Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 1-15 of 15 documents


articles

1. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 82 > Issue: 2
Alain de Libera

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article offers a tentative deconstruction of Heidegger’s account of the “modern,” that is, the “Cartesian,” “subject.” It argues that subjectivity, understood as the idea of some “thing” that is both the owner of certain mental states and the agent of certain activities, is a medieval theological construct, based on two conflicting models of the mind (nous, mens) inherited from ancient philosophy and theology: the Aristotelian and the Augustinian (or perichoretic) one, developed in connection with such problems as that of the two wills in the incarnate Christ. Starting with Nietzsche’s criticism of the “superstition of logicians” (the belief that“the subject I is the condition of the predicate think”) and Peter Strawson’s question in Individuals (“Why are one’s states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all?”), the article discusses Peter Olivi’s and Thomas Aquinas’s treatments of the problem, as well as the principle invoked to resolve it: actiones sunt suppositorum, “actions belong to subjects.” Against this background, the discussion refers to Heidegger’s notion of “subjecticity” and Armstrong’s “attribute-theory” in order to reappraise the Hobbesian and Leibnizian contributions to the history of the Self.
2. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 82 > Issue: 2
Yul Kim

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In the present article I wish to discuss the positive aspect of Nietzsche’s thought. This includes the attempt to avoid the nihilism of a simple inversion of Platonism and the fact that for Nietzsche, critical/genealogical philosophy is always subordinate to the will to affirm existence “as it is.” In this regard, I will be drawing especially on the work of Gilles Deleuze, whose Nietzsche and Philosophy remains the canonical defense of the positive in Nietzsche’s thought. In the secondpart of the paper, however, I will argue that the “higher morality” generated by this position is essentially “otherless.” While this critique is not in itself devastating,I will go on to argue that this ethic ultimately generates a paradox in Nietzsche’s thought against which the will to affirmation is finally destroyed.
3. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 82 > Issue: 2
James McGuirk

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In the present article I wish to discuss the positive aspect of Nietzsche’s thought. This includes the attempt to avoid the nihilism of a simple inversion of Platonism and the fact that for Nietzsche, critical/genealogical philosophy is always subordinate to the will to affirm existence “as it is.” In this regard, I will be drawing especially on the work of Gilles Deleuze, whose Nietzsche and Philosophy remains the canonical defense of the positive in Nietzsche’s thought. In the secondpart of the paper, however, I will argue that the “higher morality” generated by this position is essentially “otherless.” While this critique is not in itself devastating,I will go on to argue that this ethic ultimately generates a paradox in Nietzsche’s thought against which the will to affirmation is finally destroyed.
4. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 82 > Issue: 2
Dermot Moran

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Phenomenology, understood as a philosophy of immanence, has had an ambiguous, uneasy relationship with transcendence, with the wholly other, with the numinous. If phenomenology restricts its evidence to givenness and to what has phenomenality, what becomes of that which is withheld or cannot in principle come to givenness? In this paper I examine attempts to acknowledge the transcendent in the writings of two phenomenologists, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein (who attempted to fuse phenomenology with Neo-Thomism), and also consider the influence of the existentialist Karl Jaspers, who made transcendence an explicit theme of his writing. I argue that Husserl does recognize the essential experience of transcendence within immanence; even the idea of a physical thinghas “dimensions of infinity” included within it. Similarly, he asserts profoundly that every “outside” is what it is only as understood from the inside. Jaspers toomakes the experience of transcendence central to human existence; it is the very measure of my own depth. For Edith Stein, everything temporal points towardthe timeless structural ground which makes it what it is. Transcendence is an intrinsic part of being itself. Furthermore, the very lack of self-sufficiency of my own self shows that the self requires a ground outside itself, in the transcendent. There is strong convergence between the three thinkers studied on the concept of transcendence, which is indeed a central, if largely unacknowledged, concept in phenomenology both in Husserl and his followers (Stein), but also, throughJaspers, in Heidegger.

discussion

5. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 82 > Issue: 2
Roger Wasserman

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Although Michael Kelly, in his article, “On the Mind’s Pronouncement of Time” (Proceedings of the ACPA 78 [2005]: 247–62), is correct to maintain that Augustine and Husserl share a common conception of time-consciousness, I argue that the similarity does not lie where he thinks nor is it restricted to Husserl’s early period. Instead I locate the source of this commonality in a shared response to a particular Platonic problematic, which I find expressed at Parmenides 151e–152e. This essay shows how the Neoplatonic conception of time, which I claim inspired Augustine, emerged from that problematic and how Husserl, in a thought experimentfrom 1901, wrestles with a similar problematic before adopting a model of time-consciousness roughly analogous to that of Augustine. It is suggested that Kelly is misled by his Aristotelian approach, which causes him to regard the Augustinian and Husserlian models of memory as “trapped” in the present. The point is a significant one if, as I conclude, there is no escaping the conception of time as absolute flow, once we abandon the Platonic view of time as a completedsuccession of nows, eternally fixed.

review articles

6. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 82 > Issue: 2
Sean J. McGrath

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The extent of the influence of Augustine on Heidegger, long only indicated in a few notes in Being and Time, has come into focus with the publicationof Heidegger’s earliest lectures. Far from one among many sources upon which Heidegger draws, we now know that Augustine’s Confessions is a central source of concepts for the early Heidegger. While this is further evidence of the ongoing relevance of Augustine to contemporary philosophy, it does not necessarily makeHeidegger an Augustinian thinker. The question of the degree to which Heidegger’s philosophy is compatible with Augustine’s theology is the subject of a recentlypublished volume of papers, The Influence of Augustine on Heidegger. While the editor, Craig de Paulo, proclaims the advent of an “Augustinian phenomenology”founded upon Heidegger, several contributors exhibit more caution, pointing out important divergences between Heidegger—whom no one would call a Christian—and Augustine. The author sides with the skeptics, reading Heidegger as in fact a subversion of Augustine. Heidegger reverses Augustine’s central insight, that the restless heart is intentionally structured, directed toward union with God. Heidegger’s anxiety in the face of death has no intentional term; it is self-reflective,Augustinian agitation without that which agitates it.
7. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 82 > Issue: 2
John Deely

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Jacques Maritain tells us that, apart from St. Thomas himself, his “principal teacher” in Thomism was John Poinsot. Poinsot, like Maritain and Thomas, expressly teaches that the basis of “Thomist realism” lies in the distinction between sentire, which makes no use of concepts, and phantasiari and intelligere, which together depend essentially on concepts. O’Callaghan makes no discussion of this point, resting his notion of realism rather on the widespread quo/quod fallacy, that is, the misinterpretation of concepts as the id quo of knowing. Poinsot demonstrates that this view conflates the distinct notions of species expressae and species impressae, demonstrating further that concepts as such cannot provide the cognitive basis of realism. O’Callaghan in effect suppresses the distinction betweenobjects and things in his effort to achieve the impossible. In this review, I show that it is a question of semantics vs. semiotics over which O’Callaghan stumblesin misrepresenting “Thomist realism.”

book reviews

8. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 82 > Issue: 2
Timothy A. Mahoney

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
9. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 82 > Issue: 2
Mary Beth Ingham, C.S.J.

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
10. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 82 > Issue: 2
William Junker

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
11. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 82 > Issue: 2
Cynthia R. Nielsen

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
12. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 82 > Issue: 2
L. Michael Harrington

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
13. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 82 > Issue: 2
Glenn Chicoine

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
14. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 82 > Issue: 2
Donovan Anderson

view |  rights & permissions | cited by

books received

15. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 82 > Issue: 2

view |  rights & permissions | cited by