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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 1

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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 1
Dimitrios Dentsoras

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This essay examines the early Stoic debates concerning the number of virtues and the differentiation among them. It begins with the defense of virtue’s unity offered by the heterodox Stoic Aristo of Chios and with a comparison between the definitions that Aristo and Zeno offered for the four primary virtues. Aristo maintained that virtue consists exclusively in the knowledge of good and bad. Zeno and his successors presented the virtues as epistemic dispositions whose scopes differ. I conclude that by adding the knowledge of indifferents to the definition of virtue, Zeno and his successors were able to avoid the circularity to which Aristo’s definition of virtue fell victim while providing a way to differentiate among the virtues.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 1
Hao Liu

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This paper will investigate the roots of intentionality in Aristotle’s theory of perception and assess the accuracy of Brentano’s proposed location of intentionality in Aristotle. When introducing intentionality into contemporary philosophy, Brentano attributed it to Aristotle, whose theory of psychology he believed to reveal the characteristics of intentional inexistence. After setting up a working definition of intentionality that stresses such features as immanent content and intentional directedness, I will then clarify Aristotle’s theory of perception with regard to these two characteristics. I draw the conclusion that we can only find the roots of immanent content in Aristotle’s perceptual theory. For him, directedness moves from the sensible object to the sensitive soul, and thus it does not correspond to what contemporary philosophers define as intentional directedness.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 1
Alexander Earl

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Current trends in scholarship—epitomized in the works of, inter alia, Lewis Ayres, Adrian Pabst, and Rowan Williams—argue for a metaphysics of relationality at the heart of Christian thought that is at its root Platonic. This metaphysic is in turn typified by its commitment to divine simplicity and its corresponding apophatic grammar, which serve as useful points of contact with Plotinus’s own thought. Examination of key texts in Plotinus’s Enneads demonstrates a shared trinitarian grammar when speaking about the first principle. These connections prompt a need to articulate trinitarian dogma as an important step in the history of philosophy, and not just theology, especially for resolving the perennial problem of the one and the many. This “Christian Platonism” has been in a necessary process of recovery and re-articulation, of which the above is put forward as a contribution.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 1
Steven Haug

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Three artworks are discussed in detail by Heidegger in his lecture “Origin of the Work of Art.” Prioritizing one work above the others affects what is understood to be the overall project of the lecture. Because of this, we need to attend closely to the debate in the literature about the most important work of art in Heidegger’s “Origin of the Work of Art.” This article explores the debate by looking at three positions. I examine each of these positions independently. In the final section I side with those scholars who take the ancient Greek temple to be the most important work in Heidegger’s lecture. I argue that the reason why the temple is the most important is its ability to disclose community.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 1
Patrick H. Byrne

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In his most recent book Alasdair MacIntyre criticizes the dominant moral system of advanced societies, which “presents itself as morality as such.” Yet, he argues, its primary function is to channel human desires into patterns that will minimize conflict amid distinctively modern economic and political arrangements. Although he appreciates how what he calls “expressionism” has unmasked this ideological function of modern morality, he points out that expressionism is also impotent to provide adequate moral guidance amidst the “conflicts of modernity.” He proposes that Neo-Aristotelianism’s account of reasoning and desire has the ability to overcome the moral failings of these modern modes of thought. Yet he relies on an excessively deductive version of reason and overlooks Aristotle’s fuller account of desire. The article shows how Bernard Lonergan’s account of both provides a superior account of both Aristotle’s own writings and the actual human phenomena of reasoning and desire.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 1
Eric LaRock, Jeffrey Schwartz, Iliyan Ivanov, David Carreon

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In this paper we discuss the two-system framework, examine its strengths, point out a fundamental weakness concerning the unity of conscious experience, and then propose a new hypothesis that avoids that weakness and other related concerns. According to our strong emergence hypothesis, what emerges are not merely mental properties in specialized, distributed neural areas, but also a new, irreducibly singular entity (i.e., an emergent self) that functions in a recurrent (or top-down) manner to integrate its mental properties and to rewire its brain. We argue that the former function is suggested, in part, by the effects of anesthetics on sensory integration, and that the latter function is suggested by evidence garnered from the neuroscience of mindfulness, constraint-induced movement therapy for stroke, and neuroimaging data surrounding mental illness. We then discuss how our strong emergence hypothesis relates to the description and treatment of neuropsychiatric disorders. Finally, potential objections are addressed.

book reviews

8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 1
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.

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9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 1
Aaron Pidel, S.J.

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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 1
Victor Salas

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11. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 1
Stephen Chamberlain

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12. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 1
Francesca Ferrando

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books received

13. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 1

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