explains, the terms become sexually coded: idealism, paternal-masculine; materialism, maternal-feminine. Incorporeal feminism does not merely invert the roles, but radically reimagines the relation between them, postulating the ideal as a maternal condition of possibility for birthing the material into existence; not separate substances but the inseparable activity of materiality making itself. For Peirce, ideas act; and though he was by no means a feminist, his metaphysics lend at least three insights to incorporeal feminism: (1) an alternative to dualism in the trichotomic categories “firstness, secondness, and thirdness”; (2) an evolutionary cosmology where the material universe is a gestating embryo within a womb; and (3) an objective idealism: a model for addressing the dilemma of when sexual difference begins. Within “firstness,” sexual difference is ideal; an incorporeal activity pre-existing and latently imbuing materiality to varying degrees, ultimately expressing itself in certain life-forms as bodily differences.
3. philoSOPHIA: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Jana McAuliffe

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This paper engages television comedy to critique the ethical values that are amenable to neoliberal capitalism. First, I explore the co-optation and containment of feminism as a collective social change movement by postfeminist and neoliberal cultures. I show how self-reliance and resilience become legible as classed, raced, and gendered values packaged for feminine, neoliberal women. Next, I address the specific challenges that neoliberal biopower poses for ethical values as they have been traditionally understood. I then argue that comedy is a particularly effective medium through which to consider the generation of resistant values that can support feminist collectivity. I develop a provisional protocol for engaging ambivalent media and read two scenes from TV comedies focused on the femininity of class-aspiring or class-privileged women. This critically exposes what kinds of values might counter the co-optation of self-reliance and resilience. I conclude that cultural performances of femininity not only codify neoliberal values, they also are a resource for generating resistant feminist values inasmuch as they present intentionally frivolous modes of living. Within such a culture frivolousness becomes viable as a mode of everyday ethical commitment that can disrupt the negative impact of neoliberal biopower.
4. philoSOPHIA: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
James Sares

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Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalytic project has been understood to be antithetical, or at best indifferent, to any project of sexual ontology. Against these dominant views, I argue for an interpretation of the schizoanalytic project that does justice to the differentiation of beings—particularly the human being—according to distinct forms of sexuate morphology. I claim that, although it is largely absent in Deleuze and Guattari’s writings, we can read this kind of determinate sexual difference into their project at both the organic stratum of the organism and the alloplastic stratum of human signification and meaning. Given its importance in structuring bodies and organizing generational reproduction, I consider how sexual difference is the historical condition of possibility for alloplastic subjectivity. Nevertheless, I argue that the innovative features of Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalytic project emerge from their recognition that neither the organismic structure of sexual difference nor its social and personal representation is static. As such, reading sexual difference into the schizoanalytic project not only supplements Deleuze and Guattari’s work but also opens possibilities for developing a sexual ontology that recognizes the dynamic embodiment of individuals without denying the structural reality of sexual difference (particularly, for the human being, as male/female).
5. philoSOPHIA: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Ann J. Cahill

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Feminist theory has produced a robust literature on embodiment that explores phenomena such as maternity, mobility, ability, and aging. However, the field has produced surprisingly few analyses of the bodily phenomenon of voice; references to voice in the context of critical theory are almost entirely metaphorical in nature, a relegation that obscures the philosophical relevance of voice as embodied phenomenon. Using insights garnered from the fields of sound studies and musicology, I argue that contemporary feminist theory should address the social, political, and ethical meanings of the bodily, material phenomenon of vocality. Specifically, I argue that vocality is better understood as intervocality, that it is an existentially significant aspect of identity, and that it is implicated in systematic inequality and social relations (both individual and structural) in meaningful ways. I critique Adriana Cavarero’s approach to vocal justice, demonstrating that it does not sufficiently take up the challenges of intervocality. The article concludes with some preliminary remarks regarding a conceptualization of vocal justice.

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6. philoSOPHIA: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Edith Jeřábková, Francis McKee

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7. philoSOPHIA: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Sarah Keller

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8. philoSOPHIA: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
E. Tracy Grinnell

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book reviews

9. philoSOPHIA: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Rebecca Hill

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10. philoSOPHIA: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Rose Trappes

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11. philoSOPHIA: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Morgan Jean Jennings

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