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Essays in Philosophy:
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Karim Dharamsi
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Carlos Leone
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This paper makes the case for the relevance of C. G. Hempel’s 1942 proposal of the usage of «covering laws» in History. To do so, it argues that such a proposal reflects how 18 and 19th centuries «philosophy of History» became methods or epistemology of History. This carried a change in meaning of «History»: no longer a succession of past events but the study of documented human action (including of scientific kind in general), its distinction vis-à-vis philosophy, sociology etc., becomes a minor matter as far as logic of research is concerned. Also present in this paper is the conception of theory as a conceptual mode of narrative, and the defense of a development of theories alongside their practice, not apart from them. Authors considered besides Hempel range from Max Weber to Sigmund Freud, from Arthur C. Danto to Albert O. Hirschmann.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Nikolay Milkov
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The following paper advances a new argument for the thesis that scientific and historical knowledge are not different in type. This argument makes use of a formal ontology of history which dispenses with generality, laws and causality. It views the past social world as composed of Wittgenstein’s Tractarian objects: of events, ordered in ontological dependencies. Theories in history advance models of past reality which connect—in experiment—faces of past events in complexes. The events themselves are multi-grained so that we can connect together different faces of theirs without counterfeiting history. This means that, on the basis of the same set of facts, historians can produce different models of past events, in which different dependences are brought forth. A conception of this kind substantiates an objectivist account of the recurrent falsifications of the theories in history.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Nick Redfern
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As a technology and an art form perceived to be capable of reproducing the world, it has long been thought that the cinema has a natural affinity with reality. In this essay I consider the Realist theory of film history out forward by Robert C. Allen and Douglas Gomery from the perspective of Radical Constructivism. I argue that such a Realist theory cannot provide us with a viable approach to film history as it presents a flawed description of the historian’s relationship to the past. Radical Constructivism offers an alternative model, which requires historians to rethink the nature of facts, the processes involved in constructing historical knowledge, and its relation to the past. Historical poetics, in the light of Radical Constructivism, is a basic model of research into cinema that uses concepts to construct theoretical statements in order to explain the nature, development, and effects of cinematic phenomena.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Constantine Sandis
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Anders Schinkel
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The phrase ‘the object of history’ may mean all sorts of things. In this article, a distinction is made between object1, the object of study for historians, and object2, the goal or purpose of the study of history. Within object2, a distinction is made between a goal intrinsic to the study of history (object2in) and an extrinsic goal (object2ex), the latter being what the study of history should contribute to society (or anything else outside itself). The main point of the article, which is illustrated by a discussion of the work of R. G. Collingwood, E. H. Carr, and G. R. Elton, is that in the work of historians and philosophers of history, these kinds of ‘object of history’ are usually (closely) connected. If they are not, something is wrong. That does not mean, however, that historians or even philosophers of history are always aware of these connections. For that reason, the distinctions made in this article provide a useful analytical tool for historians and theorists of history alike.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Charles E. M. Dunlop
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Benjamin A. Gorman
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Thomas Keith
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Aaron Ogletree
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Aaron Ogletree
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Eric M. Rovie
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Essays in Philosophy:
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H. Benjamin Shaeffer
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Brian Gregor
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