Environmental Ethics

In an era in which a conflicting relationship exists between humans and nature, ways of solv­ing environmental problems need to be introduced into people’s thinking about what to do, what lifestyle we should accept, and what kind of people we should become to support our environmental protection work using better justifications. Traditional Chinese Confucianism and Taoism can exert a profound ideological, philosophical, and spiritual influence on how people judge the meaning and value of their lives. Regarding how humans face the natural environment and how they perceive the meaning and value of human lives, Chinese Con­fucianists and Taoists who possess profound wisdom and great benevolence have provided unique philosophical views. The philosophical views and thinking of Chinese Confucianism and Taoism provide links to the environmental crises that humans encounter today.

There has been relatively little debate about Nietzsche’s place in environmental ethics, but the lines of the debate are well marked. He has been viewed as an anthropocentrist by Michael E. Zimmerman, a humanist by Ralph Acampora, a biocentrist and deep ecolo­gist by Max Hallman, a constructivist by Martin Drenthen, and an ecocentrist by Graham Parkes. Nietzsche does provide a theory of intrinsic value and his philosophy of nature is germane to an environmerntal ethic. His philosophical biology grounds his value theory. The secondary literature contains three main claims plaguing the debate about his views. First, commentators tend to ignore or downplay Nietzsche’s biology. Second, his value theory is not adequatey addressed. Third, does Nietzsche’s emphasis on hierarchy enable him to maintain that human life is more valuable than that of other life forms, but that the lower life forms have a different kind of value insofar as they enable and support higher life forms? This view is roughly parallel in many respects to the views of Paul Taylor, David Ray Griffin, and Michael E. Zimmerman.

Soundscapes are comprised of biological sounds (biophony), non-biological sounds (geophony), and sounds introduced through human activity (anthrophony). These sounds provide us with the opportunity to both better understand and enjoy the natural world. Di­verse soundscapes across the globe are being degraded and disappearing altogether in the face of global climate change and habitat alteration. Humility and quietude are required as a means to confront the devastating loss of soundscapes. Stoicism offers fruitful accounts of these virtues that can be useful to us in our modern lives as we attempt to appreciate and protect natural soundscapes.

It is common to hear that deep ecology “has reached its logical conclusion and exhausted itself” in a vacuous anthropomorphism and absurd nonanthropocentrism. These conclusions should be rejected. Properly understood, neither objection poses a serious problem for deep ecology so much as for the ethic of “ecological holism” which some philosophers—wrongly—have taken to arise from deep ecology. Deep ecology is not such an ethic, but is best understood as an aesthetically articulated conception of what, following Robinson Jeffers, may be called “Wild Mind,” and such a Wild Mind is characterized—not criticized and condemned—by just that anthropomorphism and nonanthropocentrism critics focus on when they attack the ethic of ecological holism.

Ethicists regularly turn to virtue in order to negotiate features of climate change that seem to overwhelm moral agency. Appeals to virtue in climate ethics differ by how they connect individual flourishing with collective responsibilities and by how they interpret Anthropocene relations. Differences between accounts of climate virtue help critique proposals to reframe global ecological problems in terms of resilience and planetary stewardship, the intelligibility of which depends on connecting what would be good for the species with what would be good for an individual life. A pragmatic way of establishing that connection may need a strong role for respect of nature.

What might a modern environmental or technological virtue or vice look like? That is, what virtues or vices might relate to our environmental place in the world, rather than our social place in the world? This question is particularly pressing in light of the unique chal­lenges presented by the current environmental and technological milieu. A recurring theme that arises in response to advances in certain technologies, particularly technologies that are seen in some way as “interfering in nature,” is that humans are indulging in the vice of hubris, often referred to by the phrase “playing God.” Taking the notion of hubris as a starting point, the notion of “living in place” can be developed as a primary environmental and technological virtue, with reference to Heidegger’s analysis of the role of technology in human life. A pre-eminent environmental and technological virtue—living in place—can be understood in the light of Heidegger’s notion of “poetic dwelling,” where the role of human art and technology, rather than being primarily to dominate or manipulate nature, is to bring the natural world “into being.”